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QUALIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY II: 
A NEW INNOVATION INDEX FOR 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS & PRODUCTS 
Ron A. Bouchard† 
Abstract 
Governments around the world are increasingly engaged with 
the political mandate of innovation, which is seen as a fundamental 
gateway to national productivity and prosperity. To date, innovation 
is measured primarily using quantitative methods, particularly with 
regard to patents. However, even though these methods are widely 
considered to be problematic, a model that assesses patent value at 
numerous stages in the product lifecycle using qualitative methods 
has not yet emerged. This article describes a qualitative innovation 
index that may fill some of the gaps in patent valuation. An innovation 
index is given that provides a measure of patent quality that is 
specific to pharmaceutical patents and products. The index is based 
on regulatory preferences and evidentiary requirements for various 
types of new and follow-on drugs and yields a method that is not only 
graded incrementally but which reflects the social value of the 
products. The innovation index rewards innovation both in the new 
drug approval stream and for follow-on approvals in proportion to 
the degree of innovation evidenced by the resulting products. Given 
that policy-makers no longer need to wait for licensing, litigation, or 
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prior art citations to occur, the innovation index reported here may 
allow for regulatory decisions to be made earlier and more rapidly. 
The index is sufficiently flexible to be used at several stages of the 
product lifecycle, including during the regulatory approval stage and 
post-market surveillance stage. The index may also provide 
regulators with a mechanism to make judgments about which types of 
patents should be listed on the patent register under linkage laws in 
an objective and evidence-based manner. Finally, the attribute of 
flexibility may lend itself to customization of the index by jurisdictions 
with analogous food and drug law. Customization is not limited to 
qualification of technology in the pharmaceutical sector, but may be 
used to qualify any indicator, provided that the evidentiary 
requirements for and prioritization of the indicator within different 
classes have been stipulated by regulators. 
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I. ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ANDS  Abbreviated New Drug Submission 
ER 
FIC 
Expedited Review 
First in Class 
NAS  New Active Substance 
NCE New Chemical Entity 
NDS New Drug Submission 
NDS NAS  NDS drug containing a NAS 
NDS ER  NDS drug undergoing ER 
NDS FIC  FIC drug approved via NDS route 
NDS Me Too Me Too drug approved via NDS route 
NDS MI  Most Innovative NDS Drug 
NOC  Notice of Compliance 
NOC/c Notice of Compliance with Conditions 
PR Priority Review 
SANDS Supplemental Abbreviated New Drug Submission 
SNDS  Supplemental New Drug Submission 
SNDS ER SNDS drug undergoing ER 
SNDS FIC  FIC drug approved via SNDS route 
SNDS Me Too Me Too drug approved via SNDS route 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Governments around the world have become uniformly locked in 
to the political mandate of innovation, both in developed and 
developing nations. It is a race no one wants to lose. Yet, despite the 
non-rival nature of knowledge,
1
 it is one few will win. Innovation is 
widely accepted to be a fundamental gateway to national and global 
productivity and prosperity.
2
 Nowhere is this truer than in the fields of 
                                                                                                                            
 1. Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in 
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 197 
(2005). 
 2. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, PEOPLE AND EXCELLENCE: THE HEART 
OF SUCCESSFUL COMMERCIALIZATION 6 (2006); BRIAN GUTHRIE & TREFOR MUNN-VENN, 
LEADERS’ ROUNDTABLE ON COMMERCIALIZATION, SIX QUICK HITS FOR CANADIAN 
COMMERCIALIZATION ii, 1 (2005); see COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, INNOVATE AMERICA: 
NATIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVE SUMMIT AND REPORT 7 (2005), for an analogous discussion 
of the importance of industrial intellectual property incentives in national productivity and 
prosperity in the United States. For a review of the history of innovation systems theories and 
their basic dependence on an “economistic” worldview that emphasizes the central role of 
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science and technology, particularly in the life sciences.
3
 The 
argument in favor of patenting in the pharmaceutical industry has 
been made consistently and with vigor for over a half-century.
4
 The 
pharmaceutical industry claims that its research and development 
(R&D) activities are responsible for most new and innovative 
medicines.
5
 Indeed, a major justification for high and increasing drug 
expenditures is that such profits are necessary to underpin the 
development of new and innovative drugs.
6
 
To date, innovation is measured using primarily quantitative 
methods.
7
 Patents are usually used as the prime measure.
8
 Methods 
most often reported include counting patents, patent citations, prior 
art citations and related litigation outcomes.
9
 These measures are used 
extensively in prominent domestic, regional and global reports 
focused on productivity and prosperity.
10
 Indeed, much of what 
                                                                                                                            
businesses in translating science and technology knowledge into national prosperity and 
productivity, see Mathieu Albert & Suzanne Laberge, The Legitimation and Dissemination 
Processes of the Innovation System Approach, 32 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 221, 226 
(2007). 
 3. See, e.g., EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY 
ROAD MAP TO 2010: PREPARING THE GROUND FOR THE FUTURE (2005) (Doc. Ref: 
EMEA/H/34163/03/Final); FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY 
ON THE CRITICAL PATH TO NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS (2004); Alan Bernstein, Toward Effective 
Canadian Public-Private Partnerships in Health Research, 168 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 288 (2003); 
Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Balancing Early Market Access to New Drugs with the Need for 
Benefit/Risk Data: A Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823-24 
(2008); Elias Zerhouni, The NIH Roadmap, SCIENCE, Oct. 3, 2003, at 63, 64. 
 4. See generally PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING AMERICA’S HEALTH: THE FDA, 
BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION (1st ed. 2003); JERRY AVORN, 
POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (1st ed. 
2004); MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 241 (2008); JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT 
FAILURE (2008). 
 5. Drug Safety and Pricing Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Health, Educ., Labor and 
Pension, 106th Cong. 91 (2000) [hereinafter Holmer] (testimony of Alan F. Holmer). 
 6. See, e.g., Joseph P. Cook et al., Generic Utilization Rates, Real, Pharmaceutical 
Prices, and Research and Development Expenditures 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 15723, 2010), available at http://nber.org/papers/w15723. 
 7. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1521-22 (2001); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2005); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Using Patent Data to Assess the Value of 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 176, 177 (2009). 
 8. See BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 4; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, for review 
of many empirical studies. 
 9. See id.; see also Lemley, supra note 7; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7. 
 10. See, e.g., Outterson, supra note 1, at 196; 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, 
supra note 2, at 6; GUTHRIE & MUNN-VENN, supra note 2, at 5, 8; COUNCIL ON 
COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2, at 38. 
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governments understand about innovation is currently shaped by 
measurements of patenting activity. For example, patenting licensing, 
litigation, and prior art citation data can be useful as indicators of how 
general knowledge flows within and between different industries,
11
 
and has helped to shape priority areas for government investment,
12
 
including several sectors within the life sciences rubric.
13
 Citation 
counting has demonstrated differences between public and private 
patentees in the medical research and product development sector, 
leading some to conclude that non-profit patents, such as those to 
universities, are valuable to the ultimate commercialization of 
medicines.
14
 Others have suggested patents are a good indicator of 
employee productivity.
15
 
However, a focus on quantifying intellectual property, and 
patents in particular, relating to life sciences inventions is 
acknowledged to be problematic for an array of reasons. First, not all 
innovating firms perform R&D with the express purpose of inventing 
new and innovative technologies, and not all R&D outcomes are 
necessarily patented.
16
 Even when firms do obtain a substantial 
amount of patents, this may simply reflect the size of the firm or its 
commitment to obtaining more patents.
17
 Many firms and industry 
leaders do not consider patents an effective appropriation mechanism, 
focusing instead on secrecy, lead time, and learning curve 
advantages.
18
 In addition, patent filings are often indiscriminate with 
respect to determinations of the value or quality of a patented 
                                                                                                                            
 11. See, e.g., Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the 
Value of Innovations, 21 RAND J. ECON. 172 (1990); Rebecca Henderson et al., Universities as a 
Source Of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis of University Patenting 1965-1988, 80 
REV. ECON. STAT. 119 (1998); David C. Mowrey et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional 
Experience, Learning and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents after the Bayh-Dole 
Act, 1981-1992, 48 MGMT. SCI. 73 (2002); Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Patent 
Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring Innovation with Multiple Indicators, 114 ECON. 
J. 441 (2004). 
 12. See, e.g., Outterson, supra note 1, at 214. 
 13. See, e.g., 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2, at 6; GUTHRIE & 
MUNN-VENN, supra note 2, at 2; COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2, at 18. 
 14. See, e.g., Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 7, at 180. 
 15. See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 798 (1987). 
 16. Id. at 812-15. 
 17. See, e.g., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, R&D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 
(Zvi Griliches ed., 1984). 
 18. See, e.g., Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 3 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552; Levin et al., supra note 15, at 793. 
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invention,
19
 although there is some evidence that patents cited as prior 
art in later patent applications should be accorded more value than 
merely counting once.
20
 Even so, utilization statistics indicate that a 
very low percentage of granted patents actually have value. One 
widely quoted study showed that only 5% of patents are actually 
implemented in the market through licensing or via litigation.
21
 This 
is not surprising, since the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
apparently approves most of the applications it processes,
22
 leading 
some to claim that patents are an “unwieldy measure of 
productivity.”23 
Other studies have demonstrated that the substantial majority of 
granted patents create little or no revenues for patentees,
24
 and that 
close to 50% of granted patents are abandoned by patentees rather 
than paying renewal fees.
25
 There is also evidence suggesting that 
citation counts do not account for a firm’s R&D priorities or 
productivity in the pharmaceutical sector.
26
 Finally, even when 
patents can be shown to have financial value, the numbers cited are 
much lower than might be expected. For example, the mean patent 
value in the US market was approximately $20,000, $15,000, $5,000, 
and $4,000 for electronic, mechanical, chemical, and pharmaceutical 
patents, respectively.
27
 Similar results have been demonstrated in the 
European Union.
28
 Given the link between patenting incentives, 
                                                                                                                            
 19. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 363 (2001); Lemley, supra note 7, at 1506. 
 20. See, e.g., Trajtenberg, supra note 11; Henderson et al., supra note 11; Mowrey et al., 
supra note 11, at 74-75; Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 443. 
 21. See, e.g., Mark Schankerman, How Valuable Is Patent Protection? Estimates by 
Technology Field, 29 RAND J. ECON. 77 (1998); Lemley, supra note 7, at 1507; see also 
Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 14; The Valuation of Patents: A Review of 
Patent Valuation Methods with Consideration of Option Based Methods and the Potential for 
Further Research, 3, Econ. Comm’n for Europe, U.N. Doc. OPA/CONF.1/2002/6 (Aug. 21, 
2002) (by Robert Pitkethly); Meir Perez Pugatch, What is the Value of Your Patent? Theory, 
Myth and Reality, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FRONTIERS: EXPANDING THE BORDERS OF 
DISCUSSION 14-15 (Anne K. Jensen & Meir Perez Pugatch eds., 2005). 
 22. Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and 
Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 3 (2001). 
 23. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 24. 
 24. Richard J. Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence, in STRATEGY, 
PREDATION, AND ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 205 (Steven C. Salop ed., 1981). 
 25. Francesca Cornelli & Mark A. Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 
30 RAND J. ECON. 197, 197 (1999). 
 26. See, e.g., Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 11, at 444. 
 27. See, e.g., Schankerman, supra note 21, at 94. 
 28. See, e.g., Ariel Pakes, Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding 
European Patent Stocks, 54 ECONOMETRICA 755, 777 (1986). 
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profits obtained by patent monopolies, and the use of some of these 
profits for R&D into new and innovative drugs,
29
 the low value of 
pharmaceutical patents is somewhat surprising. This issue will be 
dealt with in greater detail below with regard to the rising prominence 
of product cluster models of drug development. 
When quantitative measurements of patent value are described, 
they often provide less meaningful data than one might hope. This is 
because one must often wait post hoc until licensing, prior art citation 
and litigation events occur, when the public incurs a significant 
fraction of related spillover costs. Even so, it is not necessary for 
licensing or litigation events to occur for patents to be valuable in a 
defensive context.
30
 This observation is strengthened in legal forums 
that have brought in some form of pharmaceutical linkage,
31
 where 
highly selective listing of patents on a patent register can yield an 
effective two-fold increase in the term of cumulative patent 
protection.
32
 The costs to the public resulting from the absence of 
qualitative patent value are potentially enormous. They are at least 
proportional to the degree of litigation on contested patents in 
general,
33
 the degree of litigation relating to patents eventually found 
to be invalid or not infringed when assessed on the merits in 
particular,
34
 and the delay between the original patent’s termination 
date and the termination date of the latest listed patent. 
Finally, it remains difficult to determine the degree to which an 
individual patent represents a socially beneficial innovation in so far 
as it is embodied in a product, service, or process. The question of 
whether a new innovation represents a substantial source of new 
                                                                                                                            
 29. See, e.g., Holmer, supra note 5; see generally Cook et al., supra note 6, at 2. 
 30. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 26-27. 
 31.  Ron A. Bouchard et al., The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and 
Innovation: Who’s Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1463 n.2 (2009) 
[hereinafter Bouchard 2009]. 
 32. See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard et al., Structure-Function Analysis of Global 
Pharmaceutical Linkage Regulations, 12 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 391 (2011) [hereinafter 
Bouchard 2011]. 
 33. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 2; C. Scott Hemphill & 
Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 
ANTITRUST L. J. 947, 948 (2011). 
 34. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY 20 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf 
[hereinafter FTC 2002]. See also EDWARD HORE, PATENTLY ABSURD: EVERGREENING OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE OF 
COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS OF CANADA’S PATENT ACT 20 (2004), available at 
http://www.canadiangenerics.ca/en/news/docs/patently_absurd_04.pdf; Lemley, supra note 7. 
But see Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 41. 
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value, significant change in practice, or is incremental in nature 
always arises in this instance. The problem of incremental innovations 
assumes critical importance in the pharmaceutical industry.
35
 This is 
because many (though not all) follow-on innovations can have little 
clinical benefit compared to existing therapies.
36
 A regulatory 
preference for incremental innovation may present a particularly 
intractable problem in sectors that privilege the cluster-based, or 
portfolio-based, strategies for innovation.
37
 The same conclusion 
applies under circumstances where patents of unknown value are 
aggressively employed as a legal tool to game the system.
38
 
                                                                                                                            
 35. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-on Drug 
Research and Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development, 22 (Supp. 2) 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1 (2004); Joseph A. DiMasi & Laura B. Faden, Competitiveness in 
Follow-on Drug R&D: A Race or Imitation?, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 23 (2011). 
But see Aidan Hollis, Commentary, Comment on “The Economics of Follow-On Drug Research 
and Development: Trends in Entry Rates and the Timing of Development”, 23 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 1187 (2005). 
 36. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH AND EDUC. FOUND., 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION 7 (2002); John Abraham & Courtney 
Davis, A Comparative Analysis of Drug Safety Withdrawals in the UK and the US (1971-1992): 
Implications for Current Regulatory Thinking and Policy, 61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 881 (2005); 
Drugs in 2001: A Number of Ruses Unveiled, 11 PRESCRIRE INT’L 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter 
Drugs in 2001]; La Revue Prescrire, Editorial, European and French Pharmaceutical Market 
Assessed by Prescrire in 2005: Mainly Bogus Innovation, 30 FARMACIA HOSPITALARIA 68 
(2006); Kenneth I. Kaitin et al., Therapeutic Ratings and End-of-Phase II Conferences: 
Initiatives to Accelerate the Availability of Important New Drugs, 31 J. CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY 17 (1991); Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights and the Canadian 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Where Do We Go From Here?, 35 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 237, 
243 (2005); Donald W. Light, Bearing the Risks of Prescription Drugs, in THE RISKS OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 1 (Donald W. Light ed., 2010); Domenico Motola et al., An Update on 
the First Decade of the European Centralized Procedure: How Many Innovative Drugs?, 62 
BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 610, 614 (2006); New Medicines in 2007: Regulatory 
Agencies and Policy Makers Leave Public Health in the Hands of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
17 PRESCRIRE INT’L 78 (2008). 
 37. RON A. BOUCHARD, PATENTLY INNOVATIVE: HOW PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS USE 
EMERGING PATENT LAW TO EXTEND MONOPOLIES ON BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS 187 (2011) 
[hereinafter PATENTLY INNOVATIVE]; Ron A. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s 
Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regulations for Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 71, 130 (2011) [hereinafter Bouchard, MARQUETTE]. 
 38. Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical 
Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 172 (2008–
2009); Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents, 4 INNOVATION POL’Y ECON. 
145, 147 (2004); Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents 
and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 
VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2004). See Edward Hore, A Comparison of United States and Canadian 
Laws as They Affect Generic Pharmaceutical Market Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (2000). 
But see Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for 
Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 14 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 209, 2004). 
15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:41 AM 
296 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
The need for a rational and evidence-based mechanism to value, 
or qualify, intellectual property is clear from the above discussion. 
This is true not only in the debate between patent scholars and law 
makers; an evidence-based mechanism that values patents at various 
points in their product lifecycle would have critical importance for 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs who wish to commercialize new 
products at varying points in the product and regulatory lifecycles. 
The need for a lifecycle-based qualitative assessment of intellectual 
property associated with pharmaceutical products assumes greater 
importance as the number of patents per product increase, the number 
of legislative and regulatory vehicles providing intellectual property 
protection on pharmaceuticals expands over time, as the emphasis on 
incremental innovation assumes more importance than breakthrough 
innovations; and to the extent that lowered standards for drug 
approval, patenting, and latent listing result in an increased capacity 
to restrain competition between pharmaceutical firms and prolong 
patent monopolies for older products that would otherwise come off 
patent protection. 
III. WHY QUALIFY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 
A. Pancakes and Global Intellectual Property Waves 
It is one thing to acknowledge that there is a patent bargain and 
that leading appellate courts require reasonably proportional 
balancing of public and private interests under the quid pro quo of 
this bargain, but what do you do when there are two groups at the 
table and one side has 30 pancakes on its plate and the other has 300? 
Such is the state of affairs that developed, and increasingly 
developing, nations face with regard to the public and private interests 
in the nexus between food and drug law and intellectual property law. 
This Section briefly reviews how and why the ratio of 300 to 30 has 
occurred and why there are more pancakes on the pharmaceutical 
plate than on most other plates at the table. 
The debate over the social value of pharmaceuticals in developed 
nations is usually framed in one of two contexts. The first is in 
relation to the social value of patented medicines that are “new” drug 
products versus products variously referred to by the courts, the 
intellectual property bar and legal commentators as “follow-on,” 
“incremental,” “line extension,” “me too,” or “supplemental.” A 
number of critics have derided the social value of follow-on 
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innovations,
39
 while others assert follow-on drugs to be a critical 
component of pharmaceutical innovation.
40
 Indeed, the issue 
consumes significant resources of drug regulators, who are tasked 
with determining the mechanisms and priorities of evidentiary 
standards for various types of new and follow-on drugs. The second 
component of the debate over the social value of pharmaceuticals is in 
regards to the ability of brand-name drug companies to forestall 
generic entry on older blockbuster drugs under pharmaceutical 
linkage laws using so-called weak or defensive patenting strategies 
and practices. While it is now understood that both brand and generic 
firms play the system for their own ends,
41
 support of generic firms 
has taken on a life of its own due to the presumed cost savings aspect 
of generic substitutes.
42
 
While there has been widespread criticism of the ability of the 
patent system to encourage innovation,
43
 the pharmaceutical industry 
in particular has been singled out as a successful example of the need 
for strong intellectual property protection.
44
 Indeed, over the last 25 
years the global public has witnessed a veritable landslide of patent 
and related regulatory protection mechanisms. This has occurred via 
alterations in the standards of patentable subject matter, obviousness, 
novelty, prolongation of the terms of single patents and cumulative 
patent portfolios, and prolongation in the terms of data exclusivity 
protection for clinical trial data required for regulatory approval. Most 
recently, we have seen new forms of legal protection for drugs at the 
                                                                                                                            
 39. See, e.g., James Love, Evidence Regarding Research and Development Investments in 
Innovative and Non-Innovative Medicines, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, 20 (Sept. 22, 
2003), http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/evidenceregardingrnd.pdf; Drugs in 2001, supra 
note 36, at 58; Lexchin, supra note 36, at 243. 
 40. See, e.g., Ernst R. Berndt et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in 
Biopharmaceuticals: Drug Utilisation in Original and Supplemental Indications, 24 (Supp. 2) 
PHARMACOECONOMICS 69, 69 (2006); Joshua Cohen & Kenneth Kaitin, Follow-On Drugs and 
Indications: The Importance of Incremental Innovation to Medical Practice, 15 AM. J. 
THERAPEUTICS 89, 91 (2008); DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35; DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 
35. 
 41. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 38, at 172; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 398-99; 
Bulow, supra note 38, at 163-73; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 38, at 1; HORE, supra note 34, at 
3. 
 42. See, e.g., Hollis, supra note 35, 1189-90; Paul Grootendorst et al., Canada’s 
Pharmaceutical Intellectual Property Laws: The Case for Fundamental Reform, CANADIAN 
MED. ASS’N. J. (forthcoming 2012). 
 43. See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4; BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 4.  
 44. See generally ANGELL, supra note 4; AVORN, supra note 4. See also Stuart 
Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on 
Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 135, 135-36 (2004), available at 
http://www.stuartmacdonald.org.uk/pdfs/Macdonald.pdf. 
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end of their patent life in the form of so-called “linkage regulations,” 
which tie generic entry to all patents deemed relevant to the marketed 
reference product.
45
 In this manner patent law has become 
fundamentally linked to food and drug law through the specific legal 
nexus of linkage regulations. 
These means of protecting life sciences inventions have come 
into being as a result of purposeful, and largely targeted, intellectual 
property-based policies in the United States. The basket of policy and 
legal vehicles to achieve this end are widely accepted to include the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the 
Bayh-Dole Act, the Hatch-Waxman Act, the consolidation of 
intellectual property appellate courts into the Federal Circuit, and the 
institution of fee-for-service provisions in the grant of both drug 
approvals and drug patents.
46
 
Based on a review of applicable literature, it appears there have 
been at least three distinct waves of intellectual property reform 
largely centered in the United States that have swept the globe over 
the last half century. The first of these came about as a result of major 
reforms to the U.S. Patent Act
47
 in 1952.
48
 One of the most significant 
amendments removed the “flash of genius” requirement for invention 
and replaced it with the skill level appropriate to a “person having 
ordinary skill in the art,” otherwise known as the PHOSITA.49 This 
rendered what was once considered to be “mere workshop” 
improvements patentable.
50
 This had two long-ranging effects on 
pharmaceutical law and practice. First, it gave rise to an increase in 
                                                                                                                            
 45. See, e.g., SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF 
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research 
and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored 
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1633, 1710-12 (1996); Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US 
Academic Research in the 20th Century: The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 
772, 780-81 (2006). 
 46. See, e.g., KRIMSKY, supra note 45; Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 1670-71; Sampat, 
supra note 45, at 773. 
 47. Patents, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006). 
 48. William Kingston, Intellectual Property’s Problems: How Far Is the U.S. 
Constitution to Blame?, 4 INTELL. PROP. Q. 315, 332-35 (2002). 
 49. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions From the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 885, 885-88 (2004); Ron A. Bouchard, 
Living Separate and Apart Is Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as the Tie that 
Binds Obviousness and Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 4 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 
17 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard, PHOSITA]. 
 50. See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard, Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention 
Vitiate Obviousness Under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations: To Test 
or Not to Test?, 6 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 1, 1–27 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard, Obvious]; 
Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 49, at 9-10. 
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the perceived value of incremental innovation, which paved the way 
legally for the accumulation of such inventions into clusters of patents 
and related products.
51
 It is these clusters to which linkage laws would 
later add the new tool of patent listing. Secondly, and consistent with 
the lowering and broadening of the standard of invention, the 1952 
amendments also rendered the PHOSITA capable of being 
represented by entire teams of skilled technicians, as is abundantly 
clear in the case law pertaining to pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology.
52
 Similar changes were made to patent legislation in 
Japan, Sweden, France, Germany and Britain between 1959 and 
1977.
53
 
The second wave of global legal reform relating to patenting in 
the life sciences sector came in the 1980s. The 1980 decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty began the process,
54
 under which 
“everything under the sun” became patentable, including for the first 
time, living matter.
55
 The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allowed university 
inventors to patent their inventions,
56
 launching an intense pursuit by 
domestic universities of licensing and other technology transfer 
revenues.
57
 In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act yielded patent term 
restoration at the front end of the product lifecycle for inventors 
whose products were held up in regulatory review for a significant 
portion of patent term.
58
 Hatch-Waxman also gave generic firms 
significant patent rights, in particular, an exception to patent 
infringement narrowly construed to mean the ability to “work up” 
generic versions of products that were still under patent protection.
59
 
In exchange for the working up exemption, Hatch-Waxman gave to 
brand firms extended patent terms for older blockbuster drugs at the 
back end of the product lifecycle by obliging generics to litigate all 
                                                                                                                            
 51. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 332-34; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra 
note 7, at 57-60; Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval – Drug 
Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 181-
82 (2010) [hereinafter Bouchard 2010]. 
 52. See, e.g., Bouchard, Obvious, supra note 50, at 4-5; Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 
49, at 28-32. 
 53. Kingston, supra note 48, at 334-35. 
 54. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, The Life Sciences and the Rule of Law, 319 J. MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 891, 895 (2002); Sampat, supra note 45, at 784. 
 55. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 56. Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000). 
 57. See, e.g., KRIMSKY, supra note 45. 
 58. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)) (commonly known 
as the Hatch-Waxman Act) [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act]. 
 59. See, e.g., Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 413-14. 
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relevant patents to the reference product prior to gaining market 
entry.
60
 Hatch-Waxman has been credited for successfully launching 
the generic drug industry in the United States.
61
 
Currently, we are witnessing a third major wave of global patent 
reform favoring strong intellectual property protection. The leading 
edge of this wave occurred in the early 1990s, at which time the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS)
62
 was negotiated and ratified by many nations.
63
 This was 
followed by additional nations signing bi-lateral or multi-lateral Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the United States.
64
 FTAs in 
particular are proving to be an excellent vehicle for the global spread 
of pharmaceutical linkage.
65
 As patent protection available for 
pharmaceutical products under linkage provisions extends beyond the 
harmonized patent regime under TRIPS, linkage is referred to as 
TRIPS-Plus.
66
 
In addition to expanded patent rights, TRIPS and other FTAs 
also provided for data protection, whereby brand firms are provided 
with a guaranteed period of market exclusivity tied to their regulatory 
approval submission packages.
67
 During the period of market 
                                                                                                                            
 60. See Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 448. 
 61. Gerald J. Mossinghof, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the 
Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 194 (1999); Epstein & Kuhlik, supra 
note 38, at 9-10. 
 62. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 
289 (1993) (between the Governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States; entered into 
force Jan. 1, 1994); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) of 
the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)). 
 63. Robert S. Tancer, Foreign Investment in North America and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Canada, 39 INT’L EXE. 283 (1997); Christopher Scott Harrison, Protection of 
Pharmaceuticals as Foreign Policy: The Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement and Bill C-22 Versus 
the North American Free Trade Agreement and Bill C-91, 26 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 457, 
460 (2000–2001). 
 64. Carlos María Correa, Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to 
Medicines, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 399, 399–404 (2006); Judit Rius Sanjuan, Patent-
Registration Linkage, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, 1 (Apr. 3, 2006), 
http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf. 
 65. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 397; Overview on Patent Linkage, FINSTON 
CONSULTING, LLC, 1 (Aug. 7, 2006), 
http://www.finstonconsulting.com/version03/files/Overview.pdf (UK Consulting Report). 
 66. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 397. 
 67. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information 
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 477, 483 (2003); Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and 
European Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 479-80 (2004); Trudo Lemmens & Ron A. 
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exclusivity, generic firms cannot rely on the evidence of safety and 
efficacy of the brand reference drug and hence cannot obtain 
regulatory approval to market generic substitutes.
68
 Under conditions 
where the regulatory approval stage was lengthy, data protection 
ensures that brand firms have some form of legal protection for their 
drug development efforts should the patent protection expire prior to 
approval and marketing. 
Thus far, we have seen how the pancakes have been stacked on 
our two sets of plates. On the one plate, the one with 300 pancakes, 
we have patent laws and regulatory rights favoring the development 
of “new and innovative” products by “innovator” firms. Importantly, 
the policy underpinning these reforms was purposefully directed to 
encouraging the development of breakthrough remedies as opposed to 
low-level incremental innovations. We saw that the flash of genius 
requirement for patenting was obviated in favor of workshop 
improvements, and that the inventor no longer need be a lone genius 
working in the basement, but, in fact, can be a whole team of PhDs 
and MDs working in well lighted laboratories of multinational firms 
towards incremental innovations. This change in the law gave rise to a 
new emphasis and appreciation on the value of the whole stack of 
pancakes, rather than the skill in rendering one particularly beautiful 
pancake. After this, we observed a series of legal changes that 
lowered the standard of patentability relating to subject matter, 
obviousness, and utility, increasing the stack of pancakes further. In 
addition, more people obtained licenses to make pancakes, furthering 
the number of pancakes yet again. Finally, through TRIPS and FTA, 
we saw a new round of pancake appreciation, increasing the height of 
the stack through a combination of patent rights and data protection 
rights. The pièce de résistance is a new type of pancake syrup 
developed at this time, which prolongs the life of older pancakes at 
the bottom of the stack that would have otherwise been thrown out. 
This last touch, of course, was provided by the TRIPS-Plus 
pharmaceutical linkage regime. 
On the other plate, the one with 30 pancakes, we have patent 
laws favoring the development of “copycat” products by generic 
firms. We saw the pile increase from zero to 30 pancakes through the 
early working provisions of Hatch-Waxman. This legislation is 
responsible for increasing the percentage of generic drugs as a 
                                                                                                                            
Bouchard, Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in Canada, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 
311, 312 (Jocelyn Downie et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007). 
 68. Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 484. 
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fraction of all domestic US prescriptions from 19% in 1984 to 69% in 
2008.
69
 However, this stack of 30 pancakes seems to increase and 
decrease in number fairly frequently, as the linkage system is gamed 
by both the people making and serving the pancakes.
70
 As a result, the 
people eating the copycat pancakes never quite know what their share 
will be, or how much they will have to pay for a pancake on any 
given day. Moreover, in other nations, the system of producing these 
pancakes does not work as well as it does in the United States, 
resulting in much less than 30 pancakes per stack.
71
 Some nations 
have decided not to cross “picket-lines” set up as a result of differing 
opinions on whether to allow access to generic drugs because of 
differing interpretations of TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus obligations. 
Combined, these factors have led to some nations and major 
economic regions such as the European Union and India deciding 
against having the second stack at all as it applies to pharmaceutical 
linkage.
72
 This has, not surprisingly, created much havoc in nations 
with less bargaining power and more hunger for pancakes.
73
 In total, 
of the legislation brought into force over the last 25 years alone in the 
United States designed to stimulate the production of new and 
innovative drugs and encourage timely generic entry; six of seven 
legislative vehicles are aimed at facilitating innovation by brand firms 
and one is directed to encourage the timely entry of generic drugs.
74
  
Adding to the uncertainty in patent and innovation policy is the 
observation that the identity of the first and second stacks is becoming 
increasingly blurred over time. This is for two reasons. First, because 
                                                                                                                            
 69. Cook et al., supra note 6, at 3-4 fig.1. 
 70. See, e.g., FTC 2002, supra note 34, at i-ii; Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 38, at 1; 
Bulow, supra note 38, at 145; Avery, supra note 38, at 173; HORE, supra note 34, at 3. 
 71. See, e.g., Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 408-09. 
 72. For a discussion of drug shipments seized by nations who allege that the shipments 
are in violation of domestic patent laws linked to international trade instruments such as TRIPS 
or other FTAs, see, for example, Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 401; WTO Dispute over 
Seized Drug Shipment, THE PHARMA LETTER (Feb. 16, 2009), 
http://www.thepharmaletter.com/file/91762/wto-dispute-over-seized-drug-shipment.html. For a 
discussion of the reasons why the EU and India rejected linkage based on anti-competitive and 
public health grounds, see, for example, European Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
Final Report, at 315 (July 8, 2009), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf 
[hereinafter EC Final Report]; Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, No. LPA 443/2009, 6, 20 (Delhi 
H.C. Feb. 9, 2010) (India), available at http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/SMD/judgement/09-02-
2010/SMD09022010LPA4432009.pdf. 
 73. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 64, at 400; Sanjuan, supra note 64, at 1-2; Overview on 
Patent Linkage, supra note 65, at 1–2; GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2d ed. 2009). 
 74. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 419 fig.1. 
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emerging empirical data demonstrates that the brand pharmaceutical 
landscape is increasingly dominated by low level innovations that by 
and large parallel the innovative characteristics of so-called “copycat” 
generic products. Data from the companion study show clearly that 
the vast majority of drug development and patenting by multinational 
pharmaceutical firms is in relation to line extension drugs generally, 
and line extension Me Too drugs specifically. Secondly, generic firms 
are accruing, and indeed exercising, ever greater intellectual property 
and regulatory rights in order to protect their inventions.
75
 For 
example, in the companion paper we demonstrated that generic firms 
are accruing larger numbers of regulatory approvals, patents, and 
chemical compound designations that may have been previously 
recognized on their products, such that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between the drug development and intellectual 
property strategies of brand and generic firms. As a result, it is not 
only getting more difficult to tell the two sectors apart from one 
another from an output perspective, but also more challenging to 
justify distinctions in patent and innovation policy for the two sectors 
under conditions where the outputs of both systems mirror one 
another so strongly. 
B. Product Clusters: Path of Least Resistance to Patent 
Portfolios 
In addition to the number of intellectual property mechanisms 
over time, there has also been a slow evolution away from 
highlighting the value of single patents resulting from the exercise of 
the flash of genius toward clusters,
76
 or portfolios,
77
 of patents on 
incremental innovations held under common control. In fact, some 
have gone so far as to say the era of the individual patent is over.
78
 In 
this way, not only are individual pancakes in the stack assumed less 
                                                                                                                            
 75. For an analysis of US outcomes, see Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 10-11, 
and Hemphill & Sampat, infra note 279, at 1. For an analysis of Canadian outcomes, see 
Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug Approval Data 
2001-2008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With Less”?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 
85, 97–114 (2009); Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1505-06; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, 
at 174; Ron A. Bouchard, Qualifying Intellectual Property I: Harmonized Measurement of New 
and Follow-On Drug Approvals, Patents and Chemical Components. 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
(forthcoming 2012). [hereinafter Bouchard 2012]. 
 76. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 226-27; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37, at 
243-58. For a description of an analogous scenario in the EU, see infra Part VII.C.3. 
 77. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 
7, at 1. 
 78. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 51. 
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attractive, but the value of the stack has grown in proportion to the 
sum of individual pancakes. 
As noted by Kingston, rational investment in a portfolio of 
relatively high-risk products becomes increasingly attractive when the 
risk attaching to the portfolio as a whole is statistically lower than that 
of the more risky individual components.
79
 Such investments are 
more attractive when patents are easier to come by and defend, and 
where drug development strategy is focused on rational drug design 
rather than the (apparently) more creative or flash of genius oriented 
drug screening methods. Patent portfolios have also been described by 
Polk and Parchomovsky, who observed that the right to exclude 
conferred by a collection of related patents under common control is 
greater than the sum of individual patents.
80
 These authors properly 
point out that the portfolio literature and practice is at least a decade 
old,
81
 stating that “the value of patent portfolios has been widely 
recognized in commercial circles, but has received little attention (and 
virtually no discussion of its implications outside of antitrust) in the 
legal-academic circle.”82 Citing an array of literature, they define a 
patent portfolio as a strategic collection of discrete yet related patents 
under common control that, when combined, offer advantages to the 
patentee that would not otherwise occur.
83
 
As previously noted in the context of the complex nature of 
technological invention,
84
 an important feature of patents in a 
portfolio is their degree of functional relatedness. The value of 
obtaining a cluster of related patents on a number of related drug 
products has been recognized in the pharmaceutical industry for some 
time.
85
 This property of relatedness contributes to the scaling effects 
                                                                                                                            
 79. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327. 
 80. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 5, 33, 52. 
 81. Id. at 27 n.99. 
 82. Id. Similar statements cite literature dating as far back as 1991 (n.107) and 1982 
(n.109). 
 83. Id. at 27, 29, 30. 
 84. W. Brian Arthur, The Structure of Invention, 36 RES. POL’Y 274, 275 (2007); ERIC 
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 85. In the Parliamentary debate leading up to linkage and TRIPS in Canada, Dr. Stephen 
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Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 227, 233 n.27 (2001) (citing 
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of portfolios, which provides non-linear market power to patentees 
that would be impossible with single patents.
86
 It is this scale feature 
that led both Kingston
87
 and Polk and Parchomovsky
88
 to speculate 
that the power of portfolios is greater than the sum of individual 
patents.  
The scaling effect of patent or product clusters has been 
demonstrated empirically to shift power in the litigation arena to the 
portfolio-holder; the likelihood of success in a given case increases as 
the number of litigated patents in the portfolio increases. This is true 
even if the chance of success on individual patents is low.
89
 
Observations such as these help to explain the very large number of 
patents per drug for pharmaceutical products (41:1 to 48:1) as well as 
the finding that the percentage of listed patents can increase quite 
considerably with drug profitability (from 5-27%).
90
 The patent 
portfolio theory also helps to explain the observation that while up to 
50-75% of patents in linkage litigation can be invalid or not 
infringed,
91
 brand firms still win in approximately 50% of litigation 
on the merits.
92
 
As we have noted previously in the context of drug 
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23 CHAIN DRUG REV. RX13 (2001)). 
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numbers, see generally, Adam Greene & D. Dewey Steadman, Pharmaceuticals: Analyzing 
Litigation Success Rates, RBC CAPITAL MARKETS (Jan. 15, 2010), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/pharmareport.pdf; Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 48. For 
a discussion of parallel rates of litigation and findings of invalidity in the EU, see EC Final 
Report, supra note 72, and the European Comm’n, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Preliminary 
Report, at 113-14 (Nov. 28, 2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf 
[hereinafter EC Preliminary Report]. 
 92. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 48; Greene & Steadman, supra note 91. The 
rate is lower than in the previous decade when generics won 73% of cases (FTC 2002, supra 
note 34) because of an increase in settlements. See, e.g., Avery, supra note 38, at 182; Hemphill 
& Lemley, supra note 33, at 48. 
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development,
93
 product clusters appear to be a fundamental feature of 
the regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL) that characterizes 
drug development.
94
 The rTPL has characteristics of a complex 
adaptive system, where the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts.
95
 In a regulatory landscape with complex features, scale effects 
occur as a result of the degree of interconnection and interdependence 
of actors and institutions in the innovation ecology. This ecology can 
be local or global,
96
 with appropriate scaling. The value-added aspect 
of a complex innovation ecology comes from the combination of 
nodal interdependence and the resulting increase in cumulative 
market exclusivity afforded to the entire cluster of products and 
patents.
97
 The specific nature of the scaling effect in the context of 
pharmaceutical linkage is a direct function of patent law interacting 
with food and drug law through linkage regulations. Our empirical 
data to date wholly support the notion of patent portfolios, and 
extends the concept to include not only patents, but also multiple 
related products and patent listing under the tandem of patent law 
acting in conjunction with newer forms of linkage laws.
98
 The issue of 
clusters or portfolios becomes even more problematic for policy-
makers and other stakeholders when the technology that is the subject 
of product clusters was also the recipient of substantial public funding 
in earlier stages of development.
99
 
                                                                                                                            
 93. For discussion of product-patent clusters and the relation of such clusters to linkage 
law, see Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 125-28; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 
37, at 244-53. For discussion of cluster-based drug development as a consequence of the larger 
intellectual property-intensive regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL), see Sawicka & 
Bouchard, supra note 75, at 88; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1516; Bouchard 2010, supra 
note 51, at 174. 
 94. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 88; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1516; 
Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 174. 
 95. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 
7, at 1; Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 2: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent Law on 
Canadian and Global Systems-Based Innovation Ecologies, 15 HEALTH L.J. 247, 250-52 
(2007). 
 96. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal 
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 406 (2004); Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 
404-05; Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 225. 
 97. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 174. 
 98. Id. at 192. 
 99. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 332; KRIMSKY, supra note 45; Ron A. 
Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of Publicly Funded 
Medical Research: Is There a Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 120, 141 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard 2007]; Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens, 
Commentary, Privatizing Biomedical Research—a ‘Third Way’, 26 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
31, 32 (2008). 
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Combined, these possibilities highlight the importance of 
providing a rational and evidence-based mechanism to qualify as well 
as quantify intellectual property rights associated with pharmaceutical 
products. An index of this nature would be particularly valuable if it 
had sufficient functional utility and flexibility to extend to other 
regulated technologies and to mitigate the types of restrained 
competition that have been observed to occur between brand and 
generic pharmaceutical firms in jurisdictions with linkage laws. 
C. Summary 
In summary, it seems reasonable to speculate that the transition 
from the flash of genius approach to the PHOSITA approach 
underpinning invention was meant to be commercially “inclusive.” In 
other words, the amendments were intended to avoid preventing or 
otherwise chilling incremental inventions that could have as much 
value as breakthrough inventions. With time, and serial legal reforms, 
more and more emphasis has been made on protecting the possibility 
of innovation by minimizing the legal hurdles for innovators and 
maximizing incentives. This evolution of intellectual property law has 
occurred with perhaps less effort going toward the other side of the 
balance that ensures that only inventions with significant social 
benefits are rewarded with the grant of patent.
100
 The result is that we 
have moved from a comparatively single-inventor single-product 
system focused on breakthrough innovation to a multiple-inventor 
multiple-product system concentrated on incremental innovation. 
Tellingly, this transition has been fully enabled by law. 
As a result of the history reviewed above, we have wound up 
with a tall stack of pancakes that are perhaps less tasty and less 
nourishing, but more impressive from a dimensional perspective. 
Despite claims to the effect that all the good wheat for making 
pancakes has been used up (low hanging fruit)
101
 or that good tasting 
and nourishing pancakes have become too expensive to make (rising 
R&D costs),
102
 it remains possible the bakers are simply making more 
                                                                                                                            
 100. An elegant discussion of rights balancing in this regards can be found in the U.S. 
Attorney General’s Amicus Curiae brief in KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc. (decided April 30, 2007).  
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, KSR Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/3mer/1ami/2004-
1350.mer.ami.pdf. 
 101. See, e.g., Fredric J. Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 NATURE 
78, 78 (2005). 
 102. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug 
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). 
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lower quality pancakes because they are given substantial subsidies to 
do so (basket of IP rights). As noted previously,
103
 the implication of 
this scenario is that bakers are aiming ex ante at legal targets which 
provide the most return on investment rather than the most benefit to 
the public. This result parallels data from studies of complex political 
systems, where “yardsticks” designed to measure progress reorient 
behavior narrowly towards fulfillment of yardstick metrics.
104
 In the 
present instance, it is possible that the relevant yardstick is 
represented by a “paradoxical drug approval drug patent linkage,” 
whereby firms can obtain the largest scope of cumulative patent 
protection and market exclusivity with products with relatively low 
levels of innovation.
105
 This yardstick is a function of weak 
evidentiary standards for patents, approvals, and listed patents that 
combined do not provide the greatest benefit to society but do provide 
                                                                                                                            
 103. Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1513. The notion of “capturing” legal rights 
necessary to restrain competition is hardly new.  
Over the last twenty years, there has been an enormous extension of intellectual 
property; a far-ranging enclosure movement over the public domain, paralleling 
the eighteenth century’s enclosure of common lands. Intellectual property rights 
have been broadened to cover more subjects, deepened to cover them for a longer 
time, widened to cover them in more ways. Current law is actually nibbling at the 
two areas that supposedly could never be owned, facts and ideas respectively. 
James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2000). 
 104. For a discussion of complex political systems and how these systems often work 
narrowly in service of identifiable goals, outcomes, and outputs, see ROBERT JERVIS, SYSTEM 
EFFECTS: COMPLEXITY IN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LIFE 87 (1997); COMPLEXITY IN WORLD 
POLITICS: CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF A NEW PARADIGM (Neil E. Harrison ed., 2006). 
 105. For a discussion of the concept and data relating to paradoxical drug approval drug 
patent linkage in our earlier work, see Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 176, 183, 219-21; 
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 86, 94, 127; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37, 
at 252-53. The latter reference describes the paradox in relation to growth in the spatiotemporal 
nature of product clusters over time, stating that:  
[A]s the number of follow-on drugs in the cluster grows over time, so too does 
cumulative market exclusivity and innovator firm profit. The maximum point of 
inefficiency occurs when the product cluster has a very long duration of 
cumulative market exclusivity with little or no therapeutic benefit to the larger 
population compared with the original pioneering drug on which the cluster is 
based. This is referred to as the most “paradoxical” drug approval-drug patenting 
nexus from a public policy perspective because the two goals of pharmaceutical 
linkage are to increase the production of new and innovative drugs and to 
facilitate timely generic entry. Both goals are frustrated with increased market 
exclusivity on poorly innovative clusters. Any move away from the point where 
the special provisions of pharmaceutical linkage to provide enhanced intellectual 
property protection for older blockbuster drugs is no longer balanced by a 
proportional benefit to society under the patent bargain is thus deemed to be 
paradoxical. 
Id. 
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the least risk and most benefit to pharmaceutical firms in their drug 
development activities.
106
 
IV. STUDY OBJECTIVES 
As we have seen with the pancake analogy, the result of 
sequential waves of intellectual property reforms is that there is now a 
significant amount of patent and related regulatory rights associated 
with pharmaceutical products. We are no longer primarily looking to 
make tasty and nourishing pancakes, but towering stacks of pancakes 
with impressive visages. Of course, with these rights come prolonged 
periods of market exclusivity and monopoly pricing, the costs of 
which are passed on to consumers. One question that arises from this 
discussion is what is society getting in return for all these rights? In 
particular, is this new basket of intellectual property and regulatory 
rights for private firms balanced by a proportional social benefit to the 
public? As the legal mechanisms for patent protection generally, and 
patent protection in the life sciences sector in particular, become 
increasingly harmonized globally, the presence or absence of 
empirical data to support the harmonized model becomes central. As 
noted in Section III supra, nowhere is the need more great than for 
qualifying patent value. 
Considerations such as these motivated the present study. The 
objective was to develop a novel innovation index to qualify 
intellectual property rights associated with pharmaceutical products. 
A second goal was to design the index such that it could qualify the 
value not only of drug patents, but also of related drug approvals and 
chemical components associated with particular drugs as well as other 
drug-related metrics deemed relevant to innovation and its valuation. 
The primary reason for investigating chemical components in addition 
to approvals and patents was to gain some understanding of the utility 
of chemicals to cluster-based drug development. This was based in 
part on our earlier and somewhat surprising observation that chemical 
patents represented the lowest quantity of patent classifications for a 
cohort of the most profitable drugs.
107
 A third goal was to create an 
innovation index that accorded with both the plain meaning of the 
words “new” and “innovative” but also a purposive legal 
interpretation that accorded with the first principles of statutory 
interpretation and leading jurisprudence on the patent bargain.
108
 
                                                                                                                            
 106. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51; PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37. 
 107. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 202-03 fig.6. 
 108. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 432. In previous work, these issues, as discussed by 
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Through the terms of the patent bargain, as modified by the specific 
nexus between food and drug law and patent law via newer forms of 
linkage law,
109
 the index would therefore reflect the degree of social 
benefit attached to varying degrees of innovation. A fourth goal was 
to create an index that could be used to qualify patents for listing on 
the patent register. This need follows the growing divergence of 
listing practice from the policy underpinning linkage regulations in 
both originating jurisdictions, which placed clear limits on the scope 
of patents allowed to be listed on the register. A final objective was to 
design an innovation index that would be sufficiently flexible to be 
customized by jurisdictions in accordance with their food and drug 
laws interacting with domestic and global intellectual property laws, 
as well as for other technologies with regulatory requirements 
stipulated and prioritized by federal or state regulators. 
V. METHODS 
A. Drug Approval Nomenclature and Classification 
The rationale and methods for categorizing drug approvals, drug 
patenting, and associated chemical components, as well as that for 
drug class nomenclature are the same as in the companion paper.
110
 
Briefly, drug approvals, patenting, and associated chemical 
components were analyzed across numerous classes within the 
broader categories of “new” and “follow-on” drugs. This included 
approvals in the new drug approval route directed to First in Class 
drugs (NDS FIC), Me Too drugs (NDS Me Too), drugs containing a 
New Active Substance (NDS NAS), drugs undergoing one of the two 
pathways (NOC/c; PR) for expedited review (NDS ER) and drugs 
deemed to be the most innovative (NDS MI) in the cohort of analyzed 
drugs. Drugs moving through the new drug approval route that did not 
have an extra designation (NDS) were also quantified. Line extension 
drugs approved via the follow-on pathway were studied alone 
(SNDS) or in conjunction with FIC (SNDS FIC), Me Too (SNDS Me 
Too), and ER (SNDS ER) designations. Finally, generic drugs 
undergoing the conventional (ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS) 
abbreviated review were studied. Terms and abbreviations were those 
                                                                                                                            
the Supreme Court and government branches of both the United States and Canada, have been 
analyzed in the context of both a regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL) and cluster-
based drug development. 
 109. Id. at 439-40. 
 110. Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at 47-55. 
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in the companion paper, and drugs are said to be in approval, patent, 
chemical cohorts and indicators, new and follow-on classifications, 
and the various FIC, Me Too, ER, NAS, and MI classes. The 
nomenclature for analysis of all data relating to new and follow-on 
drugs is summarized for convenience in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  
Classification Scheme for New and Follow-On Drugs 
 
 
B. Innovation Index 
Using the quantitative data in the companion as a starting point, 
a qualitative innovation index was constructed. The innovation index 
is a linear representation of the qualitative value of drug approvals, 
patents, and chemical components. Calculated values represent 
transformed data in that the raw quantitative values pertaining to drug 
approvals, patents and chemicals are substituted with innovation 
index values. As discussed in greater detail below, the transformed 
data were determined by a combination of objective and subjective 
analysis of the degree of difficulty in obtaining regulatory approvals 
in various new and follow-on categories and the prioritization of 
various drug classes as described and determined by drug regulators 
in relevant disclosures of both pharmaceutical and innovation policy.  
As the innovation index values reflect regulatory goals and 
priorities set by federal regulators in pursuit of their public health 
mandate informed by patent and innovation policy, it is reasonable to 
assume they accord with the plain reading of the terms “new” and 
“innovative” and thus represent a good first order approximation of 
the patent bargain as it is guided by the three legal vehicles 
underpinning pharmaceutical innovation: patent law, linkage law, and 
food and drug law. 
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The method for constructing the innovation index and resulting 
index values are illustrated in Table 2. The index is linear, moving up 
and to the left generally with increasing qualitative value. The various 
new and follow-on drug classes are represented in the top of each 
column. The four major categories of approvals (NDS, SNDS, 
ANDS, and SANDS) are represented in the first column. Both the 
classes and categories have individual multipliers (indicated in 
brackets) that were calculated to yield the innovation index for each 
drug class. As before, these move from the lowest level of innovation 
(LOI) values at the bottom right of the table associated with follow-on 
generic drugs (LOI= 0.5) to the highest LOI values for NDS MI drugs 
(LOI= 15) at the top left of the table. All four sets of tabulated LOI 
values for the Total Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP 
Chemical Cohorts follow this pattern (Tables 4-7). 
 
Table 2. 
Innovation Index for Pharmaceutical Products 
 
DRUG TYPE* MI
(5)
ER
(4)
FIC
(3)
NAS
(2.3)
Me Too
(1.5)
NDS
(1.3)
SNDS
(1)
ANDS
(1)
SANDS
(1)
NDS (3) 15 12 9 7 4.5 4
SNDS (2) 8 6 3 2
ANDS (1) 1
SANDS (0.5) 0.5
 
 
*NDS, New Drug Submission; SNDS, Supplementary New Drug Submission; 
ANDS, Abbreviated New Drug Submission; SANDS, Supplementary Abbreviated 
New Drug Submission; MI, Most Innovative; ER, Expedited Review (Priority 
Review + NOC/c); FIC, First in Class; NAS; New Active Substance. Note the 
numbers in parentheses are multipliers. The rationale to determine multipliers is 
discussed in Methods. 
 
The index has been constructed using data obtained from Health 
Canada websites and personal interviews conducted with Health 
Canada regulators with the intent of elucidating metrics that 
objectively demonstrate the level of difficulty in obtaining approval 
for new and follow-on drugs and that meet the requirements for 
prioritized forms of drugs as defined by regulators (e.g., drugs 
meeting set criteria for Most Innovative, Expedited Review, New 
Active Substances, First in Class, and Me Too drugs). These metrics 
were then cross-referenced by analyzing the global drug regulation 
literature with the aim of gaining further information about what 
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metrics and drug classes various groups (regulators, patient groups, 
industry-funded scholars, independent scholars, etc.) prioritized or 
otherwise defined as “new” or “innovative” in their analyses. Where 
there was a clash between criteria, the regulatory requirements 
enumerated by the federal government were given privilege. 
Where Phase 1-3 trials demonstrate that the potential therapeutic 
benefits of a given new pharmaceutical outweigh its potential risks, 
the manufacturer may file a New Drug Submission (NDS).
111
 The 
NDS contains data on drug safety, efficacy, and quality, including 
data from all relevant preclinical studies and clinical trials pertaining 
to a drug’s manufacturing, packaging, labelling, claimed therapeutic 
value, conditions for use, and side effects.
112
 A Supplemental New 
Drug Submission (SNDS) may be filed by a manufacturer for changes 
to a drug product already marketed by that sponsor.
113
 Drugs of this 
nature are referred to as “line extension” drugs.114 When NDS and 
SNDS applications contain sufficient data on drug safety, efficacy, 
and quality to warrant approval, they received a market authorization 
referred to as a Notice of Compliance or NOC.
115
 
Manufacturers of generic drugs submit an Abbreviated New 
Drug Submission (ANDS) in order to obtain market authorization. An 
ANDS requires that the generic drug be pharmaceutically equivalent 
to the reference brand name product.
116
 In this context, “equivalence” 
means that the generic product must be the same as the reference 
product with regard to (a) chemistry, (b) manufacturing, (c) route of 
administration, (d) conditions of use, and (e) therapeutic and adverse 
                                                                                                                            
 111. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 325; see also Food and Drug Regulations, 
C.R.C., c. 870 § C.08.002(1)(a) (2011). The Food and Drug Regulations are propagated under 
the general authority of the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27 (2011) (Can.). 
 112. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 325; Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 
111, at § C.08.002(2). For details, see HEALTH CANADA, THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS PROGRAMME 
GUIDELINE: PREPARATION OF HUMAN NEW DRUG SUBMISSIONS (1991) [hereinafter HEALTH 
CANADA 1991], available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/prephum-eng.pdf. 
 113. Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111, at § C.08.003. 
 114. Ron A. Bouchard & Monika Sawicka, The Mud and the Blood and the Beer: 
Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework for Drug Approval, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 49, 
55 (2009); Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 106; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1466-
67, 1469. 
 115. Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111, at § C.08.002(2); Lemmens & 
Bouchard, supra note 67, at 329; see also HEALTH CANADA 1991, supra note 112. 
 116. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 325-26. For definition of “Canadian 
reference product” and “pharmaceutical equivalent”, see Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 
111, at § C.08.001.1. 
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systemic effects when given to patients under the same conditions.
117
 
Similar to brand name sponsors, generic sponsors may also submit 
Supplemental Abbreviated New Drug Submissions (SANDS) where 
certain changes are made to a generic drug that is already on the 
market. Consequently, both brand name and generic firms can make 
“new” and “supplemental” submissions. 
Compared to NDS drugs, SNDS drugs (typically called line 
extensions) involve relatively minor changes to dosage, strength, 
formulation, method of manufacture, labelling, route of 
administration, or indication.
118
 For this reason, the first distinction 
made in the present study was that between drugs approved via NDS 
and SNDS pathways. NDS and SNDS classes with no additional 
metrics or attributes (in other words no FIC, ER, or NAS designation) 
were given the value of LOI= 4 and 2, respectively. The two-fold 
increase in NDS value compared to the SNDS value reflects the 
difference between drugs that are “new” and those that are “follow-
on” in nature. The values also reflect the relative similarities in 
evidentiary hurdles between the two categories. 
Given their so-called “copycat” nature it is not surprising that 
generic drugs will have lower values than NDS and SNDS drugs. 
Generic drugs undergoing conventional bioequivalence-based 
approval (ANDS) received an LOI value= 1 whereas SANDS 
approvals received a value of LOI= 0.5 for what essentially amounts 
to a follow-on generic approval. 
Moving upwards on the innovation index we come to Me Too 
drugs in the new drug and line extension categories. As with 
conventional NDS and SNDS drugs, the LOI values were low. For 
NDS Me Too drugs there need only be a demonstrable change in 
benefit-risk or chemical structure. This class of drugs is not the first 
product on market for a given indication and chemical class, hence its 
designation Me Too. A typical Me Too drug offers a better 
therapeutic option than existing drugs in this class.
119
 By contrast, a 
line extension (SNDS) Me Too drug represents a better therapeutic 
                                                                                                                            
 117. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 326; Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 
111, at § C.08.001.1. 
 118. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 326; Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 
111, at § C.08.003(2). 
 119. Letters between author and David K. Lee, Dir., Office of Legislative and Regulatory 
Modernization, Health Can.; Dr. Maurica Maher, Senior Scientific Advisory, Progressive 
Licensing Project, Health Can.; Lesley Brumell, Supervisor, Submission and Info. Policy Div., 
Health Can. (Apr.-July 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Health Canada Personal 
Communications]. 
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option in combination with a change in chemical form compared to 
existing products. Regarding the index, NDS Me Too drugs represent 
a slightly higher value compared to the NDS class in the absence of 
any further class designations. A higher value for NDS Me Too drugs 
encompasses the hypothetical possibility that a small fraction of NDS 
Me Too drugs may be close to their corresponding First in Class 
drugs by dint of differences in regulatory lag.
120
 Having said this, the 
scientific, therapeutic, and economic value of Me Too drugs have 
been routinely scrutinized by many industry observers and regulatory 
agencies. For this reason, the value of NDS Me Too drugs was set to 
LOI= 4.5, slightly greater than that for NDS approvals without a 
further class designation (LOI= 4). The value for the SNDS Me Too 
class (LOI= 3) reflects the need for this class of drugs to be lower 
than the corresponding value for NDS Me Too drugs while also 
acknowledging the increase in regulatory requirements of needing to 
have a positive change in benefit-risk combined with a change in 
chemical form compared to existing drugs. 
It is considered a hallmark of innovation by many for a drug to 
contain a novel chemical form and, indeed, some commentators have 
claimed a drug should be considered new or pioneering when NCE or 
new active substance (NAS) status is conferred.
121
 This plays out in 
the current regulatory context in one of two ways: drugs may either 
contain a new active substance or have sufficient chemical novelty 
and use characteristics to be denoted First in Class.
122
 For now, we 
will focus on the NAS designation. 
Previously referred to as a new chemical entity (NCE),
123
 the 
definition of a NAS encompasses a wide range of chemically active 
substances, including (1) a chemical or biological substance that has 
not been previously approved for sale as a drug; (2) an isomer, 
derivative, or salt of a chemical substance that is already approved for 
sale as a drug but differs in safety and efficacy properties; or (3) a 
biological substance previously approved for sale as a drug that 
differs in molecular structure, the nature of the source material, or the 
manufacturing process.
124
 Given the wide breadth of chemical 
                                                                                                                            
 120. See, e.g., DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 35; DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35. 
 121. J. D. Kleinke, Commentary: Much Ado About a Good Thing, 325 BRIT. MED. J. 1168 
(2002). 
 122. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 189. 
 123. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 91. 
 124. Drugs Directorate, New Active Substance, HEALTH CAN., (June 4, 1991), 
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nas_nsa_pol-eng.pdf 
[hereinafter Drugs Directorate]; Notice Of Compliance (NOC) Database Terminology, HEALTH 
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modification encompassed by the NAS definition, although not as 
wide as for that for SNDS drugs, a high LOI value cannot reasonably 
be ascribed to this class of drugs. A value of LOI= 7 was given for 
NDS NAS drugs. This value was chosen to reflect the relative 
difficulty of synthesizing compounds that meet the regulatory criteria 
for the NAS designation but which would also appropriately fall 
below the regulatory hurdles required to meet the standard for 
corresponding FIC and ER drugs. 
The next class of drugs for valuation is drugs that are First in 
Class approved in either the new or the follow-on approval pathways. 
As reviewed in the companion paper,
125
 First in Class drugs approved 
via the new drug approval route (NDS FIC) are those that consist of 
either a completely new family of active ingredient(s) comprising a 
NAS,
126
 or old active ingredient(s) used for the treatment of a 
completely new indication. A drug is an NDS FIC drug if there is no 
other drug on the market that belongs to the same compound family 
that is used for the same indication.
127
 NDS FIC drugs have received 
an LOI value= 9, reflecting a higher value than NDS NAS drugs and a 
lower value than NDS ER drugs, but a higher value than SNDS FIC 
drugs. It also reflects the regulatory requirement that the NDS FIC 
chemical form must be truly first in class whereas the SNDS chemical 
form requirement is in line with that of the SNDS category generally. 
As with Me Too drugs, drugs approved through both new and 
follow-on submission routes can be First in Class. For the “line 
extension” SNDS route, relatively small changes to existing chemical 
structures such as salts or isomers may still yield an SNDS FIC or Me 
Too designation. Compared to Me Too drugs, the difference is that 
while both SNDS FIC and Me Too drugs can cover new chemical 
forms,
128
 only line extension drugs that are directed to both a new 
chemical form and a new use may be deemed NDS FIC drugs.
129
 
Those that do not are Me Too drugs.
130
 Because even a follow-on 
First in Class drug must be directed to a new use as opposed to just a 
new chemical form with altered benefit-risk, a higher level of 
                                                                                                                            
CAN., http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/notices-avis/noc-acc/term_noc_acc-eng.php 
(last modified Aug. 19, 2010). 
 125. Bouchard 2012, supra note 75, at 10. 
 126. See, e.g., Drugs Directorate, supra note 124; Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 
55; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 94. 
 127. Health Canada Personal Communications, supra note 119. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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innovation is typically ascribed to SNDS FIC drugs as opposed to 
SNDS Me Too drugs.
131
 The SNDS FIC drug class has thus been 
given an LOI value= 6, reflecting the significant degree of innovation 
compared to SNDS Me Too drugs. The LOI value for SNDS FIC 
drugs is lower compared to that for NDS NAS drugs (LOI= 7), owing 
to the comparatively lower standard of approval for SNDS compared 
to NDS drugs, but also reflecting the relatively similar array of 
chemical modifications allowed under either category, including 
relatively simple modifications via salts, enantiomers, crystalline 
forms, dosage form, etc. 
The next group of drugs assessed is comprised of drugs 
undergoing some form of expedited review. As with FIC and NAS 
drugs, industry commentators often ascribe a significant level of 
innovation to drugs selected by regulators to undergo some form of 
priority review. Regulators may grant approval in an expedited 
fashion under domestic food and drug law in two ways.
132
 One is 
through Priority Review, which refers to the fast-tracking of eligible 
drug candidates “intended for the treatment, prevention or diagnosis 
of serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating diseases or 
conditions” with an “unmet medical need or for which a substantial 
improvement in the benefit/risk profile is demonstrated.”133 
Evidentiary requirements for safety, efficacy, and quality parallel 
those for non-priority submissions; the main difference is an 
accelerated review time.
134
 In the second path, sponsors may be 
granted an “NOC with conditions”135 (NOC/c) for eligible NDS or 
SNDS submissions directed to serious, life-threatening, or severely 
debilitating diseases, or conditions for which there is promising 
evidence of clinical effectiveness based on available data.
136
 In 
addition to less onerous evidentiary requirements, the targeted review 
time for NOC/c approval is significantly accelerated compared to that 
                                                                                                                            
 131. For a comparison of Canadian and WHO First in Class and Me Too classifications 
schemes see Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 108 (comparing Tables 2 and 5). 
 132. See generally Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 58–59. 
 133. HEALTH CAN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PRIORITY REVIEW OF DRUG SUBMISSIONS 
1, 4 (2009), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/priordr-eng.pdf. 
 134. Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 67, at 328. 
 135. NOC/c approvals are granted pursuant to § C.08.004(1), in compliance with the 
conditions of use stipulated in §§ C.08.002(1)(g), C.08.002(1)(h), C.08.006(2)(b), and 
C.05.006(2)(a) of the Food and Drug Regulations, supra note 111. 
 136. HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: NOTICE 
OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS (NOC/C) (2007). 
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for standard NDS review.
137
 The main difference with Priority 
Review is that NOC/c licensure is granted on the condition that the 
sponsor will perform additional post-market studies to confirm the 
alleged benefits and risks.
138
 It is also possible for one drug to have 
both NOC/c and Priority Review designations (PR-NOC/c). Unless 
otherwise stated, for the purposes of this Article all three NOC/c, 
Priority Review and PR-NOC/c pathways for approval are collapsed 
together under the single heading of Expedited Review (ER). 
Because firms must produce substantial evidence to regulators 
relating to (a) diagnosis of serious, life-threatening or severely 
debilitating diseases or conditions with (b) an unmet medical need (c) 
for which a substantial improvement in the benefit/risk profile or 
which promising evidence of clinical effectiveness has been adduced, 
drugs in the ER category are assumed to represent a high level of 
innovation and social benefit. The relatively high LOI value of 12 is 
given to NDS ER drugs based on its position ahead of all other drugs 
on the linear scale discussed thus far. A value of LOI= 8 is given to 
SNDS FIC drugs based on its position as the most innovative drug in 
the SNDS stream. It receives a lower grade compared to only the 
NDS FIC and NDS ER drugs. It does so based on the comparative 
difficulty in achieving the regulatory requirements for an NDS FIC 
where there is no other comparator, and to reflect the fact that a drug 
firm must have significant, if not substantial, experience with a drug 
that undergoes review in the SNDS compared to the NDS approval 
pathway. 
The final step in setting the values in the model was the 
definition of the most innovative drug class. As discussed in the 
companion paper, this was done according to a review of the literature 
regarding previously published definitions of the terms “new” and 
“innovative” in relation to drug products. As expected, the results 
were highly contingent on the industry affiliation of the authors. For 
example, depending on the source and degree of industry association, 
published definitions of what constitutes an “innovative drug” vary 
considerably, from as low a threshold as simply containing an 
NAS,
139
 to the slightly more stringent requirements of either being 
                                                                                                                            
 137. HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., ACCESS TO THERAPEUTIC 
PRODUCTS: THE REGULATORY PROCESS IN CANADA 10-11 (2006), available at http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/pubs/access-therapeutic_acces-therapeutique-eng.pdf. 
 138. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 59; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra 
note 75. 
 139. See, e.g., Kleinke, supra note 121, at 1168. 
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directed to FIC therapies
140
 or to follow-on drugs that nevertheless 
undergo Priority Review.
141
 However, as discussed previously,
142
 
merely containing a NAS is an insufficient basis for designating a 
drug as pioneering or strongly innovative because there is ample room 
in the definition for minor changes to previously approved medical 
ingredients, including salts, esters, solvates, polymorphs, and 
enantiomers. A similar conclusion applies to drugs that are only 
directed to FIC therapies, as these can also be follow-on versions of 
previously marketed products containing slightly modified medical 
ingredients or directed to new uses within a therapeutic class. 
Moreover, where Priority Review need only be directed to drugs 
demonstrating moderate clinical improvement over existing therapies, 
it is also an insufficient proxy for strong innovation. 
The most reasonable definition for a most innovative drug is one 
that is truly pioneering and accords to the plain meaning of the words 
new and innovative.
143
 That is, a drug that is approved via the new 
drug approval pathway (NDS), contains a NAS, undergoes some form 
of Expedited Review, and is directed to a FIC therapy.
144
 Only in 
combination do these requirements approach a reasonable definition 
for a truly breakthrough technology. This drug class has been 
designated NDS MI. Keeping with the qualitative linear scheme, NDS 
MI drugs are awarded an LOI value= 15. 
As a methodological matter, it may be pointed out that the 
qualitative data obtained using the LOI method are consistent with the 
quantitative data reported in the companion paper and vice versa. The 
method in the companion paper emphasizes absolute and fractional 
percentage analyses, whereas the innovation index described here 
hinges primarily on the raw number of approvals, patents, and 
chemicals. Moreover, data in the companion paper do not qualify the 
numbers of indicators per cohort in an incremental and rational 
manner. For example, as reviewed in our Berkeley study,
145
 one 
person’s gold standard (innovation equivalent to only a NAS or FIC) 
is another person’s “moderate” or “mild” degree of innovation. The 
                                                                                                                            
 140. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 101, at 78; NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, PROSPECTUS FOR 
NATIONAL KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT, COMMITTEE ON KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT (1996) 
[hereinafter PROSPECTUS]. 
 141. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. RESEARCH AND EDUC. FOUND., 
supra note 36. 
 142. See generally Kleinke, supra note 121. 
 143. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 101, at 78; PROSPECTUS, supra note 140. 
 144. See Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1508. 
 145. See Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1507-09. 
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designation of the NDS MI class as the most innovative may incur 
some debate among those who are industry supporters, but the 
designation is reasonable in light of both the plain meaning and 
purposive legal interpretation of the terms “new” and “innovative.”146 
Further, in a primarily quantitative model, there is more 
uncertainty as to which class of indicator per cohort should reflect the 
next level of innovation as opposed to the NDS MI class and so on, as 
one proceeds from one class to the next. For example, both indices 
reflect the difficulty in obtaining drugs in the expedited review 
categories (NOC/c and Priority Review) as well as the difficulty in 
obtaining FIC approvals in the new drug approval stream (NDS 
FIC).
147
 However, as one can see in Figures 6 and 7 of the companion 
paper, when approval, patenting, and chemical indicators in more than 
one drug class increases across cohorts either separately or together, it 
is difficult to appreciate which drug class is relatively more 
important.
148
 The same will be true when two or three classes are 
evolving with the broader NDS and SNDS classes either within a 
given indicator or across cohorts. 
Compared to the quantitative model, the innovation index is 
therefore less concerned with trends in fractional percentages between 
drug classes, and thus avoids bias in emphasizing these numbers (e.g., 
assuming that because there are significant differences between 
SNDS FIC or NDS and SNDS ER approvals across NDS and SNDS 
categories or between indicators that these classes of drugs must be 
the most important classes). In addition, quantitative data alone do not 
tell us which class is the more innovative class. Only a rational, 
graded, and evidence-based index does so. 
Based on the discussion thus far, it can be argued that the 
innovation index provides a rational and evidence-based measure of 
the value of each drug class to society. This conclusion stems from 
basing the index on specific regulatory requirements and priorities 
rooted in publicly disclosed evidence of safety, efficacy, and quality; 
unmet medical need; improvements in benefit-risk; and whether drugs 
occupy categories of socially beneficial innovation described by 
regulators in Canada and elsewhere. 
A final observation is that only the qualitative innovation index 
displays the numerical “long tail.” This term refers to the statistical 
property of a data set whereby a significant fraction of data is found 
                                                                                                                            
 146. See Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 110. 
 147. See generally Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 97-114. 
 148. Id. at 98. 
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within the tail-end of a probability distribution. The long tail is 
inherently valuable to the LOI data, because the numbers in the higher 
end of the index represent the most innovative drugs. As a result, even 
though in practice data at the high end of the LOI range invariably 
comprise a much smaller percentage of the total values, they represent 
the most important classes of drugs studied. 
C. Examples of LOI Compound-Indication Classifications 
A noteworthy characteristic of the innovation index described in 
this Article is that it rewards innovation for both new and follow-on 
drugs. It does so based on the degree of innovation objectively 
demonstrated to be associated with a given drug based on 
corresponding regulatory requirements and priorities. This is 
particularly important in the pharmaceutical sector, where many have 
claimed that incremental and/or follow-on innovation is critical not 
only to later breakthrough developments,
149
 but also important in and 
of itself.
150
 
Two examples of proportional rewards in developing new and 
follow-on drugs are provided in Table 3. The data illustrate that brand 
firms are clearly rewarded for developing difficult SNDS FIC and 
SNDS ER drugs compared to several classes of new drugs. This is 
appropriate as SNDS FIC drugs encompass both new use and new 
chemical form requirements. This can be compared to NDS NAS 
status, which can be based on small chemical modifications to an 
already marketed drug. Similarly, SNDS ER drugs are meeting a 
substantial unmet medical need as defined by regulators as well as 
displaying an improved benefit-risk over products already available 
on the market. For this reason the LOI value is greater than NDS, 
NDS NAS, and NDS Me Too drugs. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 149. See Cohen, supra note 101, at 78-79. 
 150. See, e.g., DiMasi & Faden, supra note 35; DiMasi & Paquette, supra note 35, at 12. 
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Table 3. 
Examples of LOI Compound-Indication Classifications 
 
 
 
In essence, the data in Table 3 demonstrate that, as a given drug 
fans out over time from a “new and innovative” drug with significant 
objective evidence of its innovativeness derived from regulatory 
requirements (NAS, FIC, ER) to progressively lower levels of 
innovation over time, the innovation index value goes down 
correspondingly. As noted above, while the index rewards innovators 
both at the NDS and SNDS levels, the index provides lower values to 
firms as the degree of innovation diminishes and as the product 
cluster grows to encompass first lower level line extension products 
and then generic products. 
D. Curve Fitting 
As noted in the Introduction, in assessments of innovation found 
in many government reports and documents, one often finds the 
assumption that an increase in the number of patents in a given 
technology sector equals increased innovation in that sector.
151
 Here 
also one finds arguments linking increased innovation and patenting 
to increased domestic productivity and prosperity as well as enhanced 
competitiveness on the global stage.
152
 The link between the two is 
the final assumption that patenting has social benefits that are 
proportional to the invention disclosed. There is no allowance, or, at 
the very least, precious little, made in political discourse for the 
possibility that sectors with high and increasing patent activity may be 
getting near the point of diminishing returns. Thus, while it is rarely 
                                                                                                                            
 151. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2, at 6. 
 152. Id. 
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explicitly stated, there is built into a great deal of intellectual property 
policy, the assumption that innovation, prosperity, and productivity 
are positively correlated with patenting. A negative correlation would 
contradict a certain fraction of patent policy and a good deal of drug 
firm lobbying. 
Our model allows us to obtain some relevant information 
pertaining to this debate. The reason for this conclusion is that the 
qualitative index is derived from regulatory standards that are 
themselves at least a first order approximation of social benefit. Thus, 
the trend between innovation and patent quality may be positive or 
negative and this trend can be either linear or exponential. 
For a positive correlation, a linear increase in LOI with indicator 
number would imply that for every increment in drug approval or 
drug patenting there would be a corresponding increase in social 
benefit. A log increase in patenting or approval with LOI would 
suggest a positive non-linear relationship between indicator number 
and social benefit. In this scenario the majority of either indicator 
would reside in the lower LOI value bins, implying that the majority 
of inventions measured would be likely to be poorly innovative with 
correspondingly low social benefit. In comparison, an exponential 
increase would suggest that the majority of either indicator would 
reside in the higher LOI value bins. For both the log and exponential 
scenarios, the extent to which the 25
th
, 50
th
, 75
th
 or any other 
percentage of maximal indicator would be in a relatively low or high 
portion of the index would depend on the power of the exponent, 
which in turn depends on the distribution of the data across LOI bins. 
The implications are reversed for a negative correlation. A linear 
decrease in LOI with indicator number would imply that for every 
increment in drug approval or drug patenting there would be a 
corresponding decrease in social benefit. An exponential decrease in 
patenting or approval with LOI would suggest that the majority of 
indicators would reside in the lower LOI value bins, again with 
correspondingly lower social innovation value. Conversely, a log 
decline would suggest that the majority of indicators would reside in 
comparatively higher LOI value bins, with accordingly greater 
probability of higher value innovation at all levels of LOI up to the 
maximal value. 
As discussed in the context of the Results (cf. note 155), the 
choice of numerical functions to describe the dependence of indicator 
on LOI value was not based on a specific model, econometric or 
otherwise. Rather, the purpose of analyzing the data in this manner 
was to provide a set of numerical benchmarks from which to assess 
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the descriptive properties of the data across the various new and 
follow-on categories and classes. The hybrid objective-subjective 
nature of the resulting transformed data is addressed below in Part 
VII.B. 
E. Data Analysis 
Drug approval, patenting, patent listing, and chemical data were 
collected, statistically analyzed, and graphed as described in the 
companion paper
153
 using a combination of Excel
®
 (Microsoft. Corp., 
Redmond, WA), Access
®
 (Microsoft.Corp., Redmond, WA), 
GraphPad Prism
®
 (Graphpad Software, Inc., La Jolla, CA), and 
SigmaPlot
®
 (Systat Software, Inc., San Jose, CA). Approval data were 
obtained from the Health Canada website and patent and chemical 
data were obtained from Canadian (CIPO) and US (USPTO) patent 
databases. Patent listing data were obtained from the Canadian Patent 
Register website maintained by Health Canada. 
VI. RESULTS 
A. Presentation of Data 
As outlined in the Methods and summarized in Tables 4-7, drug 
approvals, patents, and chemical components were analyzed across 
numerous drug classes within the broader categories of new and 
follow-on drugs. This included approvals in the new drug approval 
route directed to FIC drugs (NDS FIC), Me Too drugs (NDS Me 
Too), drugs containing an NAS (NDS NAS), drugs undergoing one of 
the two pathways for expedited review (NDS ER), and drugs deemed 
to be the most innovative (NDS MI). Drugs moving through the new 
drug approval route that did not have an extra designation (NDS) 
were also studied. Line extension drugs approved via the follow-on 
pathway were studied alone (SNDS) or in conjunction with FIC 
(SNDS FIC), Me Too (SNDS Me Too), and ER (SNDS ER) 
designations. Finally, generic drugs undergoing the conventional 
(ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS) abbreviated review were studied. 
Quantitative data were transformed into index values for drug 
approvals in the full cohort of 2,087 Notices of Compliance (NOCs), 
or approvals, associated with 608 drug products by regulators 
between 2001 and 2008, updated to November 2010 (Total Approval 
Cohort). The starting point for analysis was 2001, as major 
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amendments to the nation’s food and drug legislation and regulations 
which affected both the goals and mechanism of national drug 
regulation were made at this time.
154
 LOI values were next calculated 
for a sub-set of 375 of these approvals associated with 95 of the most 
profitable drugs approved over this period, also updated to 2010 (MP 
Approval Cohort). In addition to approval data, LOI values were 
calculated for patents and chemical components associated with the 
MP Approval Cohort. These are referred to as the MP Patent Cohort 
and the MP Chemical Cohort, respectively. 
LOI values were derived for approvals, patents, and chemicals in 
each of the drug classes enumerated above. In addition, LOI values 
across indicators were normalized for submissions within new (NDS), 
line extension (SNDS), and generic categories, both as a percent of all 
indicators investigated and as a percent of brand and generic 
approvals. Manipulation of data in this matter was not as extensive as 
undertaken in the companion paper, and generally was restricted to 
normalization for brand submissions following excision of generic 
data. Thus, the main data presented in Figures 1-4 follows the same 
pattern: First, raw LOI data are provided for all NDS, SNDS, ANDS, 
and SANDS classes (Figs. 1a-4a), following which only brand data 
are analyzed. This includes raw data for each indicator for only brand 
drug companies (Figs. 1b-4b), followed by fitting of raw and 
normalized data to various parametric functions (Figs. 1c-4c and Figs. 
1d-4d). 
A number of methods were utilized in order to quantify the 
numerical characteristics of the increase and decrease in LOI values 
with the numbers of approvals, patents, and chemical indicators as 
well as changes in LOI baseline values from one indicator to the next. 
First, approval, patent, and chemical indicators were assessed using 
the curve fitting approach described in Part V.D. Brand data were 
represented in a scatter diagram with corresponding fits (Figs. 1c-4c). 
With trial and error, we found that the decline in indicator with LOI 
value shown in Figs. 1c-4c could be best fit to an exponential function 
of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B, where A is the amplitude, λ is 
the rate constant for decline, and B is the baseline value. The 
statistical properties of the fit are given by the R
2
 value, which 
represents the goodness of fit of the data to the function. 
Next, LOI data were normalized to the cumulative maximum for 
each indicator (Figs. 1d-4d). This was done to assess how “fast” or 
“slow” the data rise to peak LOI levels in different cohorts. 
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Cumulative data in Figs. 1d-4d were best fit by a 4-parameter 
sigmoidal function of the form Y = B + A/[1 + (Index/S)
Q
],where B is 
the constant baseline, A is amplitude, S is the scaling factor, and Q is 
the power factor. Again, goodness of fit was assessed using R
2
 values. 
It can be verified by visual inspection of the data and best-fits in 
Figures 1c-4c and 1d-4d that the exponential and sigmoidal functions 
have opposite dependence on index values, with the exponential 
decreasing and the sigmoid increasing with increasing LOI values. 
The opposite dependence of the magnitude of the two functions on 
LOI values arises because the cumulative plots (Figs. 1d-4d) are an 
approximation to an integral of the declining plots (Figs. 1c-4c).
155
 
Cumulative data were further quantified by calculating the 
normalized LOI value at 50% (CNV50) and 80% (CNV80) of 
maximum. The values were calculated for the Total Approval, MP 
Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. These data were 
then described in the Results relative to Figures 1d-4d and compared 
directly to one another in Figure 5b and Figure 6b. The method for 
calculating the values is given in the inset to Figure 1d, which 
illustrates the manner in which the CNV50 and CNV80 values are 
calculated from the fitted curves. The goal of obtaining and 
comparing CNV50 and CNV80 data is parallel to that for assessing 
dose-response curves for biologically active compounds and the 
effective concentration at 50% maximum, typically referred to as the 
EC50 value. As such, the CNV50 value allows for a comparison of the 
number and type of drug classes that comprise the fiftieth percentile 
of maximal innovation in each cohort. The value at 80% maximal was 
chosen over the maximal value in order to gain an understanding of 
whether the data were accumulating in a linear or a non-linear 
manner. The purpose of both sets of analyses is to obtain descriptive 
information, in this case, about the manner in which LOI values 
change with indicator number across the different drug classes chosen 
for study. 
The difference between peak LOI values for each indicator 
                                                                                                                            
 155. The choice of exponential and sigmoidal functions to describe the dependence of 
indicator on LOI value was not based on any particular model. The purpose of the fitted 
functions was to provide simple global metrics that could describe the properties of the data set 
contained in each cohort. The exponential and sigmoidal functions were found to provide 
adequate, yet simple and quantitative descriptions for the raw data (Figs. 1c-4c) and the 
cumulative data (Figs. 1d-4d). It is likely that other functions could provide similarly “good” fits 
to the data, but at the expense of additional complexity. However, the excellence of the fits of 
the sigmoidal function to the cumulative data suggests that very little would be gained by using 
a more complex function. 
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minus the corresponding baseline LOI value for that indicator (Peak-
Baseline) for LOI values ≥ 6 were calculated and represented in 
graphical form (Fig. 6a). Peak values were the maximal LOI value per 
indicator and the Baseline value was taken as the mean of LOI values 
between LOI= 6 and LOI= 15.  
Finally, in order to gain an understanding of which drug classes 
might be contributing to changes in baseline, raw LOI data and the 
change from one new and follow-on drug class to the next for Me 
Too, FIC, ER, and NAS drugs were compared across NDS and SNDS 
categories and between MP Approval, Patenting, and Chemical 
Cohorts (Tbl. 8). Differences between drug classes are also analyzed 
in Figure 7, which summarizes the data in spider plot format. Spider 
graphs are particularly useful in this context, as they permit direct and 
simultaneous visual comparison of all new and follow-on drug classes 
across all four cohorts studied. Raw data for all four cohorts studied 
are provided in Tables 4-7 below. 
 
 
Table 4. 
Innovation Index Data for Total Approval Cohort 
 
TOTAL COHORT
- APPROVALS
MI
(5)
ER
(4)
FIC
(3)
NAS
(2.3)
Me Too
(1.5)
NDS
(1.3)
SNDS
(1)
ANDS
(1)
SANDS
(1)
NDS (3) 22 47 65 130 245 311
SNDS (2) 56 73 976 1049
ANDS (1) 580
SANDS (0.5) 147
 
 
 
Table 5. 
Innovation Index Data for MP Approval Cohort 
 
MP COHORT
- APPROVALS
MI
(5)
ER
(4)
FIC
(3)
NAS
(2.3)
Me Too
(1.5)
NDS
(1.3)
SNDS
(1)
ANDS
(1)
SANDS
(1)
NDS (3) 20 44 20 39 31 51
SNDS (2) 46 34 194 228
ANDS (1) 57
SANDS (0.5) 11
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MP COHORT
- PATENTING
MI
(5)
ER
(4)
FIC
(3)
NAS
(2.3)
Me Too
(1.5)
NDS
(1.3)
SNDS
(1)
ANDS
(1)
SANDS
(1)
NDS (3) 550 1049 550 995 742 1182
SNDS (2) 1057 1076 2514 2577
ANDS (1) 744
SANDS (0.5) 508
Table 6. 
Innovation Index Data for MP Patenting Cohort 
 
 
 
Table 7. 
Innovation Index Data for MP Chemical Cohort 
 
MP COHORT
- CHEMICALS
MI
(5)
ER
(4)
FIC
(3)
NAS
(2.3)
Me Too
(1.5)
NDS
(1.3)
SNDS
(1)
ANDS
(1)
SANDS
(1)
NDS (3) 20 43 20 39 30 48
SNDS (2) 26 24 62 64
ANDS (1) 13
SANDS (0.5) 5
 
 
 
B. Total Approval Cohort 
Results for the Total Approval Cohort are illustrated in Figure 1a 
and Table 4. The two values at the lowest end of the index are, not 
surprisingly, those for conventional (ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS) 
generics. After excision of generic data (Fig. 1b), the calculated LOI 
values for brand approvals can be observed to decline smoothly in 
bins with decreasing numbers of approvals. One of the most 
important results of this study is that the classes with the two largest 
numbers of approvals had the lowest LOI values next to generics; 
SNDS (LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too (LOI= 3) drugs. The classes 
represent line extension drug generally and line extension Me Too 
drugs specifically. As illustrated in Figure 1b, SNDS and SNDS Me 
Too drugs dominated the data set, with each class containing 
approximately 1,000 approvals. The next greatest class was the NDS 
class, which contained a little over 300 approvals. This indicates that 
there were over 300% more line extension approvals than new drug 
approvals. From an LOI value of ≥ 3, there was a smooth decline in 
calculated LOI value as the number of approvals in each class 
decreased. 
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Figure 1. 
Innovation Index Data for Total Approval Cohort 
 
 
Fig. 1. Innovation Index Data for Total Approval Cohort. Bar graphs showing the 
number of total approvals expressed as a function of the level of innovation (LOI) 
before (a) and after (b) excision of generic data. c. Brand approvals as a function of 
LOI shown in scatter plot format. Solid line is a fit of the data to a single exponential 
function of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. d. Cumulative normalized brand 
approvals expressed as a function of LOI. Solid lines are fits using a sigmoidal 
function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S)Q]. Inset. Method for calculating 
cumulative normalized values at 50% (a; CNV50) and 80% (b; CNV80) maximal.  
  
Figure 1c shows the brand data in a scatter diagram with 
corresponding curve fitting. The declining LOI data in Figure 1c was 
well fit to a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(-
Index/λ) + B. The R2 value, representing the goodness of fit of the 
data to the function, was 0.891. The data demonstrate a clear and 
convincing negative correlation between the number of approvals in a 
given new or follow-on drug class and its corresponding LOI value. 
Thus, of the range of possible numerical relationships between 
approval number and the corresponding level of innovation in the 
various drug classes investigated (see Part V. Methods), an 
exponential decline in LOI with approval number was observed. This 
finding supports the conclusion that the large majority of approvals in 
the Total Approval Cohort reside in the lower LOI value bins with 
correspondingly lower social benefit values. 
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That the bulk of approvals accumulate with the greatest 
frequency in lower LOI bins is supported by the cumulative 
normalized data and fit in Figure 1d. The cumulative data normalized 
to maximum were well fit by a sigmoidal function of the form Y = B 
+ A/[1 + (Index/S)
Q
], with an R
2
= 0.998. Supporting the conclusion 
that the majority of pharmaceutical innovation resides in low value 
LOI bins, CNV50 and CNV80 values for the Total Approval Cohort 
were 1.97 and 3.45, respectively. This result indicates that 50% and 
80% of all innovative value for the 2,087 approvals studied occurred 
at LOI values that were only 13% and 23% of maximal (LOI= 15). 
Not only are these values very low, especially the CVN80 value, but 
the results are skewed heavily by the largest two classes of approvals 
in the Total Approval Cohort that have the lowest LOI values, SNDS 
and SNDS Me Too drugs. Thus, the vast majority of all drug 
approvals granted by regulators over the ten year test period were of 
very low innovative value. 
Finally, the data in Figure 1, particularly the fits in Figures 1c 
and 1d, illustrate the value of the innovation index in identifying and 
measuring the long tail of the data set. As noted in the Methods, this 
portion of the LOI index represents the statistical property of a data 
set where a small but significant fraction of data is found within the 
tail end of a probability distribution. As illustrated by the raw index 
data in Figure 1b especially and the corresponding fit to the data in 
Figure 1c, the long tail is invaluable for investigation of LOI data, as 
it represents the locus of the most innovative drugs. While the fraction 
of drug classes at the higher end of the innovation index is not large in 
the Total Approval Cohort, we will see below that the size and 
distribution of classes within the long tail changes substantially across 
cohorts and indicators. 
C. MP Approval Cohort 
In order to address innovation index values for the most valuable 
drugs, LOI data for the MP Approval Cohort were calculated. The 
data obtained had analytical parameters that were very similar to 
those in the Total Approval Cohort and are provided in Figure 2 and 
Table 5. As shown by a visual comparison of Figures 1 and 2, the 
pattern and trends in the data for the MP Approval Cohort were 
similar to those observed for the Total Approval Cohort. 
The first observation is that the two values at the lowest end of 
the index again represent conventional (ANDS) and follow-on 
(SANDS) generics. These values are somewhat of a surprise given the 
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MP Approval Cohort reflects a narrower group of most valuable 
drugs in the total cohort. The presence of substantial ANDS and 
SANDS approvals demonstrate that a significant percentage of brand 
drugs came off patent protection during the test period. 
Second, the two largest classes of drug approvals in the entire 
data set pertaining to brand pharmaceuticals had the lowest LOI 
values. As in the Total Approval Cohort, these were SNDS approvals 
(LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too drugs (LOI= 3). As shown by the data in 
Table 5 these two classes represented the majority of all approvals in 
the MP Approval Cohort. There were 200 approvals in the SNDS 
category compared to 50 in the NDS category. Thus, there were four 
times more line extension drug approvals than new drug approvals in 
the most profitable cohort. 
 
Figure 2. 
Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Approval Cohort 
 
 
Fig. 2. Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Approval Cohort. Bar graphs 
showing the number of most profitable approvals expressed as a function of the level 
of innovation (LOI) before (a) and after (b) excision of generic data. c. Brand 
approvals expressed as a function of LOI in scatter diagram format. Solid line is a fit 
of the data to a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. d. 
Cumulative normalized brand approvals expressed as a function of LOI. Solid lines 
are fits using a sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S)Q]. 
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Third, after excision of generic data (Fig. 2b), the calculated LOI 
values again declined smoothly in drug classes with progressively 
decreasing numbers of approvals. From an LOI value of 3 onwards, 
there was a gradual decline in calculated LOI value as the number of 
approvals in each class decreased, with relatively greater jitter at the 
NDS ER (LOI= 12) and SNDS ER (LOI= 8) data points. More will be 
said about this later. 
 As in the Total Approval Cohort, data in the MP Approval 
Cohort scatter diagram indicate that the data points were well fit using 
an exponential function, with an R
2
= 0.839. As illustrated in Figure 
2c, the goodness of fit to the exponential was similar to that observed 
in the Total Approval Cohort (R
2
= 0.891). As a result, there was a 
clear negative correlation between the number of approvals in a given 
new or follow-on drug class in the MP Approval Cohort and its 
corresponding LOI value. This finding supports the conclusion that 
the majority of approvals in the Total Approval Cohort reside in the 
lower LOI value bins with lower social innovation value. 
The scatter around the fit was improved when the data were 
normalized for cumulative growth across classes (Fig. 2d). The R
2
 
value was 0.986, which was almost identical to the goodness of fit to 
the Total Approval Cohort (Fig. 1d; R
2
 = 0.998). CNV50 and CNV80 
values for the Total Approval Cohort were 2.48 and 5.26, 
respectively. These data reveal that that 50% and 80% of all 
innovative value for the 347 approvals studied in the MP Approval 
Cohort occurred at LOI values that were 17% and 35% of maximal. 
These values were low in view of the fact that all drugs assessed 
occupied the “most profitable” category, but improved compared to 
the corresponding data in the Total Approval Cohort (13% and 23%). 
The most significant increase occurred for drugs with LOI values of 7 
(NDS NAS), 8 (SNDS ER), and 12 (NDS ER). 
While the value of the NDS NAS, SNDS ER and NDS ER 
classes increased in a small but significant manner, the data in Figure 
2 nevertheless demonstrate that the large majority of approvals 
associated with the most profitable drugs approved during the eight 
year test period were of very low innovative value. As in the Total 
Approval Cohort, the results remain heavily skewed by the largest 
two classes of approvals in the MP Approval Cohort with the lowest 
LOI values, SNDS and SNDS Me Too drugs. Consequently, while the 
innovative value of the cohort increased somewhat compared to the 
Total Approval Cohort, the large majority of drug approvals granted 
by regulators over the test period were of low innovative value. The 
relative increase in LOI values for the more innovative classes shows 
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up visually as a small but observable increase in the baseline of the 
long tail, both in the raw LOI values (Fig. 2b) and in the fitted curves 
(Fig. 2c). Similarly, the slope of the cumulative normalized brand 
LOI values in Figure 2d is shallower and shifted rightward as it drives 
towards its maximum. 
D. MP Patenting Cohort 
One of the most important reasons for conducting this study was 
to determine the innovative value of patents associated with various 
classes of new and follow-on drugs. Following much of the patent 
literature and government reports on topic, one might expect to see a 
positive relationship between those drug classes perceived to be the 
most valuable and patenting activity in relation to those drugs. Even if 
this were not true across all classes of drugs, it would be reasonable in 
light of the persistent claims by industry and its supporters to expect 
lower patenting numbers on drugs with the least innovative value. To 
the degree that the data do not support these expectations, it would 
then be plausible to speculate whether portfolio, or cluster-based, 
drug development strategy is in fact driving much of firm approval 
and patenting behaviours. 
As illustrated by the data in Figures 3a-3c, a positive correlation 
between drugs with the greatest number of patents and their 
associated innovation index value was not observed. Indeed, exactly 
the opposite pattern was demonstrated; that is, drugs with the lowest 
LOI values had the greatest number of associated patents. As with the 
drug approval data in Figures 1 and 2, line extension drugs generally 
and SNDS Me Too drugs in particular attracted the greatest number 
of patents. Conversely, the drug class with the lowest number of 
patents was that with the highest LOI value corresponding to the NDS 
MI class. The distribution of remaining patents was spread relatively 
equally across drug classes with comparatively higher LOI values 
than that observed for both approval cohorts. 
As observed for the Total Approval Cohort and MP Approval 
Cohort, the two values at the lowest end of the index encompassed 
conventional (ANDS) and follow-on (SANDS) generics. Indeed, the 
number of patents in the generic drug classes was surprisingly large. 
The most significant observation in this regard is that the number of 
generic patents exceeded those for brand drugs in many of the new 
and follow on drug classes investigated (Fig. 3a). In a similar vein, 
there was a significant fraction of total generic patents in what 
amounts to the generic follow-on class. These values are remarkable 
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given that the MP Patent Cohort reflects the more narrowly defined, 
most profitable, cohort. Combined with the data in the MP Approval 
Cohort, patenting data in the MP Patent Cohort indicate that, 
notwithstanding the low LOI values attached to generic patents, 
generic firms appear to be leveraging the same approval and patent 
strategy as brand firms. 
 
Figure 3. 
Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Patent Cohort 
 
 
Fig. 3. Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Patent Cohort. Bar graphs 
showing the number of patents associated with most profitable approvals expressed 
as a function of the level of innovation (LOI) before (a) and after (b) excision of 
generic data. c. Patents associated with brand approvals in the MP Approval Cohort 
were identified, expressed as a function of LOI, and shown in scatter plot format. 
Solid line is a fit of the data to a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(-
Index/λ) + B. d. Cumulative normalized patents expressed as a function of LOI. Solid 
lines are fits using a sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S)Q]. 
 
Of the general trends in the patenting data, the most important is 
that the dominance of the SNDS and SNDS Me Too classes extends 
to drug patenting as well as drug approval. As illustrated in Figure 3b, 
following excision of generic data the two largest classes of drug 
patents again had the lowest LOI values. These were SNDS patents 
(LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too patents (LOI= 3). As shown by the raw 
data in Table 5 these two classes represented a substantial majority of 
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all patents in the MP Patent Cohort. There were approximately 2,600 
patents associated with line extension (SNDS) drugs, compared to 
1,200 patents associated with new (NDS) drugs. Thus, it is not the 
most innovative or even moderately innovative drugs that are 
attracting the greatest firm patenting effort. Rather, it is the least 
innovative brand drugs of all classes investigated that is attracting the 
greatest patent protection. 
When only data from innovator firms are analyzed (Fig. 3b), the 
calculated LOI values for brand drugs declined progressively across 
all drug classes studied. The lowest number of patents in the entire 
data set was in the NDS MI class. As with the MP Approval Cohort, 
there was a comparatively smaller decline in calculated LOI values in 
the NDS ER (LOI= 12) and SNDS ER (LOI= 8) classes. This resulted 
in a larger baseline at higher LOI values. 
The data in the scatter diagram in Figure 3c show that the data 
points continued to be reasonably well fitted to an exponential 
function, with an R
2
 value= 0.768. The goodness of fit to the data was 
not as strong as that in the MP Approval Cohort (R
2
= 0.839). As 
noted above, this is due to the greater scatter and higher baseline 
component of the fit, which itself was due primarily to the single data 
point for NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12). The data in Figures 3a and 3b 
demonstrate convincing negative correlation between the number of 
patents in a given new or follow-on drug class and its corresponding 
LOI value. As such, the data in Figure 3 answer the question raised 
earlier in the Article of whether there is, in fact, a positive or negative 
correlation between the social benefits of innovation and patenting 
activity, at least using the present methodology. 
The scatter around the fit was improved when the data were 
normalized for cumulative growth across classes (Fig. 3d). The data 
were well fit by a sigmoid function, with an R
2
 value= 0.993. The fit 
supports the conclusion of an exponential decline in LOI with 
patenting number (Fig. 3c). Combined the data in Figure 3 suggest 
that, like the two approval cohorts assessed in Figures 1 and 2, the 
majority of patents in the MP Patent Cohort reside in the lower LOI 
value bins with correspondingly lower social innovation value. This is 
supported by the CNV data. CNV50 and CNV80 values were 3.4 and 
7.3, respectively. This result indicates that 50% and 80% of all 
innovative value for patents associated with the 375 approvals in the 
MP Approval Cohort occurred at LOI values that were 23% and 49% 
of the maximal LOI value possible. These values are greater than the 
17% and 35% observed in the MP Approval Cohort, and much higher 
than corresponding values in the Total Approval Cohort (13% and 
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23%). Therefore, while the value ascribed to drug patents using the 
innovation index is low given the “most profitable” designation of the 
drugs in this data set and the historical claim of a positive relationship 
between drug patenting and the social benefits of innovation, the 
baseline level of innovation at index values ≥ 6 is higher than 
observed for either the Total Approval Cohort or the MP Approval 
Cohort. Thus, despite their shortcomings, patents appear to be a better 
indicator of innovative value compared to approvals. 
The relative increase in LOI values for the more innovative 
classes shows up visually as an increase in the baseline of the long 
tail, both in the raw LOI values following excision of generic data 
(Fig. 3b) and in the fitted curves (Fig. 3c). Similarly, the slope of the 
cumulative normalized brand LOI values in Figure 3d is shallower as 
it reaches its maximum. Finally, the point on the index at which LOI 
values began to increase occurred at an innovation index value of 6, 
as opposed to an LOI value= 8 for the MP Approval Cohort. As with 
the approval data in Figure 2, the single data point at an LOI value of 
12 (NDS ER) seemed responsible for much of the increase in the 
baseline of the fit. 
E. MP Chemical Cohort 
As noted in the Introduction, the primary reason for investigating 
chemical components in addition to qualifying approvals and patents 
was to gain an understanding of the utility of chemicals to cluster-
based drug development. This objective arose from the observation in 
an earlier study that chemical patents accounted for the lowest 
fraction of patent classifications in the MP Approval Cohort.
156
 
Patents directed to combination therapies, routes of administration 
and uses exceeded chemical patents. Even within the chemical class, 
chemical patents that appeared to be directed to follow-on drug 
development prevailed (chemical derivatives; crystalline forms; salts; 
and enantiomers). With this in mind, we looked to see what drug 
classes had the greatest number of chemicals disclosed in patent 
claims. Much like the results expected for the MP Patent Cohort one 
might anticipate a positive relationship between chemicals and the 
level of innovation. In contrast, the opposite result may be expected to 
the extent that the cluster-based innovation strategy is dominant. The 
results obtained support the cluster-based strategy but also 
demonstrate the highest level of functional utility across all indicators 
studied. 
                                                                                                                            
 156. Bouchard 2010, supra note 51, at 202 fig.6. 
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Figure 4. 
Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Chemical Cohort 
 
 
Fig. 4. Innovation Index Data for Most Profitable Chemical Cohort. Bar graphs 
showing the number of chemicals associated with most profitable approvals 
expressed as a function of the level of innovation (LOI) before (a) and after (b) of 
generic data. c. Chemicals identified in the MP Patent Cohort were expressed as a 
function of LOI and shown in scatter diagram format. Solid line is a fit of the data to 
a single exponential function of the form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. d. Cumulative 
normalized chemicals expressed as a function of LOI. Solid lines are fits using 
sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S)Q]. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that the negative correlation between the 
number of indicators observed in a given drug class and its 
corresponding LOI value is maintained in the MP Chemical Cohort. 
That is, line extension SNDS drugs generally, and SNDS Me Too 
drugs in particular, continued to attract the greatest number of 
chemicals. However, as discussed more fully below, the distribution 
of the remaining chemical components was spread more evenly 
across all other drug classes than in the Total Approval Cohort, the 
MP Approval Cohort, or the MP Patent Cohort. 
Similar to the other cohorts, conventional (ANDS) and follow-on 
(SANDS) generics represented by far the lowest number of chemicals 
(Fig. 4a). This is not surprising since, compared to approvals and 
15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:41 AM 
338 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
patents, the development of novel chemical forms does not comprise 
a significant element of bioequivalence approval pathways. Even so, 
the number of chemical forms associated with generic products was 
not insignificant. 
As with MP Approval and MP Patent Cohorts, SNDS and SNDS 
Me Too classes represent the two largest classes of chemical 
components. As demonstrated in Figure 4b, of the 130 chemicals 
identified in the study, approximately 65 were associated with the 
SNDS drug class. By comparison, the NDS class was associated with 
50 chemicals. As a result, while line extension drugs accounted for 
the majority of chemicals (57%), new drugs accounted for 43% of all 
chemicals associated with brand drugs. This result in general supports 
the importance of subtle variations in drug chemistry to cluster-based 
drug development in the pharmaceutical sector but also highlights the 
importance of chemicals in the context of new drug development 
(setting aside the issue of whether these are chemical derivatives, 
crystalline forms, esters, salts, or enantiomers of already approved 
and marketed drugs). 
Unlike the other cohorts studied, there were significant numbers 
of chemicals occupying all other class bins, including all drug classes 
with LOI values ≥ 3 (Fig. 4b). Here we see, for the first time, the 
prominence of chemicals in the NDS category, with significant 
increases in the number of chemicals in the NDS MI (LOI= 15), NDS 
ER (LOI= 12), NDS FIC (LOI= 9), and NDS NAS (LOI= 7) classes. 
Similarly, there were significant increases in SNDS ER (LOI= 8) and 
SNDS FIC (LOI= 6) classes. The data suggest that, in addition to an 
increase in the number of chemicals occupying the most innovative 
class of all (NDS MI), elevation in the general baseline level of 
innovation is accounted for by a strong showing in several NDS and 
SNDS classes. This is especially true for both new and line extension 
ER and FIC drugs. 
The scatter diagram in Figure 4c show that the data could be 
reasonably well fit using an exponential function, with an R
2
 value of 
0.704. However, continuing the trend observed moving from the Total 
Approval Cohort to the MP Approval and MP Patent Cohorts, the 
goodness of fit observed was less strong. As observed with the MP 
Patenting Cohort, this was due to the elevated baseline in the raw and 
fitted data, which itself was due strongly to the increased value for 
NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12). While the baseline was significantly 
increased at all levels of innovation, the relationship between 
chemicals and innovation continued to be negative, with an 
exponential decline from peak values. Therefore, the method tested 
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here yields the same result for drug approvals, patents, and chemical 
components. 
Similar to all other cohorts studied, the goodness of fit was 
improved when cumulative data were normalized (Fig. 4d). 
Cumulative data were well fit using a sigmoidal function, with an R
2
 
value of 0.992. The fits in Figures 4c-4d suggest an exponential 
decline in LOI with drug class chemical number. 
The results thus far suggest that like the other three cohorts 
studied, the majority of chemicals in the MP Chemical Cohort reside 
in the lower LOI value bins with correspondingly lower social 
innovation value. The caveat to this conclusion, which is significant 
for this indicator, is that the baseline level of LOI values across the 
index is much more evenly spread out across the various drug classes. 
This can be visualized by the higher baseline values for raw chemical 
data (Fig. 4c) as well as the much lower slope of the cumulative 
normalized data to its maximum (Fig. 4d). 
Consistent with this conclusion, the CNV50 value increased to 
4.08 and the CNV80 value increased to 8.19. These data suggest that 
50% and 80% of all innovative value for chemicals associated with 
approvals in the MP Approval Cohort occurred at LOI values that 
were 27% and 55% of the maximal LOI value. This represents a 
substantial jump from the CNV50 and CNV80 values of 13% and 23% 
in the Total Approval Cohort, and a significant increase compared to 
values for the MP Approval Cohort (17% and 35%) and even the MP 
Patent Cohort (23% and 49%). Importantly, the increase in innovative 
value of chemicals is observed for all drug classes with an LOI ≥ 3. 
Taken together, the data in Figures 1-4 and Tables 4-7 suggest 
that the rank order of functional utility of the indicators studied is 
chemical components > drug patents > drug approvals. Having said 
this, only approvals and patents provide firms with the legal license to 
operate in the pharmaceutical sphere and can be used as legal tools in 
cluster-based drug development. 
F. Class Trends Across Indicators 
As discussed in Part V.A. above, a number of methods were used 
to quantify trends in the LOI data and to identify which drug classes 
might be driving the fits across indicators and cohorts. The data are 
directly compared and summarized in Figures 5, 6, and 7. From these 
data six general trends across indicators can be extracted: (1) line 
extension (SNDS) and line extension Me Too (SNDS Me Too) drugs 
represented the two largest drug classes across all approval, patent 
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and chemical indicators studied; (2) the lowest number of approvals, 
patent and chemicals studied was always in the most innovative drug 
class (NDS MI); (3) there was a negative exponential relationship 
between all approval, patenting and chemical indicators studied and 
LOI value; (4) the baseline level of innovation at higher LOI levels 
increased across the four cohorts; (5) in different cohorts, different 
drug classes contributed differently to the baseline elevation; and (6) 
the one exception to the previous rule is that the NDS ER class (LOI= 
12), and to some extent the SNDS ER class (LOI= 8), appeared to be 
primarily responsible for the baseline elevation across cohorts and 
indicators. The remaining data in the Results section explore these 
trends in more detail. 
The numerical relationship between LOI values for drug classes 
across indicators is summarized in Figure 5. Figure 5a provides 
comparative data relating to the exponential decline in LOI value with 
decreasing indicator number across cohorts normalized to maximal 
values. Figure 5b shows a comparison of the cumulative increase in 
indicators with LOI across cohorts normalized to relevant maximal 
values, from which CNV50 and CNV80 values were calculated. 
Figure 5a directly compares the normalized exponential decline 
in approval, patent, and chemical indicators with LOI value. The 
decline of indicator number with LOI value was fit to a single 
exponential function of the form Y=A*exp(-Index/λ)+B. R2 values 
were 0.891, 0.839, 0.768, and 0.704, for the Total Approval, MP 
Approval, MP Patent and MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively. For 
convenience’s sake, only the fits to the data are compared. Following 
removal of generic data, the two drug classes with the largest numbers 
of indicators and lowest LOI values were invariably the SNDS line 
extension drugs, followed by line extension Me Too drugs. From their 
normalized maximal, LOI data in all four cohorts declined smoothly 
with indicator number. The fits provide strong evidence in support of 
an exponential decline in all approval, patent and chemical indicators 
studied as the level of innovation increases from the lowest LOI value 
of 2 for brand drugs (SNDS) to its maximal value of 15 for NDS MI 
drugs. There was a clear negative correlation between the number of 
approvals, patents and chemicals for both new and follow-on drug 
classes and their corresponding LOI value. This finding supports the 
conclusion that the majority of approvals, patents and chemicals 
associated with approved drugs reside in the lower LOI value bins 
with correspondingly lower social innovation value.  
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Figure 5. 
Comparison of Decline and Rise of Normalized LOI Data Across 
Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Comparison of Decline and Rise of Normalized LOI Data Across 
Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators. Fits compared are those to brand data 
for Total Approval Cohort (─ ; strongest exponential decline), MP Approval Cohort 
(─ ; next strongest exponential decline), MP Patent Cohort (─ ; moderate exponential 
decline) and MP Chemical Cohort (─ ; weakest exponential decline). Top Panel. 
Exponential decline in the number of brand approvals, patents and chemicals as a 
function of LOI. Data have been normalized to maximal values for each of the four 
cohorts studied. Solid lines are a fit of the data to a single exponential function of the 
form Y = A*exp(-Index/λ) + B. R2 values were 0.0.891, 0.839, 0.768, and 0.704, for 
the Total Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent and MP Chemical Cohorts, 
respectively. Bottom Panel. Cumulative increase in the number of brand approvals, 
patents and chemicals with LOI normalized to maximal values. Solid lines are fits 
using a sigmoidal function of the form Y = A + B/[1 + (Index/S)Q]. R2 values were 
0.998, 0.986, 0.993, and 0.992 for the Total Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent and 
MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively.  
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Figure 6. 
Changes in Peak-Baseline Values and CNV50 and CNV80 Values 
Across Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators 
 
 
Fig. 6. Changes in Peak-Baseline Values and CNV50 and CNV80 Values Across 
Approval, Patent, and Chemical Indicators. a. Blue bars () represent the 
difference between peak LOI values and baseline LOI values for the Total Approval, 
MP Approval, MP patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. Peak value was taken as the 
peak LOI value per indicator. Baseline was calculated as the mean of LOI values ≥ 6. 
b. Bars represent the change CNV50 () and CNV80 () values across cohorts and 
indicators. 
 
The second major observation in Figure 5a is that the baseline 
level of innovation at higher LOI values increases as one moves 
progressively from the Total Approval Cohort to the MP Approval, 
MP Patenting, and MP Chemical Cohorts. As such, the news is not all 
bad regarding pharmaceutical innovation. This finding is not 
surprising however, as the latter three cohorts have already been 
vetted by the market to be the most profitable. Elevation of LOI 
values across drug classes shows up visually as an increase in the 
baseline of the long tail, which as noted above refers to the property 
of a data set where a significant fraction of data is found within the 
tail-end of a probability distribution. That data reveal consideration of 
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the long tail is pertinent to the LOI model because the numbers in the 
higher end of the index represent the most innovative drugs yet 
invariably comprise a smaller fraction of the total values. As shown in 
Figure 5a, the baseline of the tail increases across cohorts, suggesting 
a rank order of innovation of chemicals > patents > approvals.  
The analysis of normalized cumulative data in Figure 5b was 
undertaken to assess the frequency of accumulation of indicator in 
lower LOI bins in the various cohorts. The increase in cumulative 
indicator to its normalized maximum across the LOI scale was fit to a 
sigmoidal function of the form Y=B+A/[1+(Index/S)
Q
]. R
2
 values 
were 0.998, 0.990, 0.995, and 0.994 for Total Approval, MP 
Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively. The 
data demonstrate that there is a significant difference in the slope of 
the cumulative LOI values across indicators as the fits drive towards 
their maximum values; the “faster” the fit drives to its maximum, the 
greater fraction of total indicator resides in lower LOI bins. The 
fastest increase was observed for the Total Approval Cohort, the 
slowest for the MP Chemical Cohort, with the MP Approval and MP 
Patent Cohorts straddling the difference. These data suggest that a 
significant majority of all approvals, patents and chemicals indicators 
studied reside in relatively low value innovation index bins with 
accordingly low social benefit. The specific rank order of cohorts 
weighted more heavily in lower LOI bins was Total Approval Cohort 
> MP Approval Cohort > MP Patent Cohort > MP Chemical Cohort, 
essentially the inverse of the rank orders for the increase in baseline 
values in Figure 5a. 
Figure 6 quantifies the rise in baseline levels in Figure 5a using 
two methods. The first, shown in Figure 6a, is a simple calculation of 
the difference between measured peak values and baseline values. 
The height of the bars in the graph reflect the numerical difference 
between the peak LOI value for a given indicator minus the average 
LOI value for all drug classes with LOI values ≥ 6 (e.g., all drug 
classes with LOI values greater than SNDS FIC drugs). The data 
demonstrate a clear increase in the Peak-Baseline value as it 
represents the sum of all changes in the fraction of NDS NAS drugs 
(LOI= 7), SNDS FIC drugs (LOI= 6), SNDS ER drugs (LOI= 8), 
NDS FIC drugs (LOI= 9), NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12), and NDS MI 
drugs (LOI= 15). The values increased from 4.8% of the peak 
indicator value in the Total Approval Cohort to 12.5% in the MP 
Approval Cohort to 27.2% and 46.2% of peak values for MP Patent 
and MP Chemical Cohorts, respectively.  
Figure 6b summarizes results from the second method, described 
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above for calculating CNV50 and CNV80 values. The former values are 
represented by open bars and the latter by closed bars. As with the 
Peak-Baseline values, both CNV50 and CNV80 values increased from 
their lowest value in the Total Approval Cohort to their maximal 
value in the MP Chemical Cohort. More specifically, the CNV50 value 
increased from 1.97, to 2.48, 3.4 and 4.08, amounting to a 2.1-fold 
increase across indicators. Similarly, the CNV80 value increased from 
3.45, to 5.26, 7.3 and 8.19, amounting to a 2.4-fold increase across 
indicators. The difference between the two is accounted for by the 
non-linear nature of the fits to the data. 
The comparative data in Figures 5 and 6 reveal that the baseline 
amount of innovation generally increases from the Total Approval 
Cohort to the MP Approval, Patent and Chemical Cohorts but 
provides little information as which specific drug classes are driving 
the trend. In order to investigate this issue further the LOI values 
across indicators and drug classes were compared against one another 
in spider graph format. Certain data were then extracted and 
expressed relative to maximal approval, patenting and chemical data 
for brand pharmaceutical firms. Drug classes selected for analysis 
were new and follow-on Me Too, FIC, ER and NAS drugs. The 
resulting data are presented in Figure 7 and Table 8. 
Figure 7 summarizes all raw LOI data analyzed in this Article 
using the spider plot format. Spider graphs are particularly useful in 
the present context, as they permit direct and simultaneous visual 
comparison of all new and follow-on drug classes across cohorts. 
Data trends in the plots can be seen to be comprised of two distinct 
components; a “shoulder” component at LOI values between 2 and 3 
and a smaller “core” component corresponding to the baseline 
component in Figures 1-5 at LOS values ≥ 6. Whereas the fits in 
Figures 1-5 tend to smooth out small but significant differences in the 
data, these same data points are particularly visible in the spider plots 
(and are also visible in the raw data in Figures 1c-4c). 
The graphs illustrate well the three most important trends across 
indicators. That is, the peak values always occur at LOI values 
between 2 and 3, the lowest LOI value always occurs at the maximal 
LOI value of 15, and the core, or baseline, LOI values increase across 
cohorts. Comparison of Figures 7a and 7b reveal surprisingly little 
difference in radial plots between the Total Approval Cohort 
containing all 2,087 approvals over the eight year study period and 
the 347 approvals contained in the much narrower Most Profitable 
Approval Cohort. There was a small but significant elevation in the 
data at LOI values of 12 and 8, corresponding to the NDS ER and 
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SNDS ER classes. As noted above, these differences were smoothed 
out by the curve fitting procedure, but are quite visible when graphed 
in the format used in Figure 7. The only other major difference is the 
notable decline in generic drugs at LOI values lower than 2, as would 
be expected in the most profitable cohort.  
 
Figure 7. 
Summary and Comparison of Innovation Index Data for Total 
Approval, MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Summary and Comparison of Innovation Index Data for Total Approval, 
MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. Spider graphs illustrating 
the relationship between the number of indicator and its corresponding innovation 
index value in the Total Approval Cohort (a), MP Approval Cohort (b), MP Patent 
Cohort (c) and MP Chemical Cohort (d). Data are normalized to the peak LOI value 
of 15 in each instance to increase separation of data at lower LOI values to the 
maximal degree. Peak values are 1049, 228, 2577 and 64 in Panels a-d, respectively. 
Note that each plot has an equal number of radial tics from zero to the maximal value.  
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As one moves to the MP Patent and Chemical Cohorts in Figures 
7c and 7d, the most striking observation is the strong increase at LOI 
values of 12 (NDS ER drugs). Also visible are increases in drug 
classes at LOI values of 6, 7 and 8, corresponding to SNDS FIC, NDS 
NAS, and SNDS ER drugs, respectively. The largest change from the 
MP Approval Cohort to the MP Patent Cohort was NDS ER drugs 
(LOI= 12) and SNDS ER drugs (LOI= 8), whereas the largest change 
for the MP Chemical Cohort was for NDS ER drugs (LOI= 12) and 
NDS NAS drugs (LOI= 7). 
Table 8 further quantifies the data relating to changes in NDS 
and SNDS Me Too, FIC, ER, and NAS classes for the MP Approval 
Cohort, MP Patent Cohort, and the MP Chemical Cohort. The data are 
expressed as a percentage of total brand approvals, patents, and 
chemicals for each indicator. The numbers in brackets illustrate the 
percent increase in Me Too, FIC, ER, and NAS classes in the MP 
Patent and MP Chemical Cohorts compared to the MP Approval 
Cohort, which was used as a convenient benchmark. 
 
Table 8. 
Change in New and Follow-On Sub-Categories Across Indicators 
 
 
*Data are expressed as a percent of total brand approvals for Most Profitable drugs 
approved between 2001-2008 (updated to November 2010). Parentheses represent the 
percent change from Approval Values. Note that even where the total fraction of 
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approved drugs do not change from one Indicator to the next (e.g. Me Too), that the 
percentage of drugs in NDS and SNDS sub-categories change substantially. 
 
The results from this analysis confirm the results in Figure 7 and 
supply further information pertaining to new and follow-on Me Too 
and FIC drugs. As with the spider plots, the data show that the 
increase in the level of baseline innovation has a differing mechanism 
for the approval, patenting and chemical cohorts. For approvals, by 
far the greatest class was SNDS Me Too drugs. However, this was 
followed by a significant number of approvals in the NDS and SNDS 
ER classes, consistent with the data peak at LOI values of 12 and 8 in 
Figures 2 and 7. In the patenting cohort, there was also a significant 
spike in SNDS Me Too patents. However, we also see large numbers 
of new (NDS) and follow-on (SNDS) ER drugs and follow-on SNDS 
FIC drugs. The pattern switches up for the chemical cohort, where 
there is a very large spike in NDS ER drugs and NDS NAS drugs 
compared to NDS or SNDS FIC drugs. The data for each cohort are 
consistent with the patterns identified in Figure 7.  
These differences can also be approximated using rank order 
data. The rank order of combined NDS and SNDS drug classes was 
Me Too > ER > FIC > NAS for the MP Approval Cohort. This can be 
compared with FIC > NAS > ER > Me Too in the MP Patent Cohort 
and NAS > FIC > ER > Me Too for the MP Chemical Cohort. These 
rank orders differ substantially from one cohort to the next, and are 
responsible for the differing contributions of different drug classes to 
the baseline in different cohorts. Not surprisingly, with a more 
granular level of detail there were also significant differences in the 
ratio of new drug to follow-on drug indicators, with the largest ratio 
observed for approvals (7:1), patents (3.5:1) and chemicals (2:1) in 
Me Too class within the MP Approval Cohort, compared to minimal 
differences in other cohorts and drug classes (maxing out at 2:1 for 
patenting in the FIC drug class and 1:2 in the ER drug class for 
chemicals).  
Nevertheless, while the classes responsible for the increased 
baseline LOI values at index values ≥ 3 differed significantly between 
cohorts, the common denominator driving these changes was an 
increased focus on both NDS and SNDS ER and FIC drugs. A 
secondary consideration was an increased focus on NDS and NDS 
NAS drugs, especially for the MP Chemical Cohort.  
VII. DISCUSSION 
The primary observation in this Article is that it is possible to 
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move beyond methods employed to count or quantify patents, patent 
citations, and related litigation data and, instead, to provide a 
qualitative measure of patents on pharmaceutical products that is 
coherent with the first principals of patent law and policy. A new 
qualitative innovation index is presented that is rational and based on 
objective evidence that provides a means to qualify patent protection 
attached to drug products. A second important characteristic of the 
model is that the index is sufficiently flexible to gain a measure of the 
quality, or social value, of patents at various stages of regulatory 
approval, including before drugs are approved and during the post-
market surveillance period. Thus, the index may have utility in newer 
“lifecycle” models of drug approval which contemplate drugs being 
marketed after Phase 2 clinical trials with greater post-market 
surveillance.
157
 A third advantage of the model is that, in addition to 
calculating the quality of patents, the index can also be used to qualify 
other legal and technological components associated with drug 
products, including regulatory approvals, patents that are listed on the 
patent register, market exclusivity periods attached to a given drug, as 
well as related chemical components, patent classifications, WHO 
Anatomic Therapeutic Classes, and other related information. Fourth, 
unlike the majority of counting models, it is not necessary to wait 
until the patent has been licensed, litigated, or granted long enough to 
be cited as prior art; patents may be qualified using the index before 
these events create full spill-over effects to the public. A fifth 
advantage of the index is that there is sufficient flexibility in the index 
for recalculating the LOI value on a moving basis for a given drug as 
it transitions from one stage of its product lifecycle to another over 
time. The index may also be used to qualify technologies other than 
pharmaceuticals, provided that regulatory requirements and priorities 
have been elucidated by regulators. Finally, given that it is based on 
values and priorities set by regulators in their mandate to balance 
public health and industrial and economic policy, the index is 
consistent with the first principles of patent law. 
                                                                                                                            
 157. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 823; Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 
66. This utility would apply not only to government regulators and pharmaceutical firms, but 
also to university technology transfer offices, venture capital, and other funders of early- to mid-
stage technologies and products. 
15 BOUCHARD (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:41 AM 
2012] INNOVATION INDEX FOR PHARMACEUTICALS 349 
A. Interpretation of the Data 
1. Drug Approval 
The vast majority of brand approvals in both the Total Approval 
and MP Approval Cohorts were for the classes of drugs with the 
lowest LOI values, in particular SNDS (LOI= 2) and SNDS Me Too 
(LOI= 3) drugs. These drugs occupy the two lowest LOI value bins in 
the index next to conventional (ANDS; LOI= 1.0) and follow-on 
(SANDS; n= 0.5) generic drugs. The fraction of SNDS and SNDS Me 
Too drugs accounting for NDS, SNDS, and total approvals for both 
Total Approval and MP Approval Cohorts, are quantified in the 
companion paper and will not be discussed further here. Suffice to say 
that just these two drug classes alone accounted for 55% of all brand 
drugs studied over the test period. 
As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the number of drug approvals 
for products with LOI values ≥ 3 fell strongly with LOI in both the 
Total Approval and MP Approval Cohorts. As such, a major 
observation of this study is the negative correlation between the 
number of approvals in various drug classes and the corresponding 
innovation index value. The fall in LOI value with approval number 
could be fit to a single exponential function. An exponential decline 
in approval LOI values is consistent with the conclusion that that the 
large majority of drug approvals reside in the lower LOI value bins. 
A finding consistent with this conclusion is provided by the 
CNV50 and CNV80 data. As indicated in the discussion pertaining to 
Figures 1 and 2, and the data in Figures 5 and 6, 50% of all approvals 
in the Total Approval and MP Approval Cohorts resided at LOI 
values ≤ 2.5, or 13% of peak innovation. This is very low, especially 
for the MP Approval Cohort. The value comes up to an LOI= 5.25 
when the CNV80 data are used, but even so this means that 
approximately 80% of all regulatory approvals investigated over the 
eight year test period have an innovation index value that is only 35% 
of maximal. A CNV50 value of 2.5 indicates that 50% of all brand 
drugs approved are generic (ANDS, SANDS) and brand line 
extension (SNDS) drugs. A CNV80 value of 5.26 indicates that 80% of 
all brand drugs approved are comprised of conventional line 
extension (SNDS) and line extension Me Too (SNDS Me Too) drugs 
and conventional new (NDS) and NDS Me Too drugs. In either case, 
the contribution of ER, FIC, and NAS classes in both NDS and SNDS 
categories and NDS MI drugs is negligible. The contribution of these 
classes is even more minimal in the Total Approval Cohort, as the 
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CNV50 and CNV80 values were 1.97 and 3.45, or 80% and 66% of the 
values for the MP Approval Cohort. 
While an average LOI value equal to 5.26 (CNV80) in the MP 
Approval Cohort demonstrates that 80% of all brand drugs approved 
are SNDS, NDS, SNDS Me Too, and NDS Me Too drugs, the 
contribution of more innovative classes unquestionably increases 
compared with the Total Approval Cohort. As discussed in the 
companion paper, this is sensible for two reasons. First, the MP 
Approval Cohort has been vetted by the market prior to measurement. 
Consequently, the reported values are for drugs that have already 
been deemed by the market to be the most profitable. Second, drugs 
in the MP Approval Cohort have been vetted comparatively early by 
regulators, as nearly two thirds of the approved drugs went through 
one of two expedited review processes. This is evident from both the 
raw data in the bar graphs and the fitted cures in Figures 1 and 2. As 
illustrated in Figure 1 for the Total Approval Cohort, the LOI data 
decline rapidly from a peak of LOI= 2, with little contribution from 
NDS NAS, SNDS FIC, SNDS ER, NDS FIC, NDS ER, and NDS MI 
drug classes. Similarly, Figure 6 shows that the Peak-Baseline value 
is close to zero, representing approximately 5-7% of the maximal LOI 
value. By contrast, in the MP Approval Cohort, there is stronger 
representation by more innovative drugs, including all drugs with an 
LOI ≥ 3. This shows up in the higher baseline in the raw and fitted 
data (Figs. 2b-2c), the slower rise to peak cumulative normalized 
maximum (Figs. 2d and 5), the summarized CNV50 and CNV80 data 
(Fig. 6b), and the larger Peak-Baseline calculation (Fig. 6a). 
While the numbers are significantly reduced compared with 
those for SNDS, NDS, SNDS Me Too, and NDS Me Too drugs, the 
most significant elevation in the MP Approval Cohort is for the NDS 
NAS, SNDS FIC, SNDS ER, NDS FIC, NDS ER, and NDS MI 
classes. This can be seen in Figure 2 which shows that the LOI data 
for the MP Approval Cohort decline rapidly from a peak value of 2 in 
a manner similar to that observed for the Total Approval Cohort, but 
to a slightly higher baseline. As indicated by the fits in Figure 2c, the 
bar graph in Figure 6, and the fractional changes in Table 8, the 
baseline is equal to roughly 12.5% of the peak LOI value, with 
correspondingly greater numbers of NDS NAS, SNDS FIC, SNDS 
ER, NDS FIC, NDS ER, and NDS MI drugs. 
2. Drug Patenting 
A major impetus for conducting this study was to assess the 
qualitative relationship between patenting and the social benefits of 
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innovation. Therefore, one of the most important findings in this 
study is the negative correlation between innovation as measured by 
the innovation index and patenting (Fig. 2). The patent and innovation 
literature and government reports from numerous nations take as an 
implicit assumption that more intellectual property protection means 
more innovation and more social benefits, and indeed that patenting is 
necessary for innovation to occur.
158
 The same assumptions find their 
way into most policy debates on the ability of intellectual property 
rights to appropriately incentivize innovation and thus to underpin 
national productivity and prosperity,
159
 as well as specific legislative 
vehicles intended to spur innovation and translational research.
160
 
Indeed, nowhere are these assumptions more prevalent than in 
the life sciences sector, and especially the pharmaceutical industry. 
As noted in the Introduction, the pharmaceutical industry is 
repetitively singled out as the single best example of the success of 
traditional patent theory and thus the need for more extensive 
intellectual property and regulatory rights. The data reported here cast 
doubt on these assumptions, as the LOI index data clearly 
demonstrate that drug products with the lowest level of innovation 
(SNDS and SNDS Me Too) have, by far, the greatest number of 
patents. In fact, not only did the least innovative products have the 
highest patenting numbers, but the converse is true as well. That is, 
the products with the highest LOI values had, by far, the lowest 
number of patents. 
Of note, the two classes of products where this trend is reversed 
(NDS ER and SNDS ER) are, in a sense, separate classes of their 
own. This is because the approval process is shorter, less onerous, or 
both for expedited review pathways. As noted previously, based on 
drug approval and related patenting data,
161
 this combination of 
reduced evidentiary requirements and faster approval render this class 
of approvals the best bet in the high stakes process of drug 
development. The LOI data fully support this conclusion. 
                                                                                                                            
 158. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2, at 6. 
 159. 1 EXPERT PANEL ON COMMERCIALIZATION, supra note 2; GUTHRIE & MUNN-VENN, 
supra note 2. See generally COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 2. 
 160. For a discussion of pharmaceutical law and policy generally, see DUTFIELD, supra 
note 73. For a discussion of US pharmaceutical law and policy relating to technology 
commercialization, see Sampat, supra note 45; Eisenberg, supra note 45. For a review of 
American, Canadian, and global pharmaceutical linkage laws, see Eisenberg, supra note 67; 
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37; Bouchard 2011, supra note 32. 
 161. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75; 
Bouchard 2010, supra note 51. 
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The data in Figures 3 and 5 illustrate that, following excision of 
generic data, the declining trend of LOI values with increasing 
innovation is well fit by an exponential function. This suggests that 
there is not only a negative correlation between patenting and 
innovation, but further implies that the large majority of total 
patenting occurs in the lower end of the LOI spectrum. This 
conclusion is supported by the cumulative normalized data in Figure 
3d and Figure 5b, which demonstrate a “rapid” rise in cumulative 
innovation at the lower LOI values. 
Based on the statistical quality of the fit (R
2
= 0.768), it is, of 
course, possible to debate the validity of the exponential fit to the 
brand patenting data. This is where the unique status of NDS ER and 
SNDS ER drugs assumes prominence. As it is, these two values are 
primarily responsible for the elevated baseline of patenting at higher 
LOI values (Figs. 3 and 7, Table 8). However, but for the lower 
evidentiary requirements and faster approval times, it is reasonable to 
speculate that the values for these groups might be more in line with 
the lower NDS MI value and thus closer to the MP Approval Cohort 
data. 
Given that the goodness of fit and baseline value depends 
strongly on one class of drugs (NDS ER; LOI= 12) either alone or in 
combination with a related class (SNDS ER; LOI= 8), it is worth 
noting that the Expedited Review class is comprised of both Priority 
Review and NOC/c approvals. As noted in the Methods, the former 
expedited class has essentially abbreviated approval times with 
similar evidentiary requirements to NDS drugs, whereas the NOC/s 
class has an abbreviated approval path as well as lower evidentiary 
requirements prior to approval. This suggests that one of the two 
paths for expedited review is more attractive to pharmaceutical firms 
than the other. Indeed, we demonstrated previously that NOC/c 
approvals increased exponentially over the period between 2001 and 
2008 while Priority Review approvals declined linearly over the same 
period,
162
 with the net effect that expedited review approvals 
increased by 50%. It was concluded that NOC/c approvals were a 
fundamental feature of lifecycle models of regulation, such as those 
that governments in Canada, the United States, and the European 
Union currently seek to establish.
163
 It is possible that, once again, but 
for the policy goal of regulators to bring drugs onto the market faster 
                                                                                                                            
 162. Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, at 101 fig.9. 
 163. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 820-21; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, 
at 117-18. 
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than in models of regulation that emphasize the precautionary 
principal, that the data point at LOI= 12 would be more in line with 
that for the NDS MI class. To the extent this is true, the baseline 
would parallel that observed for the MP Approval Cohort, with an 
accordingly stronger negative correlation and exponential decline. 
Some evidence for this conclusion can be seen by a visual inspection 
of the data in Figures 1-4 and the spider plots in Figure 7, which show 
a demonstrable “bump” in the data at an LOI= 12 for all indicators 
and cohorts studied. This bump resulted in a larger “steady-state” 
component of all four fits that shows up as a clearly increasing ∆ 
Peak–Baseline value (Fig. 6a), CNV50 value and CNV80 value (Fig. 
6b). In each case, if the value at LOI= 12 was closer to those for 
either NDS MI (15) or NDS FIC (9) drugs, the ∆ Peak–Baseline, 
CNV50 and CNV80 values, and thus the fitted curves, would all be 
more similar to those for the Total Approval Cohort. 
Setting aside the issue of curve fitting for the moment, the dual 
finding that products with the lowest LOI values have the greatest 
number of patents and products with the highest LOI values had the 
lowest number of patents provides empirical support for the theory of 
cluster-based drug development,
164
 also referred to as patent 
portfolios.
165
 The social welfare consequences of a regulatory 
preference for line extension drugs is worsened in nations with 
pharmaceutical linkage owing to the iterative effect of low standards 
for drug approval, drug patenting, and the listing of patents on the 
patent register. Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that the era of 
the individual patent is over.
166
 Others have observed that the multiple 
waves of global patent reforms over the last half-century have 
provided fertile grounds for drug development strategies that parallel 
portfolio-based investment vehicles with comparatively lower risk 
and higher rewards than otherwise would be the case with a focus on 
breakthrough innovation.
167
 In earlier work, we referred to this 
strategy of drug development as product cluster-based innovation.
168
 
Similar clustering effects of drug and patents have been recently 
                                                                                                                            
 164. PATENTLY INNOVATIVE, supra note 37, at 250. 
 165. See, e.g., Kingston, supra note 48, at 327; Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 
7, at 2. 
 166. Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7, at 51. 
 167. For a discussion of the implications of pharmaceutical and patent law on 
breakthrough vs. incremental innovation in the context of drug clusters see, for example, supra 
Part III.A-C. 
 168. Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 133. 
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observed elsewhere.
169
 The data reported here provide clear empirical 
support for the product cluster theory, at least for pharmaceutical 
products. The data are further consistent with the conclusion that drug 
companies are aiming ex ante at legal targets that provide the most 
return on investment rather than innovative products providing the 
most benefit to the public where the two do not coincide.
170
 
Despite the negative correlation between patenting and 
innovation, there was nevertheless a significant trend towards more 
high value patents compared to approvals. This can be seen for 
example in the rightward shift of CNV data in Figures 3 and 5. While 
the CNV50 value of 3.4 was similar to the 2.48 value observed for the 
MP Approval Cohort, the CNV80 value increased from LOI= 5.26 in 
the MP Approval Cohort to LOI= 7.3 in the MP Patent Cohort. This 
represents a rightward shift in the 80th percentile data of about 40%. 
The higher level of patenting with increased LOI values shows up 
more clearly in the Peak-Baseline analysis in Figure 6a. Here it can be 
seen that this value increased from about 12.5% in the MP Approval 
Cohort to a little over 25% in the MP Patenting Cohort. 
Thus, while the number of patents remained low for the products 
with the highest LOI values, the level of innovation for drug patents 
was approximately double of that for approvals with LOI values ≥ 5. 
As such there were comparatively more NDS NAS (LOI= 6), SNDS 
FIC (LOI= 6), SNDS ER (LOI= 8), NDS FIC (LOI= 9), NDS ER 
(LOI= 12), and NDS MI (LOI= 12) patents than approvals (Table 8). 
This finding suggests patents, despite their shortcomings, are a better 
reflection of innovations with significant social value than approvals 
per se. 
The data presented in this Article also lend themselves to the 
conclusion that the “rational ignorance” observed at the Patent 
Office
171
 also extends to drug regulators as well. For example, it has 
been suggested that 95% of all patent applications are granted in one 
form or another,
172
 but that only 5% of granted patents have value in 
terms of licensing and litigation.
173
 This suggests the standard of 
approval for patents is low, a conclusion supported by the fact that 
50-75% of all patents litigated in the pharmaceutical sector are invalid 
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or not infringed.
174
 The analogy to drug approvals is striking. For 
example, the vast majority of drugs approved by domestic regulators 
(85%) are follow-on drugs, and, of all approvals granted to brand 
firms, 77% and 82% are directed to SNDS line extensions in the Total 
Approval and MP Approval Cohorts, respectively.
175
 These drug 
classes have the lowest levels of innovation for all brand drugs 
studied. 
There may, however, be a greater social cost to rational 
ignorance at the drug regulator office compared to the patent office. 
As noted supra, the evidentiary standard for a chemical modification 
to meet the regulatory requirement for both new and line extension 
approvals is very low, much like that for patenting. A major 
difference between the two legal vehicles is that, while 
pharmaceutical patents on line extension drugs may have a fairly low 
value individually,
176
 the average profit from these drugs can be 
considerable. Indeed combined SNDS Me Too and SNDS FIC drugs 
accounted for 19 of the top 25 most profitable drugs in the year 2006, 
for a total of $85,470,000 USD in sales in a single year.
177
 There are 
three interactions between approvals and patents that may account for 
this scenario. First, market authorizations provide an ex ante legal 
device for entering the market, whereas patents typically provide an 
ex post tool for defending a given product independent of whether or 
not it is on the market. In other words, “but for” the approval license, 
the drug would not be marketed regardless of the extent of patent 
protection. Secondly, the economic value of an individual patent may 
escalate in a scaled (non-linear) manner, given the ability of brand 
firms to list the same patent on the patent register against numerous 
drugs in a spatiotemporally growing product cluster.
178
 Finally, the 
economic value of functionally related patents has the potential to 
increase in value in a highly scaled manner owing to portfolio-effects 
of the type described in Part III.B. This helps to explain the large ratio 
of patents to approvals we observed in our earlier work (40:1 to 
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48:1),
179
 even though the standards for approval and patents may be 
similarly low. In this way, the economic value of both patents and 
drug approvals are tied together and change iteratively as product 
clusters grow with time. The result is the large percentage of the most 
profitable drugs is not NDS MI drugs; rather, they are line extension 
drugs generally and line extension Me Too drugs in particular. 
While patent listing was not assessed in this work, relevant data 
are available for the MP Patenting Cohort. In earlier work,
180
 the MP 
Approval Cohort was sub-divided into the top 95 drugs that did 
(Priority Review, n= 40; NOC/c, n= 16; PR-NOC/c, n= 6) and did not 
(MP, n= 33) undergo some form of expedited review. We noted that 
both the number of patents per drug and the percent of patents listed 
per drug changed with different cohorts. For example, there were 41, 
56, 32, 24, and 63 patents per drug for the Total, MP, PR, NOC/c, and 
PR-NOC/c Cohorts representing a variance across cohorts of about 
40%. The percentage of these patents listed on the register ranged 
between 3-6% per drug: 5.2%, 6.0%, 4.3%, 6.0%, and 3.0% for Total, 
MP, PR, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c Cohorts. 
Not surprisingly, the number of patents listed on the patent 
register can increase, at times dramatically, as most profitable drugs 
reach true blockbuster status. For example, in our pilot study of the 
top 16 most profitable drugs,
181
 we observed 772 patents granted in 
association with 16 drugs, with an average of 48 patents per drug. Of 
these, 77 were listed on the patent register.
182
 This amounted to 10% 
total listed patents, with an average of 5 listed patents per drug. In the 
same study, we noted that two forms of the blockbuster drug 
Omeprazole (Prilosec and Nexium) had 82 associated patents, 22 of 
which were listed on the register. This amounts to 27% of total 
patents, a greater fraction compared with the larger MP Cohort of 16 
drugs (10% total) and a much greater fraction than observed for the 
largest cohort of 95 drugs (5% total). Similar results have been 
observed for blockbuster drugs after major amendments to linkage 
laws in order to minimize evergreening. For example, in 2010 Lipitor 
had 16 listed patents. As with Omeprazole, many additional patents 
were not listed. As of 2009, 42 drugs had ≥ 5 patents listed.183 
Emerging data therefore reveals a demonstrable relationship 
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between the profit of a given drug and the fraction of listed patents, a 
conclusion that can easily be obstructed when larger cohorts of drugs 
are analyzed. As a result, it is important to understand that drug 
product-patent clusters grow over time, and the value of these clusters 
and the importance of the fraction of listed patents generally track 
increased regulator and market vetting of clusters over time. 
As demonstrated previously, strategic listing of as few as five 
patents per drug may prolong cumulative market exclusivity on older 
blockbuster drugs by as much as two-fold.
184
 Thus, as one moves 
from the high end of the LOI index with lower but still appreciable 
numbers of patents (baseline LOI ≥ 5= 650 patents) to the low end of 
the index occupied by SNDS and SNDS Me Too drugs (ceiling LOI ≤ 
3 = 2,091 patents), the increasing number of patents across the LOI 
index (Fig. 3; Tbl. 8) provide enhanced fodder for patent listing 
efforts in order to delay generic entry. Such delay may be facilitated 
by the observation that the majority of these patents are conducive to 
the development of line extension drugs, including patents with 
claims directed to combination therapies, new uses and routes of 
administration, and several classes of chemical derivatives.
185
 
3. Drug Chemical Components 
The patterns and trends observed for approvals and patenting 
continued to develop into the MP Chemical Cohort. The primary 
reason for investigating chemical components in addition to approvals 
and patents was to gain some understanding of the utility of chemicals 
to cluster-based drug development. This was based in part on our 
earlier and somewhat surprising observation that chemical patents 
represented the lowest quantity of patent classifications for the MP 
Approval Cohort.
186
 
First, as with the Total Approval, MP Approval, and MP Patent 
Cohorts, there was a negative correlation between the number of 
chemicals associated with the MP Approval Cohort and the associated 
level of LOI as evidenced by the innovation index data (Fig. 4). 
Analogous to the patenting data, this is somewhat unexpected, as one 
might predict more innovative chemicals to be associated with highly 
innovative products. This is particularly so given the wide evidentiary 
berth permitted by regulators for designation of NDS NAS status and 
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SNDS approvals, both of which permit a substantial array of chemical 
modifications such as dosage form, route of administration, salts, 
crystalline forms, enantiomers, etc.
187
 However, it is plausible that the 
lower number of chemicals associated with the most innovative drugs 
likely reflects the simple difficulty of developing truly unique 
chemical forms, particularly in the NDS FIC class, compared to 
obtaining patents or approvals. 
Based on the observations above, it is not surprising that the 
three categories with the greatest number of chemicals were in 
relation to SNDS (LOI= 2), NDS (LOI= 3), and SNDS Me Too 
(LOI= 3) drugs or that the classes with the lowest LOI values were 
NDS MI (LOI= 15), NDS FIC (LOI= 9), and NDS NAS (LOI= 6). 
This is borne out in the normalized cumulative data in Figure 4d. The 
data here indicate that, as with the Total Approval, MP Approval and 
MP Patenting Cohorts, the majority of growth in cumulative 
chemicals in the MP Chemical Cohort occurs at the lower end of the 
innovation index. That the greatest numbers of chemicals had the 
lowest LOI values and were in the SNDS and SNDS Me Too classes 
supports the theory of cluster-based drug development, as well as the 
conclusion that this model of drug development is encouraged by 
linkage laws operating in conjunction with existing patent and food 
and drug laws. 
As noted above, however, the news is not all bad in that the trend 
observed going from Total Approval to MP Approval to MP 
Patenting of increasing levels of innovation associated with products 
with LOI values ≥ 3 continued to play out with the MP Chemical 
Cohort. This can be seen in the bar graphs and fits in Figures 5 and 6 
as well as in the CNV50, CNV80 and Peak-Baseline calculations in 
Figure 6 and the broadened core in the spider plots (Fig. 7). As with 
the MP Patent Cohort, the CNV50 continued to hover around the low 
value of about 4.0. However, the movement in the mid-range of the 
LOI index is reflected by the jump up to 8.2 for the CNV80 calculation 
(Fig. 6). This is shown graphically in Figure 5, which compares the 
fits to the cumulative normalized data between cohorts. The fitted 
curves clearly indicate that the greatest fraction of indicator studied is 
in higher LOI bins for the MP Chemical Cohort. Similarly, the Peak-
Baseline value increased substantially from a little over 25% in the 
MP Patenting Cohort to 46% in the MP Chemical Cohort (Fig. 6a). 
Combined, these results suggest the largest fraction of indicator 
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associated with high LOI values was in the MP Chemical Cohort 
compared to all other cohorts investigated. 
These data suggest that chemical compounds may have the 
largest functional utility compared to either drug patents or approvals. 
Having said this, only approvals and patents provide a license to 
market drug products with defined legal boundaries, whereas 
chemicals, in and of themselves, do not. This supports the conclusion 
that patenting, along with patent listing, is a better indication of value 
to firms than approvals per se, provided that one or more approvals 
per product cluster are in place. Even so, tracking the development of 
new chemicals and the degree of social benefits associated with 
chemical innovations appears to be a reasonably valuable method for 
assessing the innovative nature of drug products. 
4. Class Trends Across Indicators 
Several observations in the current data were maintained 
throughout the entire data set. The first, and most remarkable, among 
these was the negative correlation between the level of innovation and 
the numbers of approvals, patents, and chemicals observed in the four 
cohorts (Figs. 1-4). Not only was there a negative correlation, but all 
four data sets could be reasonably well fit to declining exponential 
functions, signifying that the large majority of approvals, patents, and 
chemicals resided in comparatively low value bins. As such, the data 
reported here cast some doubt on the validity of arguments that more 
intellectual property rights necessarily lead to more innovative 
products or that more patenting will lead to products with higher 
social value. 
The second general observation is that substantial differences 
were observed among classes as one moved from one indicator and 
cohort to the next. The primary difference was the slow but gradual 
rise in the numbers of indicators with higher baseline LOI values as 
one moved from Total Approval to MP Approval to MP Patenting to 
MP Chemical Cohorts. As noted in the discussions relating to 
individual indicators, the baseline level of innovation was generally 
observed to increase across indicators and across the MP Cohorts. 
This shift was demonstrated by the gradual increase in CNV50 and 
CNV80 values and Peak-Baseline calculations (Figs. 5 and 6). 
The details of this shift in baseline LOI value can be seen by the 
data in Figure 7 and Table 8. For approvals, by far the greatest class 
was SNDS Me Too drugs. However, this was followed by a 
significant number of approvals in the NDS and SNDS ER classes, 
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consistent with the data peak at an LOI value of 12 and 8 in Figures 2 
and 7. In the patenting cohort, there was also a significant spike in 
SNDS Me Too patents. However, we also observed large numbers of 
NDS ER and SNDS ER drugs and follow-on SNDS FIC drugs. As 
noted in the discussion around the data in Table 8, the pattern 
switches up for the chemical cohort, where there is a very large spike 
in NDS ER drugs and NDS NAS drugs compared to NDS or SNDS 
FIC drugs. The data for each cohort are consistent with the patterns 
identified in Figure 7.  
These differences were also assessed using rank order data for 
combined NDS and SNDS classes. The rank order of NDS and SNDS 
drug classes was Me Too > ER > FIC > NAS for the MP Approval 
Cohort. This can be compared with FIC > NAS > ER > Me Too in the 
MP Patent Cohort and NAS > FIC > ER > Me Too for the MP 
Chemical Cohort. These rank orders differ substantially from one 
cohort to the next, and contribute to the changing baseline values in 
different cohorts.  
While the classes responsible for the increased baseline LOI 
values at index values ≥ 3 differed between cohorts, the common 
denominator driving changes in all of the cohorts assessed was an 
increased focus on both NDS and SNDS ER and FIC drugs. A 
secondary consideration was an increased focus on NDS and NDS 
NAS drugs, especially for the MP Chemical Cohort. 
The data indicate that compared to MP Approvals, the MP 
Patenting Cohort was more strongly focused on new chemical forms 
for both follow-on (SNDS FIC) and new (NDS FIC, NDS NAS) 
drugs as well as new uses (SNDS FIC, NDS FIC). Significant 
increase also occurred for both SNDS and NDS ER drugs. By 
contrast, Me Too drugs received less attention, although the number 
of NDS Me Too drugs increased by nearly 200%. A similar pattern 
was observed with the MP Chemical Cohort, with the exception that 
chemicals associated with FIC and NAS drugs exchanged places in 
the rank order (NAS > FIC > ER > Me Too). Chemicals directed to 
NAS drugs increased 250% beyond approvals so directed. Both 
SNDS and NDS FIC chemicals increased about 200% compared to 
MP Approval, while chemicals associated with NDS and SNDS ER 
drugs were 170% of corresponding MP Approval values. Continuing 
the trend observed with the MP Patent Cohort, chemicals associated 
with NDS Me Too drugs increased by 250%, but this was offset by a 
22% drop in SNDS Me Too chemicals from a larger baseline. 
Data demonstrating a shifting baseline across indicators support 
the conclusion that the degree of functional utility per indicator 
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generally increases across cohorts. The rank order for indicators in 
this regard would be Chemicals > Patents > Approvals, with the MP 
Patent Cohort having a higher rank order than tha Total Approval 
Cohort. As noted above, results such as these suggest that chemical 
compounds may have the largest utility to multinational 
pharmaceutical firms in their drug development efforts compared to 
either drug patents or approvals. A second conclusion is that 
regulators could contemplate allocating a greater share of intellectual 
property and regulatory rights incentives for drug classes 
underpinning NDS MI drug development (NDS FIC; NDS NAS; 
NDS ER), particularly the NDS FIC drug class. Data and market 
exclusivity periods could be customized to provide proportional 
incentives for new and follow-on drug development, especially in the 
classes comprising NDS MI drugs or where unmet medical need is 
greatest e.g., for pathways to expedited review in the new drug 
category (Priority Review and NOC/c). 
An observation applicable to all indicators and cohorts studied is 
that the innovation index permits the observation of a long tail of 
probability distribution. The long tail provides critical information, as 
the drug classes with the highest LOI values were those with the 
lowest number of indictors across all cohorts. The Total Approval 
Cohort appeared to encompass a more well-developed long tail of 
probability compared to the other data sets. As such, MP Approval, 
MP Patenting, and MP Chemical Cohorts may reflect a somewhat 
biased view of indicator traits, skewing to the high value side. Even 
so, these are the most sought after drugs and so obtaining information 
on their characteristics is highly desirable to stakeholders. This is 
particularly true for the innovative characteristics of the most 
profitable drugs and drugs going through some kind of expedited 
review, the latter of which provides much of the basis for the elevated 
baseline in the first place. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that generic products represent a 
substantial fraction of all indicators studied. Indeed, as demonstrated 
by the raw data presented in Figures 1-4, the number of generic 
indicators often exceeds those observed for brand approvals, patents, 
and chemical compounds at LOI values ≥ 5. One caveat to this 
assessment is that the degree to which generic indicators exceeded 
brand indicators declined as one moves from the Total Approval 
Cohort to the MP Approval, MP Patent, and MP Chemical Cohorts. 
Nevertheless, the large number of approvals and patents granted to 
generic firms suggest that generic drug companies are leveraging their 
intellectual property resources in the same manner as brand firms. 
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That is, towards the development of product clusters. 
5. Limitations 
There are two related limitations that apply to this study and the 
companion paper. First is the limitation of the number of approvals 
and drugs analyzed in the Total Approval Cohort (2,087; 608) is 
smaller than that for the MP Approval Cohort (347; 95). Similarly, 
the number of drugs assessed with respect to the MP Patent Cohort 
and MP Chemical Cohort was smaller than that for the Total 
Approval Cohort. A second limitation is that we report patenting and 
chemical data only for drugs that have already been vetted by the 
market and regulators to be high value drugs. Both have been dealt 
with in substance in the companion paper. 
An additional limit may be that the innovation index is based on 
regulatory approval requirements and therefore may not represent real 
technological advances or the technical difficulty in developing 
certain kinds of new drugs. These are reasonable points. However, the 
objective in creating the index was to define innovation in accordance 
with social preferences expressed by drug regulators exercising their 
public health mandate in legal terms. This differs substantially from 
an index with a technological or, for that matter, an economic focus. 
A fundamental distinction can be made with respect to 
pharmaceutical products between an economic analysis (even one cast 
in a law and economics light) and a patent law analysis. This is 
because one is in service of utilitarian benefit and the other is in 
service of the patent bargain interpreted in light of the public health 
mandate of food and drug law. As noted by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in its seminal decisions in Biolyse and AstraZeneca, linkage 
regulations tying generic entry to brand-name patents must be made 
in a “patent-specific” manner informed by the public health mandate 
inherent to food and drug law, thus highlighting the terms of the 
traditional patent bargain read in light of the so-called special 
provisions of linkage laws when parsing pharmaceutical patents. In 
any event, the MP Chemical Cohort does provide some valuable 
information regarding the technological aspects of drug development. 
This is supported by the conclusion above that this cohort appears to 
have the greatest functional utility with respect to identifying 
innovation compared to patents or approvals. 
While the drug class preferences identified and prioritized in the 
present study are those disclosed by government regulators rather 
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than independently, the basis for their determination is found in the 
public health policy inherent to the Food and Drugs Act,
188
 Food and 
Drugs Regulations,
189
 and Canada Health Act,
190
 elaborated in 
numerous government Guidance Documents and Regulatory Impact 
Analysis Statements (RIASs)
191
 and Supreme Court of Canada 
linkage jurisprudence.
192
 Relevant to this argument, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that RIAS documents constitute proper evidence of 
legislative intent, including in the context of litigation under the 
regulations.
193
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Consistent with the goal of creating an index that reflects the 
social benefit associated with different new and follow-on drug 
classes, the public policy values embodied by the nation’s health 
legislation are communitarian,
194
 and reflect the public system of 
health care that is not only specific to Canada,
195
 but is, generally 
speaking, representative of public health systems in most if not all 
developed nations. Thus, the various approval class preferences that 
make up the innovation index and informs the multipliers used to 
calculate LOI values reflect the duty of drug regulators to operate 
within a public health mandate typical of developed nations as this 
mandate is parsed through the trifecta of patent, linkage and food and 
drug law. This conclusion is supported by the observation that the 
standards for both drug approval and drug patenting have become 
globally harmonized over the last two decades.
196
 
B. Interpretation of the Model 
1. Objective-Subjective Considerations 
The innovation index described in this Article is both 
quantitative and qualitative in nature. It is quantitative simply 
because, by necessity, it reflects the raw number of drug approvals, 
patents, and chemical components as they are distributed across the 
various cohorts, indicators, and new and follow-on drug 
classifications and classes reported here. As suggested by data 
presented in tabular form and graphically in this and the companion 
paper, raw numbers are amenable to normalization within NDS and 
SNDS classification and the various drug classes across all three 
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indictors. Its primary utility, however, is that it qualifies, or presents a 
rationally derived set of values to estimate, the social value of drug 
approvals and their associated patents and chemical components. As 
such, the innovation index presented in this Article is both objective 
and subjective in nature. 
With any transformative index, there is always the risk of getting 
the balance between objective and subjective elements wrong; the risk 
of error being generally proportional to the uncertainties involved. 
The manner in which risks are managed is thus a fundamental 
element of any qualitative estimate, and it is reasonable to assume that 
at the center of most successful risk management tools is a rational, 
evidence-based method for identifying and minimizing risks in 
service of an identifiable goal. An important observation is that the 
innovation index model described in this Article has many features of 
existing decision-making methods relating to drug approvals and 
patents. As broached originally in Part V. Methods, the data 
comprising the innovation index are transformed data in that 
quantitative raw data representing the number of approvals, patents, 
and chemicals investigated are converted into qualitative innovation 
index data. The analytic method by which this conversion takes place 
is provided by the qualitative prioritization of different new and 
follow-on drug classes and their respective evidentiary hurdles. 
Because the model transitions from raw data to transformed data, it 
represents an objective-subjective hybrid model of analysis. As 
argued below, the legitimacy of this hybrid analysis is supported by 
decision-making models used by drug regulators, expert witnesses, 
and the courts to decide whether regulatory approval and patents are 
ultimately granted and upheld in courts of law. 
One of the most recognized objective-subjective public health 
indices relating to health technologies is that of the QUALY, or 
Quality Adjusted Life Year. Developed in part by the National 
Institutes for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom, the 
QUALY is a quantitative estimate of disease burden that attaches a 
qualitative monetary value to medical interventions.
197
 As widely 
discussed in the Health Technology Assessment (HTA)
198
 and Cost 
                                                                                                                            
 197. See National Institutes for Clinical Excellence, Measuring Effectiveness and Cost 
Effectiveness: The QALY, NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE, 
http://www.nice.org.uk/newsroom/features/measuringeffectivenessandcosteffectivenesstheqaly.j
sp (last updated Apr. 20, 2010). 
 198. See, e.g., Egon Jonsson, Development of Health Technology Assessment in Europe, 
18 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 171 (2002). 
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Effectiveness Research (CER)
199
 literature, the QUALY is a utility-
based, and thus trade-off based, model of determining which health 
technologies can be funded within the parameters of relevant public 
health and economic considerations. The QUALY is primarily 
concerned with economic efficiency as opposed to equality or social 
justice.
200
 
A quantitative value-for-money calculation such as the QUALY 
is not explicit in the model described in this Article. Yet, it is possible 
to argue that a parallel assessment is built into the innovation index 
implicitly. As reviewed previously,
201
 according to drug regulator 
guidelines, firms must have well-defined “benefit-risk” ratios and 
meet designated evidentiary standards for “unmet medical need” or 
“significant therapeutic advantage” to gain approval in the first 
instance, or to move from a simple NDS up to an NDS NAS or NDS 
FIC designation or from the NDS to the SNDS classification. The 
same is true for moving up from a simple NDS or SNDS designation 
to either of the two expedited review pathways (Priority Review or 
NOC/c approval). Economic considerations do not drive approval 
decisions, and therefore do not inform innovation index values at the 
front end of the model. However, economic considerations are 
embedded in the model at the back end through the terms of the 
patent bargain, which offers strong economic incentives for 
development of prioritized drug products in the form of monopoly 
pricing and the extended cumulative patent duration afforded to drug 
clusters via pharmaceutical linkage. 
Thus, while a monetary value measurement such as the QUALY 
is not built into the innovation index, a qualitative benefit-risk 
analysis which is informed by economic incentives provided by the 
combination of patent and linkage laws is encompassed by the index. 
The innovation index values associated with various drug classes 
                                                                                                                            
 199. See generally COMM. ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH PRIORITIZATION, 
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH (2009); Fed. Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness 
Research, Report to the President and the Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. 
(June 30, 2009), http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/programs/cer/cerannualrpt.pdf; Jerry Avorn, 
Debate About Funding Comparative-Effectiveness Research, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1927 
(2009); John K. Iglehart, Prioritizing Comparative-Effectiveness Research—IOM 
Recommendations, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 325 (2009). 
 200. See Michael F. Drummond, Output Measurement for Resource Allocation Decisions 
in Health Care, 5 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 59, 71 (1989); Adam Wagstaff, QALYs and the 
Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 21, 22 (1991). 
 201. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 55-56; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75, 
at 89, 106. 
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enumerated in this study have been qualitatively ranked according to 
the manner in which drug classes have been prioritized by drug 
regulators. As discussed in more detail in our earlier work,
202
 these 
“value statements” by drug regulators strongly track the types of 
drugs that are the target of pharmaceutical policy in developed nations 
(e.g., drugs that are “new” and “innovative”). In this regard we have 
endeavored not to stray from the axis of patent law and food and drug 
law connected by linkage law, because it is around this axis that the 
activities of drug approval, marketing, patenting, and patent listing 
revolve. Compared to the QUALY, the index provides a means of 
assessing, incentivizing, and rewarding innovation in a manner that is 
less utilitarian, more equality-based, and more informed by the first 
principles of patent law. 
The primary decision-making matrix for drug approval for close 
to fifty years has been the precautionary principle, strong 
formulations of which entail absolute proof of safety prior to 
approval.
203
 In this model, pharmaceutical firms carry the burden of 
proof to introduce necessary and sufficient evidence of drug safety in 
their drug submissions. Despite its successes, it is now recognized 
that over-reliance on this principle presents a significant barrier for 
drug development, especially when viewed through the lens of 
evolving risk management frameworks.
204
 Risk management 
mechanisms generally acknowledge the non-linear and uncertain 
nature of clinical research, even when conducted under the most 
rigorous and controlled circumstances. The acceptance of inherent 
uncertainty and risk in the context of product development and 
regulation clearly breaches the requirement in strong articulations of 
the precautionary principle for absolute proof ex ante. In its widely 
lauded Future of Drug Safety report, the US Institute of Medicine 
adopted a position that respects the various types of risks involved in 
                                                                                                                            
 202. See, e.g., Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 75; 
Bouchard 2009, supra note 31; Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37; Bouchard 2011, supra 
note 32. 
 203. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 60-61. 
 204. See, e.g., Eichler et al., supra note 3; Comm. for Medicinal Prods. for Human Use, 
European Meds. Agency, Guideline on the Scientific Application and the Practical 
Arrangements Necessary to Implement Commission Regulation (EC) No 507/2006 on the 
Conditional Marketing Authorisation for Medicinal Products for Human Use Falling Within the 
Scope of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004, EMEA/509951/2006 (2006) [hereinafter EMEA CHMP 
1]; COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE US DRUG SAFETY SYS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L 
ACADS., FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 
(Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter IOM Report]; COMM. ON DATA STANDARDS FOR 
PATIENT SAFETY, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PATIENT SAFETY: ACHIEVING A NEW 
STANDARD FOR CARE (Philip Aspden et al. eds., 2004). 
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scientific investigation,
205
 acknowledging that even the best drug 
safety system in the world will not prevent serious adverse reactions 
to marketed pharmaceuticals due in part to the complexity of their 
mechanisms of action.
206
 Probing the connection between post-market 
withdrawals and the effectiveness of drug regulation more generally, 
the Institute of Medicine noted that regulatory approval does not 
represent a lifetime guarantee of safety and efficacy, and that even the 
best drug safety system would not prevent adverse reactions to 
pharmaceuticals on the market.
207
 Regulators who review new drug 
applications must strike a delicate balance in judging the drug’s risks 
and benefits and whether the need for more study to increase certainty 
before approval warrants delaying the release of the drug into the 
marketplace.
208
 
The factors comprising the decision-making process for approval 
in the context of benefit-risk were recently assessed by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMEA).
209
 The EMEA concluded that a hybrid 
objective-subjective (or “semi-quantitative”) framework that 
incorporates both objective evidence-based and subjective expertise-
based decision-making methods is the best scheme available to 
regulators in the exercise of their public health mandates.
210
 Perhaps 
in order to allay concerns expressed over supplanting the 
precautionary principle, the EMEA stipulated that “quantitative 
benefit-risk assessment is not expected to replace qualitative 
                                                                                                                            
 205. IOM Report, supra note 204, at 1; For general references regarding the role of 
uncertainty in scientific systems and daily life, see GUNTHER S. STENT, PARADOXES OF 
PROGRESS (1978); JOHN L. CASTI, SEARCHING FOR CERTAINTY: WHAT SCIENTISTS CAN KNOW 
ABOUT THE FUTURE (1990); PAUL W. GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY, AND THE BRAIN: 
THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS (2003). 
 206. IOM Report, supra note 204, at 2. 
 207. Id. 
 208. IOM Report, supra note 204, at 2. 
 209. Comm. for Medicinal Prods. for Human Use, European Meds. Agency, Reflection 
Paper on Benefit-Risk Assessment Methods in the Context of the Evaluation of Marketing 
Authorisation Applications of Medicinal Products for Human Use, EMEA/CHMP/15404/2007 
(2007) [hereinafter EMEA CHMP 2], available at 
http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/human/brmethods/1540407enfin.pdf. See also EMEA/CHMP-
Think Tank Group on Innovative Drug Development, European Meds. Agency, Innovative Drug 
Development Approaches: Final Report from the EMEA/CHMP-Think-Tank Group on 
Innovative Drug Development, EMEA/127318/2007 (2007) [hereinafter EMEA Innovation], 
available at 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Other/2009/10/WC500004913.pdf; 
European Medicines Agency, The European Medicines Agency Road Map to 2010: Preparing 
the Ground for the Future, EMEA/H/34163/03/Final (2005) [hereinafter EMEA Road Map], 
available at http://www.emea.europa.eu/pdfs/general/direct/directory/3416303enF.pdf. 
 210. EMEA Road Map, supra note 209. 
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evaluation” as the cornerstone of the drug approval process.211 Rather, 
“expert judgment is expected to remain the cornerstone of benefit-risk 
evaluation for the authorization of medicinal products” for the 
foreseeable future.
212
 
Noting that to date there is no universally agreed-on approach to 
estimate benefit-risk or to describe the manner in which evidence 
should be properly weighed and balanced,
213
 the EMEA stressed that 
over-reliance on purely quantitative models has the potential to 
improperly skew benefit-risk calculations.
214
 This is because such 
models do not adequately reflect the contextual “intellectual process 
of assessing the empirical evidence, accommodating risks and 
balancing risks and benefits.”215 Hybrid objective-subjective models 
were deemed to most effectively weigh uncertainties inherent to drug 
development and regulation as well as to take into consideration 
different stakeholder interests while also minimizing the dangers of 
oversimplified quantitative models.
216
 In a recent review of regulatory 
decision-making, Eichler et al. also underscore the importance of 
inherent uncertainty in developing, regulating, and consuming 
therapeutic products.
217
 Particular attention was given to commercial 
risks, and their relation to idiosyncratic, rare, or otherwise unexpected 
adverse drug reactions. Indeed, the pervasive nature of scientific and 
commercial risks involved in drug development has prompted 
numerous jurisdictions, including Canada,
218
 the European Union,
219
 
and the United States,
220
 to base drug approval on both objective and 
subjective metrics rather than solely on objective evidence and 
quantitative models. 
Thus, conversion of raw data to transformed data occurs in both 
drug approval and innovation index models and the output of both 
decision-making processes is an evidence-based yet qualitative 
judgement. For drug approval safety, efficacy, and quality data 
                                                                                                                            
 211. EMEA CHMP 2, supra note 209, at 2. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 3. 
 214. Id. at 5. 
 215. Id. at 3. 
 216. Id. at 2, 4-7, 13. 
 217. Eichler et al., supra note 3, at 818. 
 218. HEALTH PRODS. & FOOD BRANCH, HEALTH CAN., BLUEPRINT FOR RENEWAL: 
TRANSFORMING CANADA’S APPROACH TO REGULATING HEALTH PRODUCTS AND FOOD (2006), 
available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/hpfb-dgpsa/blueprint-
plan-eng.pdf. 
 219. EMEA CHMP 1, supra note 204; EMEA Innovation, supra note 209. 
 220. IOM Report, supra note 204. 
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obtained from Phase I-III clinical trials are parsed through the 
qualitative filters of “unmet clinical need,” “significant improvement 
over existing therapies,” “benefit-risk,” and other decision endpoints. 
For the index model, raw approval, patenting, and chemical data are 
parsed through the filter of drug class prioritization and evidentiary 
hurdles disclosed by government. All drug classes approved by 
regulators, and hence their corresponding innovation index rankings, 
are supported by an array of legal and policy mechanisms directed to 
the speed and mechanism of reviewing new and follow-on drug 
applications that in turn determine the duration of a drug’s lifecycle 
and intellectual property protection.
221
 
As with the approval exercise, the importance of identifying and 
ameliorating risk in patent law and innovation policy using a 
combination of objective and subjective means cannot be overstated. 
It is well known that the act of invention is subsumed within the 
wider arc of innovation,
222
 and constitutes only a small fraction of the 
risks and uncertainties encompassed by the therapeutic product 
lifecycle. As discussed in terms of the pancake analogy in the 
Introduction,
223
 broad patent rights have been historically advocated 
in order to recoup transaction costs and to mitigate the risks and 
uncertainties involved in bringing pharmaceutical products to market. 
These risks are inherently unpredictable and thus parallel those in the 
drug development process. While regulatory rights are evolving such 
that the duration of regulatory protection now rivals that of patent 
protection,
224
 patents nevertheless remain the touchstone for global 
innovation policy and provide the mechanism for managing the risks 
of commercializing therapeutic products. 
It has been the role of the courts to police the balance between 
private and public interests in commercializing medical research.
225
 
                                                                                                                            
 221. Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 114, at 58-60, 63-65; Sawicka & Bouchard, supra 
note 75, at 118; Bouchard 2009, supra note 31, at 1498-99, 1501, 1506, 1510-12; Bouchard 
2010, supra note 51, at 176-77, 181-82, 220-21. 
 222. The act of invention creates a new product or process, whereas the broader act of 
innovation includes the work necessary to revise, develop, and bring that new product or process 
to commercial fruition. This distinction has been attributed to Schumpeter. RICHARD R. NELSON 
& SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 263 (1982). 
 223. See supra Part III.A. 
 224. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 67, at 482-83; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the 
FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 345-88 (2007); 
Bouchard, MARQUETTE, supra note 37, at 73, 76-77, 91-92. 
 225. See SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF 
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (2003). For a pharmaceutical specific view, see, 
for example, Bouchard 2007, supra note 99; Bouchard & Lemmens, supra note 99. 
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This is particularly true of pharmaceutical law and policy, where the 
United States has lead the way globally, both in encouraging 
commercialization of technologies developed in universities and in 
balancing the competing interests of stimulating the development of 
novel therapeutic products and the timely entry of generic substitutes 
by fundamentally linking patent law to food and drug law.
226
 The 
result has been the development of a strong generic industry 
paralleled by strong domestic pharmaceutical and biotechnology 
industries.
227
 Poor government oversight of patent policy, by contrast, 
can lead to significant social inefficiencies where monopoly pricing is 
improperly extended due to overly broad, overly narrow, or otherwise 
poorly thought out patent and regulatory rights. Reasoning of this 
nature permeates English,
228
 American,
229
 Australian,
230
 and 
Canadian,
231
 high courts. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada 
noted in one of its leading patent cases that there is a high economic 
cost attached to uncertainty and that it is the proper policy of patent 
law to keep it to a minimum.
232
 Similar statements are to be found in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s KSR decision.233 Pharmaceutical laws are 
                                                                                                                            
 226. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984). 
 227. Epstein & Kuhlik, supra note 38. 
 228. See, e.g., R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v. Gaumont-British Picture Corp., (1936) 53 R.P.C. 
167, 195 (A.C.) (Eng.); Société Technique de Pulverisation Step v. Emson Eur. Ltd., (1993) 21 
R.P.C. 513, 519 (A.C.) (Eng.). 
 229. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 266 (1851); Graham v. John Deere 
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3-4, 10-11, 17 (1966); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415-16 
(2007). 
 230. See Aktiebolaget Hässle v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., [2002] HCA 59, 164 (Austl.). See 
also BUREAU OF INDUS. ECON., DEP’T OF INDUS., TECH. & REG’L DEV., THE ECONOMICS OF 
PATENTS 45 (1994). 
 231. See, e.g., Free World Trust v. Électro Santé, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, para. 13 
(Can.); Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco, Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, para. 37 (Can.). 
 232. See Free World Trust, 2 S.C.R. at para. 42 (citing R.C.A. Photophone, Ld. v. 
Gaumont-British Picture Corp., (1936) 53 R.P.C. 167, 195 (A.C.) (Eng.)). 
The patent system is designed to advance research and development and to 
encourage broader economic activity. Achievement of these objectives is 
undermined however if competitors fear to tread in the vicinity of the patent 
because its scope lacks a reasonable measure of precision and certainty. A patent 
of uncertain scope becomes “a public nuisance.” Potential competitors are 
deterred from working in areas that are not in fact covered by the patent even 
though costly and protracted litigation (which in the case of patent disputes can 
be very costly and protracted indeed) might confirm that what the competitors 
propose to do is entirely lawful. Potential investment is lost or otherwise directed. 
Competition is “chilled.” The patent owner is getting more of a monopoly than 
the public bargained for. There is a high economic cost attached to uncertainty 
and it is the proper policy of patent law to keep it to a minimum. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 233. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415. 
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intended to operate in such a manner so as to maximize legal stability, 
predictability, and certainty and thus minimize market disruption.
234
 
Even so, in light of the public interest at stake, pharmaceutical patents 
must be carefully scrutinized to determine if they merit the grant of a 
monopoly privilege.
235
  
So, on the one hand, we have a range of scientific, medical and 
economic risks and uncertainties involved in developing, 
commercializing and marketing therapeutic products. These 
uncertainties are said to be inherent, or “indeterminate,” in nature; 
that is, they are unavoidable. On the other hand, a legal mechanism is 
required to manage these risks and uncertainties in a way that does 
not cause undue physical or economic harm to members of the public, 
who not only consume patented drug products but also participate in 
clinical trials and other research necessary for discovery. Fortunately, 
leading patent courts worldwide have evolved such a mechanism; 
otherwise known as the PHOSITA, or the Person Having Ordinary 
Skill in the Art. The legal standard of the PHOSITA provides the 
mechanism by which drug patents are assessed in litigation ex post 
which, in turn, influences how patent applications are parsed by 
patent examiners ex ante and how patents are understood and valued 
at various stages of the product lifecycle by a range of stakeholders in 
the drug development and commercialization cascade. 
The PHOSITA represents the statistical average of all decision-
making characteristics and inventive capacity of the ordinary 
scientist.
236
 Important for the present purpose, knowledge accrued by 
the PHOSITA is both focal and tacit in nature.
237
 Focal knowledge 
                                                                                                                            
 234. See, e.g., Regulations Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (1390—Data 
Protection), 138 C. Gaz. pt. I, 3712, 3714 (2004), available at 
http://canadagazette.gc.ca/archives/p1/2004/2004-12-11/pdf/g1-13850.pdf; Regulations 
Amending the Food and Drug Regulations (Data Protection),140 C. Gaz. pt. I, 1598, 1601 
(2006), available at http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/SP2-1-140-24.pdf; Regulations 
Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, 142 C. Gaz. pt. II, 
1586, 1588 (2008), available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2008/2008-10-29-
x13/pdf/g1-142x13.pdf. 
 235. Comm’r of Patents v. Farbwerke Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft Vormals Meister Lucius 
& Bruning, [1964] S.C.R. 49, 56 (Can.). 
 236. See Ron A. Bouchard, KSR v. Teleflex Part 1: Impact of U.S. Supreme Court Patent 
Law on Canadian Intellectual Property and Regulatory Rights Landscape, 15 HEALTH L.J. 221, 
238, 245 (2007) [hereinafter Bouchard, Landscape]. For an excellent review of the role of 
creativity in the legal determination, see, for example, Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-
1350); Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual 
Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350). 
 237. See Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 49, at 1, 7, 20. 
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refers to formal knowledge sources such as books, the Internet and 
other technical sources, while tacit knowledge refers to information 
gained as a result of informal person-to-person mentoring and the 
personal conversion of information into useful knowledge.
238
 
Therefore, the PHOSITA makes decisions on patent validity, 
obviousness, utility, etc. using formal knowledge sources typically 
available to a skilled technician in the art parsed through and 
prioritized in a personal manner by the PHOSITA’s creative mind. 
Therefore, the method used by the PHOSITA to render a decision is 
both objective and subjective in nature. 
The hybrid nature of the PHOSITA’s decision-making ability is 
exemplified by the recent decision in KSR.
239
 In its decision, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held expressly that the PHOSITA is not an 
automaton,
240
 underscoring that the PHOSITA is endowed with 
creative abilities that enable them to look not just at explicit prior art 
relative to the problem at hand but also to elements of the prior art 
designed implicitly to solve different problems within the same 
industry or parallel problems in different industries.
241
 In addition to 
using traditional knowledge sources to render decisions, the 
PHOSITA also does so by exercising inherent creativity.
242
 The level 
of skill and common sense are pitched neither at the level of the 
ordinary citizen nor at that of the inventor, but rather at the level of 
the ordinary person skilled in the particular art at issue informed by 
tacit and focal knowledge.
243
 As with the “semi-quantitative” method 
employed for drug approval reviewed supra, the legal standard for 
patent assessment is thus an objective-subjective hybrid model. 
Based on the above reasoning, it is concluded that the objective-
subjective hybrid model used for data transformation in the 
innovation index is internally consistent with the first principles and 
methods used for decision-making by drug regulators, patent 
examiners, expert witnesses, and the courts. Decision-making in each 
instance is both quantitative and qualitative in nature, reflecting the 
value to global drug regulators, patent examiners, expert witnesses, 
                                                                                                                            
 238. See id. at 26-33. 
 239. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-20 (2007). 
 240. Id. at 421. 
 241. Id. at 401-02, 417. 
 242. Id. at 401, 418; See also Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 891-92; Bouchard, PHOSITA, 
supra note 49, at 26-33; Bouchard, Landscape, supra note 236, at 232-39. 
 243. See Bouchard, PHOSITA, supra note 49, at 26-33; See also Eisenberg, supra note 49, 
at 887, 891-92; Jonathan J. Darrow, The Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA 
Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH., 227, 233 (2009). 
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and the courts of using both objective evidence-based and subjective 
expertise-based methods. As noted by the EMEA in its assessment of 
approval methods,
244
 compared to alternative methods, hybrid 
objective-subjective models effectively weigh uncertainties inherent 
to drug development and regulation as well as different stakeholder 
interests.
245
 Interest balancing of this nature can be seen to operate in 
a patent law context in two ways. First, the patent bargain evolved 
over time to encourage risk-taking behavior in exchange for a patent 
monopoly only on inventions with sufficient public benefit. Similarly, 
patents are granted only for inventions that are sufficiently novel, non-
obvious, and useful. Sufficiency in both instances is decided using a 
combination of subjective and objective methods. In a similar 
manner, judges work the middle ground between the twin poles of 
being overly “activist” (subjective) or “black letter” (objective) by 
following statutory direction to base their decisions on the guidance 
of the PHOSITA. As a result, their decisions are sufficiently evidence-
based and expertise-based to heed the Constitutional mandate to 
“[p]romote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” while also 
avoiding appeal or judicial review.
246
 Given the tenacity of different 
stakeholders in attempting to control the direction of pharmaceutical 
law and policy, it is reasonable to say the utility of objective-
subjective hybrid models of decision-making can be reasonably 
extended to creating an innovation index which balances the need of 
various public and private stakeholders. 
2. Intellectual Property Law Considerations 
In addition to considerations revolving around the objective and 
subjective nature of the model, the proposed method is also in line 
with prevailing legal jurisprudence on the patent bargain. As noted 
supra, the term “patent bargain” is typically taken to refer to the grant 
of a limited patent monopoly in exchange for public disclosure of 
socially valuable knowledge.
247
 In a public health context, where both 
the availability and costs of brand and generic products are 
determined by the trifecta of patent law, linkage law, and food and 
drug law, the essence of the patent bargain is the exchange of 
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extended patent protection for spatiotemporally increasing drug 
clusters for public health benefits that are proportional to the extended 
market exclusivity granted to clusters. In more common parlance, the 
term patent bargain means that inventors get what they pay for: if an 
inventor provides society with substantial innovation in exchange for 
a patent, that is what was intended by the patent bargain in the first 
instance. The ancillary of this statement is that, if an inventor 
provides society with a poor level of innovation the inventor does not 
obtain the full monopoly, or market exclusivity. This second 
statement assumes more importance under conditions where drug 
approval is contingent on pharmaceutical linkage and where, as one 
set of authors recently put it, “the era of the individual patent is 
over.”248 Indeed, in nations that have brought in provisions for 
pharmaceutical linkage, the same inventor has typically already 
established a higher level innovation on the same or similar product 
within a given cluster. A simple measure of how often this occurs can 
be seen by the fact that the vast percentage of all brand approvals are 
directed to Me Too drugs (81% in the MP Approval Cohort) and the 
fact that, of these, 70% are for SNDS Me Too drugs. 
In this way, the innovation index is in a position to do what the 
patent bargain itself cannot; to discriminate between the qualitative 
values of the first, second, third etc. order entrants in a complex 
cluster of legally related drug approvals, patents, and listed patents. It 
allows regulators to reward drug development in proportion to how 
well firms innovate in the same or chemically-related product clusters 
as time goes on. The patent bargain demands proportional incentive 
for inventors and society but depends on the courts to arbitrate this 
quality. This arbitration has become progressively more difficult for 
all stakeholders to manage as the basket of patent and regulatory 
rights attached to drug products has become progressively larger over 
the last fifty years. This problem is most substantial in nations with 
pharmaceutical linkage, as linkage not only conduces to product 
clusters but also provides ample legal grounds for their 
spatiotemporal growth over time.
249
 The index allows governments to 
recalibrate the already recalibrated quid pro quo of the patent bargain 
as it applies to pharmaceutical linkage. On the one hand, society 
incentivizes, and pays for, innovators to innovate with a full patent 
monopoly and monopoly pricing, but, on the other, it can withdraw a 
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portion of the monopoly on product clusters in proportion to how 
poorly innovative the cluster evolves cumulatively over time. 
The compound-indication classification data in Table 3 makes 
this point, illustrating how the innovation index works for two drugs 
moving through the approval system. The data show that, as a given 
drug fans out over time from (a) initially presenting with significant 
objective evidence of innovation, (b) evolves into a series of less 
innovative products, and (c) then finally to products with the least 
amount of innovation, the innovation index tracks and quantifies the 
product lifecycle at each stage of cumulative drug development and 
rewards or penalizes firms for their efforts over time. For example, 
the first drug (Compound X; Indication A) begins life as a pioneering 
drug. This compound moves through the new drug pathway (NDS), 
contains a New Active Substance and is directed to a First in Class 
chemical form or use, and goes through expedited review. Based on 
the nomenclature used in this study, it receives the NDS MI 
designation and has the highest LOI value, 15. After a time the drug 
firm decides it is time for a line extension (Compound X; Indication 
B), putting substantial effort into developing a new use. Indeed, based 
on the data in this Article, there is a two-fold greater number of SNDS 
FIC compared to NDS FIC drugs, so the example here is via the 
SNDS route. A typical example is moving from one type of salt, ester, 
crystalline, or dosage form to a second related form which still 
qualifies as a FIC when combined with a new use e.g., indication. In 
addition, even though the submission is directed to a line extension 
drug, the compound meets an unmet medical need or has a sufficient 
high benefit-risk to move through expedited review. Consequently, 
while Compound X is “only” a line extension drug, the innovative 
characteristics of the candidate are such that it receives a high LOI 
value of 8, higher than three classes of new drugs. As the drug moves 
through a second SNDS approval with fewer innovative 
characteristics (here, a new, but likely related, use combined with 
another change in the type of salt, ester, crystalline, or dosage form 
employed), its LOI value goes down correspondingly (LOI= 6). The 
drug moves through a third line extension phase, with no further FIC, 
ER or Me Too designation, with a corresponding low LOI value 
(LOI= 2). The final step in this drug’s product lifecycle is 
genericization, with an LOI value= 1. 
As illustrated by the second chemically-related drug (Compound 
aX; Indication A-C), one does not have to begin the process of drug 
development at the highest LOI value. Here we have NDS, FIC, and 
NAS designations but lack the ER designation, which drops the value 
to LOI= 9. However, the drug firm then goes through the SNDS route 
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for the next round approval maintaining the ER designation while 
exhibiting a new use (Compound aX; Indication B) in comparison to 
its first generation parent drug (Compound aX; Indication A). For its 
efforts, the brand firm receives a relatively high LOI= 8. The next 
step in the product lifecycle is another chemically-related line 
extension with a new use (Compound aX; Indication C), yielding an 
LOI= 2. Over time, this drug too is genericized, dropping the LOI 
value for the drug first to 1.0 (ANDS), then to 0.5 for the generic line 
extension (SANDS). 
From the examples in Table 3, it is not hard to imagine the wide 
array of permutations and combinations of indicators across classes 
owing to the broad range of potential mixes of new and follow-on 
drug classes across indicators. An important attribute of the index, 
therefore, is that it rewards innovators both at the new and follow-on 
levels, provided they indeed innovate. As illustrated by the examples 
in Table 3, it is possible in a number of ways for “line extension” 
drugs to have higher LOI values than “new” drugs when class 
evidentiary requirements vetted by regulators have been satisfied. To 
the extent they do not in either category, the index penalizes firms 
with a lower LOI value. Thus, the index rewards drug development in 
proportion to the degree of innovation objectively demonstrated by 
marketed products when they are gauged against publicly disclosed 
regulatory priorities. 
Based on the examples outlined above, the LOI values 
determined by the innovation index reward pharmaceutical companies 
for both new and follow-on drugs in proportion to the degree of 
innovation gauged against publicly disclosed requirements and 
priorities. As noted in Part V. Methods,
250
 the proportional output of 
the index is particularly useful for assessing pharmaceutical products 
given claims that incremental innovation in this sector may be 
uniquely important to later breakthrough developments,
251
 but in and 
of themselves.
252
 The proportionality function of the index is also 
consistent with the claim by Jayadev and Stiglitz
253
 that an effective 
reward structure for innovation should balance the marginal benefit 
for products specifically targeted by innovation policy with their 
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marginal cost. In this regard, innovation is to be parsed in a manner 
that extends beyond mere patentability,
254
 a claim that, as already 
pointed out in Part II and III supra, takes on additional significance in 
the context of a regulated therapeutic product lifecycle (rTPL) that is 
dominated by the twin pillars of pharmaceutical linkage and cluster-
based drug development. 
C. Relevance to Pharmaceutical Law and Policy 
1. Patent and Innovation Policy 
As noted in the Introduction, much of what governments 
understand about innovation is currently shaped by measurements of 
patenting activity. If, as accumulating arguments suggest, patenting 
behavior may not stimulate innovation to the degree assumed, or even 
impede it in some circumstances, much of the empirical basis for 
comparative evaluation of the innovative performance of industries 
and countries is called into question, as is the effectiveness of 
innovation policies that are linked closely or even exclusively to 
providing stronger protection for intellectual property. The outcomes 
of this debate will be particularly significant for future research policy 
and strategy in technology-intensive sectors like pharmaceuticals, 
where patents are generally considered to be essential to the business 
models of drug companies. 
Critics who argue that patents do not necessarily stimulate 
innovation tend to allow at least partial exemption for the 
pharmaceutical industry.
255
 Clinical drugs have long product cycles, 
determined in part by the requirement to submit to external regulatory 
processes. These can create substantial and unpredictable time-to-
market delays, which, given the limitations on patent terms, can 
shorten the period during which the drug producer can generate 
revenue from a new drug sufficient to recoup its development costs 
and yield a profit. Especially in the face of escalating R&D costs,
256
 
the argument is theoretically stronger that without some form of 
extended intellectual property protection, the incentive to invest in 
pharmaceutical R&D will diminish.
257
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As noted previously, public policy in many developed nations 
still tends to presume a linear model of innovation, i.e., a product 
“pipeline” that begins in universities, moves through private research 
and development, and then to commercialization in the form of 
products and services.
258
 This model implies a strong imperative to 
legally protect knowledge that has been reduced to practice in the 
form of limited-term monopolies.
259
 For pharmaceutical innovation, 
the process is complicated by regulatory requirements to gain market 
authorization, which is perceived as the output of the innovation 
pipeline. Accordingly, there is a considerable body of policy that 
identifies intellectual property rights, and, in particular, patent rights, 
as the major economic driver of innovation, national productivity, and 
translational research in the medical sciences.
260
 
In light of this policy background, it is not surprising that one of 
the claims of emerging lifecycle or “real world” models of drug 
development is that many of the problems associated with the linear 
model of innovation would be addressed in part through a new regime 
of regulation, clinical testing, and intellectual property exploitation.
261
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The rationale for this modified bargain between drug producers, 
clinicians and regulators, is that by expanding patent and regulatory 
rights protection, drug companies will have greater incentive to 
produce more innovative new treatments and patients will benefit 
from these treatments sooner.
262
 Obvious questions generated by this 
new regime concern the degree to which there has been a positive 
welfare effect for public health in terms of the availability and 
effectiveness of new treatments in the clinical environment.
263
 If the 
link between patent rights in particular and socially beneficial types of 
innovation is indeed strong and direct, it can be inferred that both of 
these outcomes should be affected positively. If, on the other hand, 
the effect on these outcomes is small, neutral, or even negative, the 
opposite inference could be made. The danger, of course, is to infer 
too much from a primarily quantitative patent analysis. 
Confusion over the value of patents and what kind of innovation 
is most effectively incentivized by patents and regulatory preferences 
raise several questions for research policy in the public sector. First, it 
raises definitional and technical questions about how governments 
conceptualize, monitor, and measure public investment in R&D. The 
patenting system provides one of very few extensive, well organized, 
and easily accessible sources of data about the production of 
inventions by firms and individuals. Accordingly, on the assumption 
that invention is at least one of the most significant inputs into 
innovation, governments in developed nations rely heavily upon 
patent data as one of the main general indicators of innovation 
activity at firm, industry, and country levels. Second, it raises 
fundamental policy questions as to whether strengthening the patent 
regime will yield more positive outcomes in terms of the commercial 
exploitation of new knowledge, especially where this knowledge is 
produced with public funding
264
 and is intended to have substantial 
public value.
265
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The qualitative innovation index reported here may fill some of 
the gaps in patent valuation discussed above. First, the innovation 
index provides a qualitative measure of patent quality that is specific 
to the products being assessed. That is, the index is based on 
regulatory preferences for various types of new and follow-on drugs. 
As noted elsewhere, these regulatory preferences accord with the 
legal values and mechanisms underpinning public health policy.
266
 
The result is not only a graded index, but also an index that reflects 
the social value of the products being valued. This differs not only 
from counting patents, patent cites, and related litigation data, but 
may also help to avoid incurring the costs of unnecessary litigation.
267
 
As policy-makers no longer need to wait for licensing or litigation to 
occur, decisions regarding policy and law making can be made earlier 
and more rapidly. 
Moreover, the index is sufficiently flexible to be used at several 
stages of the product lifecycle and for multiple purposes within a 
given stage of drug development. For example, the innovation index 
may be used to assess the quality of approval, patents, and chemicals 
during the approval stage, when regulators are making important 
decisions as to expedited review. For products that receive early 
approval compared to other products, it allows continual assessment 
of products through the post-market surveillance stage. It is plausible 
to assume that governments might customize the index by using 
progressively greater multipliers to increase or decrease the 
innovation value of serial products that occupy the same NDS or, 
particularly, SNDS, class under conditions where no other class value 
changes but where there has been a small but significant increase in 
benefit-risk to permit approval. This would allow detailed 
discrimination of the innovative value of serial line extensions within 
a given drug cluster. Similarly, the index is sufficiently flexible to be 
customized by other nations that have regulatory approval 
frameworks using different approval nomenclature for new and 
follow-on drugs, provided that the drug classes assessed are grounded 
in a parallel evidence-based system of rational decision-making. 
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Similarly, the index may provide a flexible means for governments to 
qualify technology-based indicators outside of drug products, 
provided that regulatory requirements and prioritizations are publicly 
disclosed and rationally justified by regulators. 
Regarding market push-pull mechanisms, data from the 
innovation index may be useful for drug pricing or payer 
reimbursement systems. For example, weighting methods could be 
employed to underscore the value of different drug classes for costing 
and reimbursement depending on desired public health and economic 
endpoints. As noted in the literature,
268
 linking drug price, and thus 
reimbursement, to a metric of social value for pharmaceuticals will 
incentivize drug manufacturers to produce products with value 
beyond Me Too and line extension drugs. The index reported here 
circumvents criticism relating to the lack of empirical data in the 
pharmaceutical sector as well as criticisms to the effect that new 
chemical entities (equivalent to NDS NAS here) are too often treated 
as the most innovative drugs. On the other hand, the index could also 
be used to provide objective evidence of the need for governments to 
support pharmaceutical R&D for specific types of high risk-high 
reward drug products. For example, the innovation index analysis 
identifies which drug classes represent the lowest common 
denominator for the most innovative new drugs approved by 
regulators. These data in turn could be used to develop specific drug 
targets for layering of innovation incentives, including extended 
patent and regulatory rights. 
Finally, there has been substantial criticism and wide pendulum 
swings in relation to the value of incremental innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector that may be mitigated by the innovation index 
described in this Article. The reason for making this statement is that 
the innovation index rewards brand pharmaceutical companies 
equally for both new and follow-on drugs. It rewards firms in 
proportion to the degree of innovation expressed through the relevant 
LOI value. Thus, follow-on drugs cannot be simply dismissed based 
on their incremental nature alone. 
Provided that brand firms innovate, and the LOI evidence 
presented in relation to the MP Patent Cohort and MP Chemical 
Cohort indicates that they do, in the follow-on category, there should 
be a proportional reward. This reward applies both to drug approvals 
and patents associated with these drugs. The data reported here 
suggest that if there is one area of particular concern to policy-makers 
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and drug makers it is the NDS FIC designation. The reason for this 
conclusion is that low levels of NDS FIC drugs pulled down the value 
for the most innovative drugs (NDS MI) in all four indicators studied. 
Thus, the NDS FIC group may be an excellent target for the 
development of customized innovation incentives of the type referred 
to above. 
2. Listing of Patents on the Patent Register 
The two competing policy goals underpinning pharmaceutical 
linkage are to stimulate the development of new and innovative drugs 
while also facilitating the timely entry of generic drugs.
269
 One of the 
greatest nodes of resistance to the latter policy goal is the practice of 
brand firms to list multiple patents on the patent register in order to 
delay generic entry. In this light, it is possible that the innovation 
index reported here could be used as a tool by governments to list 
patents on the patent register according to their LOI value. 
A time and intellectual property-sensitive definition for listing of 
patents under linkage law is consistent with policy debates preceding 
the coming into force of Hatch-Waxman in the United States
270
 and 
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations in 
Canada.
271
 While acknowledging that multiple patents could be listed 
on the patent register in the context of Hatch-Waxman, the legislative 
Committee on Energy and Commerce noted that the ability of brand 
firms to delay generic entry should be narrow both in scope and time; 
the proper time for generic entry being “the expiration date of the 
valid patent covering the original product” and that “there should be 
no other direct or indirect method of extending patent term.”272 A 
report by the sister Committee on the Judiciary similarly 
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Id. 
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acknowledged that FDA rules restricting generic entry prior to Hatch-
Waxman “had serious anti-competitive effects” and that the “net 
result of these rules has been the practical extension of the monopoly 
position of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent.”273 
The report went further stating that it “accepted the rationale . . . 
concerning the need to avoid multiple patent term extensions” to the 
effect that “the only patented product which experiences any 
substantial regulatory delay is the first product patent (or if there is no 
product patent, the first process patent).”274 As a result, any 
“subsequent patents on approved drug products are frequently not the 
same magnitude of innovation as occurs with respect to the initial 
patent” and that “on public policy and health policy grounds that only 
the first patent on a drug-type product should be extended.”275 An 
analogous approach was taken by the federal government in Canada 
before the NOC Regulations came in; a new and innovative drug was 
said to have “[one] main patent” and “w[h]en that main patent 
expires, anyone may copy that product and bring it to market.”276 
Thus, there is substantial evidence in both the United States and 
Canada that the nexus between drug approval and patents should be 
narrow, both in scope and time. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that a certain degree of 
expediency with regard to generic entry was articulated by North 
American policy makers in the context of linkage, and that this 
expediency was limited both in time and scope regarding patents that 
were amenable to listing on the patent register in order to delay 
generic entry. However, up to this point, there have been few means 
at the disposal of drug regulators to gauge which patents should be 
listed on the register.
277
 Regulators, in the absence of knowledge 
relating to patent validity, have settled on such broad definitions for 
listing such as whether the patent listed was in relation to an NDS or 
SNDS category, or whether listing was deemed relevant to a general 
drug form or a form that is specific to the submission for which it was 
listed as determined by the courts.
278
 Deliberations of this nature by 
drug regulators globally have come under fire.
279
 Indeed, there is 
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ample public policy in Canada,
280
 the United States,
281
 the European 
Union,
282
 and India
283
 to the effect that assessing patents is beyond the 
purview of drug regulatory agencies. There is also Supreme Court 
jurisprudence to this effect in Canada
284
 and India,
285
 although, 
interestingly, these courts reached opposite conclusions on the same 
point of law.
286
 Importantly, the issue of how weak patents can delay 
generic entry is not limited to nations with pharmaceutical linkage. 
The lack of expertise by regulators to assess patent value was used 
explicitly by European policy-makers to reject union-wide 
pharmaceutical linkage laws.
287
 
The innovation index described in this paper potentially provides 
regulators with a tool to decide which patents should be placed on the 
register that is rational, evidence-based, and sufficiently flexible to 
identify the qualitative value of approval, patents, and listed patents at 
various stages of regulatory approval. It is flexible enough such that 
governments that oversee linkage regimes in different global 
jurisdictions can modify the index according to their own policy 
debates or to provide the means of doing so to an independent 
regulatory authority, much like that already done for drug pricing 
                                                                                                                            
LPA 443/2009, ¶ 14, 28 (Delhi H.C. Feb. 9, 2010) (India), available at 
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recent empirically based criticism of patent listing, see, for example, Bouchard 2010, supra note 
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Working Paper No. 379, 2011). 
 280. AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 568-
72 (Can.); Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2003] 3 F.C. 140, 149-51 
(Can.); Wyeth Canada v. Ratiopharm Inc., [2007] 60 C.P.R. (4th) 375, para. 22 (Can.). 
 281. Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 33, at 8 n.13. 
 282. EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 130-31. 
 283. See Bayer Corp., No. LPA 443/2009 at 17. 
 284. AstraZeneca, 2 S.C.R. 560 at para. 12. 
 285. Bayer Corp., No. LPA 443/2009 at 17. 
 286. Bouchard 2011, supra note 32, at 422-24. 
 287. This issue was discussed more fully in the context of a comparative analysis of global 
pharmaceutical law and policy. See id. at 440-42. See also EC Final Report, supra note 72, at 
315 n.514: 
Article 81 of Regulation (EC) 726/2004 and Article 126 of Directive (EC) 
2001/83 provide that an authorisation to market a medicinal product shall not be 
refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set out in the Regulation 
and the Directive. Considering that patent status is not included in the grounds set 
out in the Regulation and the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument to 
refuse, suspend or revoke a marketing authorisation. The Commission may 
launch infringement proceedings against any Member State which infringes the 
Directive. 
Id. 
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alone
288
 and in combination with comparative effectiveness 
considerations,
289
 and high risk-high reward drug development.
290
 
In providing a qualitative index that grades, so to speak, the 
value of the various components making up a pharmaceutical product 
cluster, it is recognized that the patent system may not be a “one size 
fits all” system. This is because some of the drugs and patents in a 
product cluster (assuming all patents are equally easy to obtain) will 
be of low value while others will be of high value. A grading system 
of this nature may be particularly useful under circumstances where 
there are a great many patents in the product cluster and it is not clear 
which patents have the most relevance to a drug product that has 
already been determined to be “new and “innovative.” In counting 
studies, one must wait for sufficient licensing, prior art, and litigation 
data to be gathered. During this gap, patentees maintain monopolies 
on potentially poorly innovative products,
291
 and it is reasonable that 
firms will pass on the costs of both to consumers sooner or later. The 
costs of a system of this nature would be proportional to the degree 
that it allows weak or poorly innovative patents to maintain market 
exclusivity on earlier breakthrough drugs. 
Therefore, a major attribute of the innovation index described in 
this Article is that it potentially allows assessment of a patent’s value 
before licensing or litigation and, indeed, independent of both. The 
practical utility of such an index would increase in proportion to the 
prevalence of product clusters and patent portfolios, and where only a 
small percentage of issued patents actually have commercial value.
292
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Parchomovsky & Polk Wagner, supra note 7. For a discussion of patent value in the context of 
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The qualitative value of the index may also be enhanced where, as 
appears to be true in the pharmaceutical sector,
293
 the average value of 
patents is low compared to other industries.
294
 Indeed, we have 
previously shown that high value drugs typically have between 40 and 
50 patents per drug.
295
 A significant number of these patents are listed 
on the patent register to delay generic entry, the number of which 
generally increases with drug profitability.
296
 From the perspective of 
both drug regulators and competing generic firms, it is difficult to 
know which of these patents are associated with a “new and 
innovative” product other than merely being associated with a 
blockbuster drug.
297
 While profit offers some measure of patent value, 
at least with regard to the percentage of patents that are listed on the 
register,
298
 it is nevertheless a post hoc indicator and is of little help to 
regulators at the earlier stages in the product development and 
litigation processes where the need to understand which patents 
should be listed on the register arises. If, as is more or less true today, 
one arbitrarily lists all patents on the register and then waits to assess 
value of patents as a result of litigation, neither regulators, competing 
firms, nor the public have any way of knowing which of the patents 
on a given drug have value before events reach the so-called black 
swan stage.
299
 
The index described here goes at least some way to rectifying 
these problems, as regulators have the ability to calculate the 
innovation index value not only before the drug is approved, but also 
on a running basis while the drug moves through its product lifecycle. 
This observation does no violence to the integrity of the patent 
bargain, as patents were always intended to provide reward to an 
inventor in proportion to the benefit gained by society from disclosing 
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also Grootendorst et al., supra note 42, at 5-7. 
 297. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 279. 
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the invention and offering it for sale to the public. To this one can add 
the further obligation on patentees to provide to society benefits that 
are proportional not just to the value of a single patent, but in 
proportion to the rewards emanating from the entire product cluster in 
which the patents are embedded. Because leading patent law in both 
jurisdictions where linkage first came into existence explicitly accepts 
this view of the patent bargain,
300
 including in linkage cases 
specifically,
301
 an index based on the principal of reciprocity would be 
internally consistent with the first principles of patent law. 
3. Cluster-Based Drug Development 
Empirical data demonstrating that, not only are there a 
substantial number of patents that are of low worth,
302
 but that even 
when drug patents do have value, this value is much lower than 
expected,
303
 already provide a good answer to the question of why it 
is necessary to qualify intellectual property. The impetus for doing so 
in the context of pharmaceutical linkage is increased considerably. 
This follows the possible scaling effects of a portfolio-based strategy 
for drug development
304
 that provides an opportunity for weak or 
worthless patents to nevertheless restrain competition.
305
 Portfolio-
based innovation strategies can lead to consolidation of invention 
within or between groups of firms that are focused on narrowly 
defined or jointly developed products.
306
 A narrowing of innovation 
objectives of this nature would have increased social costs to the 
extent that the resulting products conflict with policy directives by 
governments to use patent and linkage law specifically to encourage 
the development of new and innovative drugs while also facilitating 
the timely entry of generic substitutes.
307
 In addition to a narrower 
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range of products, patent portfolios could also be used to achieve a 
greater share of market power, or more prolonged market exclusivity 
per cluster, than would otherwise be available.
308
 Finally, as claimed 
by Hollis, the more brand firms focus on Me Too products, the less 
they can focus on breakthrough products.
309
 
In our previous work, we hypothesized that product clusters 
enabled by linkage laws might reflect the prevailing drug 
development strategy by multinational drug firms.
310
 These clusters 
were hypothesized to comprise an expanding number of new and 
follow-on drugs over time centered on a single new and original drug. 
Products in the cluster are surrounded by a constellation of patents, all 
of which are interconnected between products within a given cluster 
through different forms of patent law. These patents serve two 
primary functions. First, they provide support for follow-on drug 
development within the cluster via traditional infringement law. 
Second, they provide fodder for listing patents on the patent register 
in order to delay generic entry via newer forms of linkage laws. 
Importantly, generic entry may be delayed not only for the original 
new and innovative drug, but also for all other follow-on drugs in the 
cluster for which the patents are deemed legally relevant. 
Of note to law-makers and other relevant stakeholders, the 
capacity of a product cluster to delay generic entry is a specific 
function of patent law operating in conjunction with linkage law and 
food and drug law. At least in our hands, the scope of the legal nexus 
between patent law and food and drug law depends on at least four 
discrete mechanisms provided for by law: the type of drug 
submission, the type of drug patent, the legal standard for patent 
listing, and how many patents are listed on the patent register.
311
 As 
such, the nexus can be broad or narrow. The lower the evidentiary 
standard for new or follow-on drug approval, the easier patents are to 
come by, the easier it is to list patents on the patent register, and the 
more patents that can be listed on the patent register, the weaker the 
legal nexus between approval and patenting and the greater the ability 
of patents to support a long-term product cluster. 
Similar observations have been made in the European Union, 
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where certain provisions in domestic patent laws and food and drug 
laws of Member States have been effectively gamed by brand firms to 
create a kind of “ghost linkage” system of drug regulation.312 Indeed, 
the European Commission (E.C.) Pharmaceutical Enquiry recently 
reported several instances where member nations have attempted to 
institute pharmaceutical linkage regimes even though European 
Union law prohibits linkage.
313
 Evidence in support of ghost linkage 
is provided by the wide-sweeping detailed empirical investigation of 
strategies and behaviors of brand and generic pharmaceutical firms 
conducted by the European Commission. The report of the 
Commission gives rise to reasonable speculation supporting the 
concept of ghost linkage, even though the Commission explicitly 
concluded that pharmaceutical linkage is contrary to the law of the 
European Union.
314
 The implications of the report for cluster-based 
drug development not only arise at the level of infringement-based 
litigation between brand and generic firms, but span a wide range of 
legal and regulatory activities relating to drug approval, patenting, 
pricing, promotion, reimbursement, and cross-border movement.
315
 
The starting point for a comparison of pharmaceutical law in 
jurisdictions with and without linkage is relevant public policy. 
Indeed, in its Final Report, the Commission notes that EU policy is 
“committed to the promotion of innovation through industrial 
property rights, including patents” and that such promotion is in 
service of “high quality patents granted in efficient and affordable 
procedures and providing all stakeholders with the required legal 
certainty.”316 In the next paragraph, the Commission goes on to say: 
At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that public budgets, 
including those dedicated to cover health expenditure, are under 
significant constraints. Competition, in particular competition 
provided by generic medicines, is essential to keep public budgets 
under control and to maintain widespread access to medicines to 
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the benefit of consumers/patients.
317
  
The Commission underscored the point that generic medicines should 
reach the market without unnecessary or unjustified delay, and that to 
fully benefit from the cost savings brought about by generic products, 
its Member States would need to have in place policies that facilitate 
timely generic uptake in terms of both volume and price 
competition.
318
  
Statements such as these are fully in line with policy grounds 
said to underpin linkage in both originating North American 
jurisdictions
319
 and, indeed, much global innovation policy. As 
observed by one commentator, the Commission’s report is predicated 
on the assumption that patent protection favors competition because it 
encourages investments into new and innovative products by brand 
firms while also encouraging the marketing of generics at lower 
prices; cost savings from generics feeding back into the system, 
which in turn contributes to positive consumer welfare outcomes and 
creates incentives for further innovation.
320
 Thus, the policy grounds 
for pharmaceutical law in the European Union are very similar to 
those in jurisdictions with linkage that explicitly speak of the need to 
balance the competing goals of stimulating the development of new 
and innovative drugs and facilitating timely generic entry. 
One of the greatest concerns in jurisdictions with formal linkage 
regimes is that the combination of a weak relevance requirement for 
patent listing and the grant of weak patents combine to delay generic 
entry on patents that are potentially invalid or not infringed by generic 
substitutes. An important observation in this regard is that the 
majority of brand claims as to validity or infringement in litigation 
between brand and generic firms were unsustainable on review by the 
court.
321
 Data reported in the E.C.’s Preliminary Report illustrate that 
generic firms won the majority of all patent litigations reported in 
which a final judgment was delivered (62%), whereas brand firms 
were successful in considerably fewer cases (38%).
322
 When initiated 
by generic firms in litigation that can be seen to be analogous to that 
which begins under linkage, generic companies won nearly three 
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quarters of all patent cases (71%).
323
 By comparison, brand firms 
were successful in slightly over half of the cases they initiated 
(51%).
324
 Not dissimilar to early qualitative and quantitative data on 
linkage in the United States
325
 and Canada,
326
 cumulative E.U. data 
indicated that generic companies won in excess of 60% of all patent 
litigation. As noted by the Commission, this outcome was achieved at 
the expense of repetitive, lengthy, and costly litigation before 
different national jurisdictions, with the result of increased costs to 
consumers and increased financial and legal uncertainty for generic 
firms.
327
 
Of specific relevance to the product cluster theory of drug 
development, generic companies won nearly 75% of all cases 
concerning secondary patents on follow-on drugs.
328
 By contrast, 
brand firms were successful in slightly greater than one quarter of 
litigations over such patents.
329
 As noted by the Commission, this 
litigation led to a substantial delay of generic entry and increased 
costs to the system.
330
 The Commission also found clear evidence 
relating to portfolio-based innovation despite the lack of linkage 
laws.
331
 As stated by the Commission: “[o]ne common strategy is the 
creation of patent clusters by the filing of numerous additional patents 
for the same medicine.”332  
The report continued, “[t]he strategy today is to try and provide a 
solid protection for the substance (has a limited time though) and a 
portfolio protecting different aspects of product providing extended 
protection both in breadth and time but inevitable less solid and 
robust.”333 Before the end of the 1980s, pharmaceutical products were 
comprised mainly of NCE/NAS drugs “which were protected by one 
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entry of generic medicines). 
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patent.” However, by the early 1990s the intellectual property 
protection scheme had changed to encompass “[e]xpansion of the 
portfolio to cover lifecycle initiatives, to extend protection time for 
product and the breadth of the protection trying to keep competition 
further away.”334 
Using a strategy familiar to those in jurisdictions with linkage 
laws, brand firms in the European Union were reported to frequently 
attempt to transition patients using brand products facing imminent 
loss of exclusivity to follow-on products from the same company. The 
Commission found that brand firms launched such follow-on drugs in 
relation to 40% of the medicines in the sample selected for 
investigation, which had lost exclusivity between 2000 and 2007.
335
 
The launch of follow-on drugs is accompanied by intensive marketing 
efforts designed to convert patients to follow-on drugs before generic 
entry,
336
 with the result that generic entry and generic market share 
once entry is accomplished is delayed and reduced.
337
 
The Commission further noted that brand firms file an onerous 
number of patent applications in order to create “patent clusters” 
around one product, and that the result of this strategy is an increase 
in the number of weak patents.
338
 An increase in weak patents is 
supported by the finding that, in patent litigation between brand and 
generic firms, the majority of litigated patents were revoked.
339
 Not 
surprisingly, the picture is bleaker when follow-on patents are 
assessed where generic firms won nearly three quarters (74%) of all 
cases concerning secondary patents in which a final judgment was 
levied. By contrast, brand firms won only one quarter of cases over 
follow-on patents (26%).
340
 The Commission found that generic firms 
won the vast majority of litigation over second medical use patents 
(83%), and had equal success challenging first medical use patents, 
with final judgments favoring generics in “the overwhelming majority 
of litigations (88% of all cases) compared to only 12% in favor of the 
originator party.”341 
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The product cluster approach is also the focal point of the 
Commission’s assessment of the “toolkit” of drug strategies employed 
by brand firms in order to delay generic entry using loopholes in 
relevant drug law. The Commission found that brand firms “use a 
variety of strategies and instruments to maintain revenue streams 
from their medicines, in particular blockbusters, for as long as 
possible.”342 These practices can “delay generic entry and lead to 
healthcare systems and consumers paying more than they would 
otherwise have done for medicines.”343 The strategies identified by 
the Commission include: (1) strategic patenting, (2) patent disputes 
and litigation, (3) patent settlements, (4) interventions before national 
regulatory authorities, and (5) lifecycle strategies for follow-on 
products.
344
 
While it was noted that the intended effects of patent clusters to 
delay generic entry is “generally in line with the underlying objectives 
of patent systems,” the strategy nevertheless appears to be aimed 
exclusively at “excluding competition and not at safeguarding a 
viable commercial development of own innovation covered by the 
clusters.”345 The Commission elaborated in its report, stating that the 
“denser the web created by patent clusters . . . the more difficult it 
will be for a generic company to bring its generic version of the 
original pharmaceutical to the market.”346 The strategy for the 
extension of exclusivity in the context of patent clusters was seen to 
be: 
[E]ven though the main patent protecting the product, e.g. the basic 
substance patent, may have expired, the generic version may still 
infringe one of the multiple patents surrounding the original 
pharmaceutical. This can occur either because patents cover all 
economically interesting or viable salt forms, enantiomers or 
formulations of the compound or all efficient ways of its 
manufacturing.
347
 
Given that linkage allows brand pharmaceutical firms to do 
formally (and up front) what they must expend greater time and 
resources to do informally (around the back end) in jurisdictions 
without linkage, it may be surmised that the pharmaceutical linkage 
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regime presents the “path of least resistance” to cluster-based drug 
development. This helps to understand why similar patent and drug 
development strategies are being leveraged in jurisdictions with and 
without linkage regimes. Nations cannot simply opt out of effective 
linkage without going out of their way to ensure systems of ghost 
linkage are not permitted. 
From the discussion above it is plausible to conclude that patent 
portfolio and product clustering comprise a dominant feature of 
global pharmaceutical intellectual property law. Practices such as 
these occur in nations with and without pharmaceutical linkage, 
though it appears safe to say that nations with linkage offer the most 
efficient economic path to cluster-based drug development. Using an 
objective evidence-based mechanism such as the innovation index 
described here to list patents on register only if they have an LOI 
value deemed sufficient by federal regulators would provide a tool to 
mitigate the negative effects of patent portfolios.
348
 Importantly, the 
index tool is amenable to use at the level of the individual patent. This 
would require minimal amendment to the section of the linkage 
regulations dealing with patent listing. 
It can be reasonably argued that firms will continue to engage in 
the practice of defensive patenting and building patent portfolios. 
However, the ability of the numerous layers of patents, drugs, and 
listed patents to combine such that the whole is greater than the sum 
of its parts can be restrained by limiting the listing of patents in 
accordance to the qualitative framework set out in the innovation 
index. In this way, only patents that are in relation to new and 
innovative drugs and that would not improperly delay generic entry 
would find their way onto the patent register. 
4. Impact on Competition 
The possibility of restrained competition in a system where drug 
development, approval, and marketing are regulated by the trifecta of 
patent law, linkage law, and food and drug law is potentially endless. 
Here, three candidates have been identified by us and others that may 
be working in an interactive manner to restrain competition. 
Analogous to cluster-based drug development and patent portfolios, it 
is possible that the three candidates interact together to yield a result 
where the anti-competitive effects may be greater than the sum of the 
three candidates in and of themselves. 
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First, brand firms might be colluding with one another,
349
 
leveraging a harmonized portfolio strategy to minimize both the 
economic and legal risks and uncertainties involved in breakthrough 
drug development.
350
 If this is so, we might expect to see a smaller 
number of NAS drugs over time and a smaller fraction of NDS Me 
Too and NDS FIC drugs while also seeing comparatively more SNDS 
Me Too and FIC drugs. Indeed, the available evidence from our own 
research appears to be consistent with this conclusion.
351
 Secondly, 
competition between brand and generic firms may be restrained as a 
result of listing multiple weak patents on the patent register in relation 
to a single or multiple products in the cluster. In this case we might 
expect to see abuses of the automatic stay and patent listing 
provisions specifically undertaken to delay generic entry, consistent 
with a large body of empirical evidence on point.
352
 The third 
possibility is that brand and generic firms may be colluding with one 
another, in which case we would expect to see abuses of the 180-day 
exclusivity period for generics. This too seems to be supported by 
wide evidence demonstrating settlement agreements to keep generics 
off market to the detriment of the public.
353
 
It could be argued that the locus for each of these nodes of 
restrained competition is the multiple patent-listing model 
encompassed by linkage laws. It is here that the three potential 
implications of the innovation index for patent and innovation policy, 
cluster-based drug development, and competition in the 
pharmaceutical marketplace converge. The index provides a means to 
qualify whether patents should be listed on the patent register, and 
thus influence legal and other commercial interactions between brand 
firms and between brand and generic firms. This conclusion is based 
specifically on a reading of the law and policy of pharmaceutical 
linkage that accords with the first principles of both statutory 
interpretation and leading patent jurisprudence.
354
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Up to this point, listing of patents on the register has been based 
on relevance ascribed by the courts to be either generally relevant to a 
drug product
355
 or relevant to the specific submission.
356
 Even the 
latter interpretation has not prevented a significant number of patents 
being listed on the register to prevent generic entry.
357
 The issue of 
listing is an important one for nations with linkage regulations owing 
to the fact that as high as 50-75% of all listed and litigated patents are 
invalid.
358
 As noted by Hemphill and Lemley,
359
 that the number of 
patents deemed by courts to be invalid has dropped in the last few 
years is not cause for confidence in the linkage system, as the number 
of settlements between brand and generic firms has increased 
reciprocally. Invalid patents are known to drive up the costs of rivals 
and increase legal uncertainty. As such, they are deemed to be anti-
competitive and contrary to the public interest.
360
 Therefore, any 
mechanism which reduces the listing of potentially invalid patents on 
the patent register before litigation occurs, and enhances competition 
between pharmaceutical firms would be a social benefit. 
The index provides regulators with an objective evidence-based 
method to allow or disallow listing on the register in accordance with 
the original policy goal of protecting only drugs that are new and 
innovative and that patents listed on the register should be narrowly 
circumscribed both in scope and time.
361
 Rather than simply using 
specific new or follow-on drug status to trigger listing, the innovation 
index allows a more discrete and rational basis for which to select 
patents on the register. Listing can be triggered by a certain level of 
innovation, independent of whether patents are associated with, or 
primarily associated with, new or follow-on drugs. Moreover, as 
noted above, different multipliers can be used for serial innovation 
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increments within a given drug category or class, thus providing 
regulators with a more detailed, but still evidence-based, criteria for 
patent listing.
362
 
Finally, as noted above, there has been wide criticism of the role 
of regulatory agencies to take jurisdiction to select patents on the 
register based on the lack of expertise as to patent quality.
363
 The 
innovation index side-steps this problem to a significant degree. This 
is because it is grounded in regulatory value preferences expressed by 
public health agencies exercising their mandate to set evidentiary 
benchmarks for an “increase in benefit-risk,” “unmet medical need,” 
or “significant advance in therapeutic value” required for approval in 
the various new and follow-on drug classes.
364
 Such decisions, unlike 
those relative to patent validity, are wholly within the expertise and 
mandates of health agencies such as the FDA, Health Canada, and 
EMEA. 
VIII. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
A qualitative innovation index for pharmaceuticals is described 
that provides a measure of patent quality that is specific to 
pharmaceutical products. The index is based on regulatory 
preferences and evidentiary requirements for various types of new 
and follow-on drugs and yields a method that is not only graded 
incrementally but reflects the social value of the products being 
valued. Importantly, the innovation index rewards innovation both in 
the new drug approval stream and for follow-on approvals. The index 
rewards equally in proportion to the degree of innovation evidenced 
by the resulting products. Given that policy-makers no longer need to 
wait for licensing, litigation, or prior art citations to occur, the 
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innovation index reported here may allow for regulatory decisions to 
be made earlier and more rapidly. The index is sufficiently flexible to 
be used at several stages of the product lifecycle, including during the 
regulatory approval stage, post-market surveillance stage, and in the 
context of deciding which patents should be properly listed on the 
patent register in order to delay generic market entry. The index may 
also provide regulators to make judgments about which types of 
patents should be listed on the patent register under linkage laws in an 
objective and evidence-based manner. Finally, the attribute of 
flexibility may also lend itself to customization of the index by 
jurisdictions with analogous food and drug law. Importantly, 
customization is not limited to qualification of technology in the 
pharmaceutical sector, but may be used to qualify any technology-
based indicator, provided that regulatory requirements have been 
stipulated and prioritized by federal or state regulators ahead of time. 
The innovation index provides a means of weighing legitimate 
patent protection against perceived societal benefit. As such, it yields 
a qualitative measure of the innovative nature of drug patents that, 
when compared to counting methods, may more adequately reveal the 
outcome of development incentives for firms and regulating bodies 
insofar as these parties have conflicting interests. The results from our 
analysis indicate that it is not the most innovative or even strongly 
innovative drugs that are attracting the greatest firm patenting effort. 
Rather, when gauged against development priorities disclosed by 
regulators, it is the least innovative drugs of all classes investigated 
that display the strongest patenting efforts. The data obtained fully 
support the conclusion that cluster-based, or portfolio-based, drug 
development has become the dominant innovation strategy for both 
brand and generic firms. An important conclusion from the analysis in 
this regard is that the data suggest that the perception on the part of 
governments, industry and the public to the effect that societal benefit 
comes as a kind of “natural consequence” of patenting may need to be 
reconsidered.  
Taken together with earlier work from our group, the data 
reported here continue to challenge the assumption that strong patent 
rights are essential to motivate and increase the amount of high value 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. The data also cast doubt on 
the claim that public health goals can be well and efficiently met by 
providing strong intellectual property incentives to private industry by 
merging public health goals with industrial goals. As discussed in 
terms of the regulated Therapeutic Product Lifecycle (rTPL) that 
characterizes pharmaceutical products, blending of industrial and 
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health policy goals may be ineffective and possibly counterproductive 
in terms of public health outcomes. Indeed, avoidance of this 
convergence of health and economic policy was explicitly claimed by 
the European Union and India as grounds to reject pharmaceutical 
linkage. More generally, the data provide empirical support to an 
emerging consensus that stacking intellectual property rights may 
actually be an inhibitor of innovation, particularly to the extent it pulls 
firms away from high risk high reward drug development activities 
towards lower risk but also high reward incremental innovation. 
Data from this Article and the companion paper also provide a 
number of important observations about the workings of the current 
patent system alone and in conjunction with linkage regulations. The 
strong negative correlation between the level of innovation and the 
various classes of new and follow-on drug approvals, patents, and 
related chemical components suggests that traditional patent 
incentives, alone and in combination with linkage laws, are providing 
poor encouragement for the development of breakthrough drug 
products. Paradoxically, patent legislation working in tandem with 
linkage laws and food and drug laws, seems to be providing a superb 
incentive for the development of line extension drugs with low LOI 
values, particularly SNDS Me Too drugs. Secondly, it is unlikely, 
absent legislation to the contrary, that any new type of patent bargain 
inherent to lifecycle models of drug regulation will change this result. 
Data revealing the dominance of SNDS Me Too drugs suggest 
that brand pharmaceutical firms are competing primarily within their 
own drug development departments than with other brand firms. This 
is suggested by the two-fold increase in all four SNDS Me Too 
indicators compared to corresponding NDS Me Too indicators. The 
data suggest that the main thrust of competition appears to have 
shifted under the linkage regime away from brand-to-brand 
competition to brand-to-generic competition. Support for this 
conclusion is provided by the low level of innovation for the vast 
majority of all approvals observed in this study and smaller number of 
NDS NAS, NDS Me Too, and NDS FIC drugs compared to SNDS 
Me Too and FIC drugs. Similarly, between 70-82% of all brand 
approval and patenting activity in the Total Approval, MP Approval, 
and MP Patent Cohorts was in relation to line extension drugs. As 
noted above, the economic incentives for follow-on drugs generally 
parallel, and are likely secondary to, the regulatory preference for 
follow-on drugs. Evidence to support this conclusion is found in the 
observation that 19 of the 25 most profitable drugs in recent years 
were follow-on Me Too and follow-on FIC drugs, totaling an 
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astounding $85,470,000 USD in sales in a single year.
365
 
A related finding arises from the fact that the LOI index is based 
on regulatory preferences that reflect comparatively higher LOI 
values in drug classes that have the greatest benefit to society. Thus, 
not only do the vast majority of drug approvals, patents, and chemical 
components have a low qualitative LOI value, they also have a 
comparatively low social value. This is a problem in and of itself with 
regard to the output of the rational policy system as discussed above, 
but is worsened knowing that these patents can be used 
indiscriminately to extend the cumulative patent life on blockbuster 
drugs. This offends both sides of the balance of pharmaceutical policy 
in jurisdictions with pharmaceutical linkage. At one end of the legal 
disequilibrium there is increased cumulative patent life on one or 
more blockbuster drugs with a corresponding decrease in the “timely” 
entry of generic substitutes. At the other end, there is a strong and 
demonstrable decline in the production of truly “new and innovative” 
drugs in favor of poorly innovative drugs, in particular follow-on Me 
Too drugs. Combined these output of the system yield a greater legal 
disequilibrium than with either output alone. 
An outcome favoring brand pharmaceutical firms from the 
innovation index analysis is that law-makers could allocate a greater 
share of intellectual property and regulatory rights incentives for drug 
classes underpinning NDS MI drug development. This would include 
NDS FIC, NDS NAS, and NDS ER drugs. Given it is the lowest 
common denominator in calculation of NDS MI values across 
indicators, additional rights could be granted for drugs developed in 
the NDS FIC class. For example, data and market exclusivity periods 
could be customized in order to provide proportional incentives for 
new and follow-on drug development, especially in the classes 
comprising NDS MI drugs or where unmet medical need is greatest 
e.g., for pathways to Expedited Review in the new drug category 
(Priority Review and NOC/c). 
Finally, the innovation index reported here is consistent with the 
first principles of patent law articulated in the United States and 
Canada, where linkage first came into force. The Supreme Courts in 
both nations have consistently articulated the primacy of the patent 
bargain when analyzing patent cases, and have maintained over 150 
years of jurisprudence that an inventor can take no more of a 
monopoly than is equivalent to what he or she discloses.
366
 The 
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bargain between patentee and public is in the interest of both sides 
only where the patentee receives a monopoly reward that is 
proportional to what it discloses to the public; a patentee who 
evergreens an invention via successive patents on uninventive 
additions prolongs its monopoly beyond what the public has agreed to 
pay.
367
 Importantly, analogous pronouncements have been made in 
the specific context of pharmaceutical linkage.
368
 The innovation 
index is consistent with this jurisprudence as it not only rewards both 
new and follow-on innovations, but does so in proportion to the 
degree of social value associated with innovation. 
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